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This dissertation consists of four separate research papers which are centered around two themes
- social learning and reputation building.
In the first paper “Experts, Quacks and Fortune-Tellers: Dynamic Cheap Talk with Career
Concerns”, Egor Starkov and I study markets for forecasters who’s well-being is primarily
determined by their public reputation. The development of social media, public blogs, and YouTube
channels has dramatically increased the amount of viewpoints available to the public about any
major topic or event. This is however not necessarily beneficial. The prospect of media attention,
fame and associated benefits potentially attracts lots of quacks who broadcast their thoughts and
opinions on who will win elections, what stock to buy and whether a next economic crisis will
hit the economy in the upcoming year even if they have no insight into the topic. Their presence
thus makes the public suspicious about the conveyed information: did it come from an expert’s
well-founded analysis of a situation, or is it just a quack’s random guess? This harms both sides of
the market. On the one hand, it means that the public cannot distinguish justified forecasts from
quacks’ random utterances. On the other hand, it makes it difficult for real experts to signal their
competence and gain the deserved reputation.
In our model, a forecaster who is privately aware of his competence, makes a choice of whether
and when to make a prediction about the outcome of some future event (i.e. elections outcome,
BTC/USD exchange rate or oil price). A competent expert may obtain some private knowledge
about the outcome before it is revealed, while a quack never does. The forecaster only cares about
belief about his competence: he collects per-period reputational benefits as before the outcome is
revealed as after it.
We show that even in the absence of any explicit intertemporal trade-offs (such as higher
precision of later information or preemption incentives in competitive settings), beliefs evolve in
such a way that later predictions are less informative than earlier ones. This is because early reports
are only ever made in equilibrium if some competent experts reveal their private information early
on. To incentivize them to do so, the value of information should be maximal at that time – i.e.,
it should be weakly decreasing over time. We show that the value of information is directly related
to the informativeness of the report, which gives the result. The second result of the paper is that
any report hurts the forecaster’s reputation in the short run, meaning that all possible benefits
from making a prediction are concentrated in the ex post reputation premium for having guessed
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the state correctly.
A more surprising conclusion is that predictions, although considered informative, are received
with solid skepticism in the sense that the forecaster’s reputation drops once he makes a prediction.
Silent forecasters see their reputation gradually improving. Those, on the other hand, who choose
to make a prediction and take a hit to their reputation, are gambling for the grand prize which
is the reputation bonus for anyone who guesses the outcome correctly. The incentives to gamble
on reputation are present even for quacks, which may appear suspicious given that they would
otherwise see their reputation improving even when they stay silent. This is explained by our
finding that informative equilibria exist only if gains from reputation are “sufficiently convex” in
belief about forecaster’s competence. Otherwise only trivial “babbling” equilibria exist, where
predictions, if they take place, convey absolutely no information about either the outcome of the
event or the competence of the forecaster.
The second research paper can be attributed to both subtopics of the dissertation. Online
product reviews, through which consumers communicate their experiences constitute an important
channel for learning the quality of a good or a service. This paper explores the mechanism through
which sellers can undermine this channel, which is censorship. In many circumstances, producers
can remove unfavorable reviews of their own product and leave only positive ones, thus hindering
the transmission of information to consumers.
A straightforward conjecture would be that no meaningful bad reviews ever remain, and those
that do convey absolutely no information. This is because the seller would delete any review
that harms sales. However, in practice we observe plenty of informative bad reviews even when
censorship opportunities exist. Furthermore, previous research suggests that a small number of bad
reviews may in fact improve product reputation, leading to higher sales. Why might the seller be
willing not to censor unfavorable reviews? Furthermore, how is the informational content of such
reviews affected by censorship? This paper answer these questions.
It shows that if some consumers in the market are naive in the sense of being unaware of possible
censorship, then no bad reviews should actually be perceived as bad by a rational consumer. More
importantly, if market share of naive consumers is positive but not too large then bad reviews are
actually good. In other words, any rational consumer improves her belief about the product quality
upon observing any review that says the product is bad. This is because the additional signal
contained in the fact that a bad review has slipped through the censorship machine outweighs the
face value of a review. What truly harms sales in this situation is the absence of reviews.
9
The paper constructs a model, in which a long-lived seller offers a good of privately known
quality to a sequence of short-lived consumers. Consumption utility is suggestive about the product
quality and is relayed to future consumers through reviews, which may be deleted by the seller.
Consumers differ in their inference process given posted reviews: some are strategic – i.e. fully
aware of the seller’s censorship capabilities, – while others are naive and ignore censorship (or are
merely unaware of it).
The reason that in all equilibria any revealed bad review has to improve seller’s reputation is
two-fold. The main idea is that it only makes sense for the seller to reveal a bad review if it does
not have any detrimental effect on future sales. The primary channel that drives the effect can
then be formulated as follows: if a bad review was published and it harms sales to naive consumers,
then it should increase sales to rational consumers, as otherwise it would not have been allowed. In
particular, this increase in sales is attained by improving firm’s reputation in the eyes of rational
consumers.
The secondary channel is more involved. When the seller gets close to losing naive consumers,
the primary channel above creates suspense among rational consumers, who await the seller’s next
move. If he reveals a bad review, he receives a significant reputation premium, but the flip side is
that rational consumers also lose faith quickly if no reviews are revealed. Revealing bad reviews
earlier in the game thus creates more suspense – since it brings naive consumers closer to leaving
the market, – and leads to faster alienation of rational consumers. Therefore, in order for the seller
to have any incentive to reveal bad reviews, he should be compensated with a reputation premium
for doing so. Notably, this premium is awarded even though he does not lose any naive consumers
immediately.
The argument above explains why any bad review should improve seller’s reputation but not
how it is achieved, and neither it says whether any bad reviews are actually revealed in equilibrium.
While deleting all reviews is always an equilibrium, we show that there exist other equilibria, in
which bad reviews are revealed in a payoff-relevant way – i.e. it is profitable for the seller to reveal
them. Moreover, it is more beneficial to do so for the seller with a high-quality product than with
a low-quality product, which is exactly the mechanism that generates the result.
The third research paper explores how people transmit information when writing reviews. It
first shows that, potentially surprisingly, transmitting own experience truthfully to subsequent
consumers is neither an optimal “social norm” (i.e., it does not maximize aggregate social welfare),
nor it is an equilibrium if consumers explicitly care about the welfare of other consumers when
10
writing a review.
Egor Starkov and I consider a model in which every consumer purchases the durable good
only if it is individually rational to do so and afterwards leaves a review to maximize the welfare
of subsequent consumers. Social welfare is maximized by some degree of myopically suboptimal
purchasing decisions, i.e., the option value of discovering a good product makes it socially optimal
to induce a purchase that would not be individually optimal. This creates a conflict between a
today’s consumer who is writing a review and wants to induce further experimentation with a
product, and tomorrow’s consumer who reads this review and tries to understand whether buying
the product is individually – rather than socially – rational.
This conflict adds noise to communication through reviews. Instead of reporting their
experiences truthfully, consumers obfuscate their reviews to foster experimentation, which creates
information losses. Despite the conflict arising only in a special set of circumstances – when the
product is believed to be good enough to experiment with socially, but not good enough to buy for
an individual, – we show that the effects of this conflict propagate and distort communication in
other cases as well. In particular, we show that communication takes the interval structure known
in the cheap talk literature, when senders with similar private beliefs pool on the same message.
Finally, the fourth research paper studies the question of strategic experimentation under
the assumption that intensity of experimentation can not be changed immediately, but instead
features some rigidity. Classical models of experimentation such as Bolton and Harris [1999] and
Keller, Rady, and Cripps [2005] assume that intensity of experimentation in a given moment in
time does not depend on the intensity of experimentation in previous moments. In contrast we
provide a model where intensities are correlated between time periods. We fully solve for optimal
experimentation strategy for a single experimenter problem, N -experimenters cooperative problem





Timing of Predictions in Dynamic Cheap Talk: Experts vs.
Quacks1
joint with Egor Starkov
Introduction
Where there is uncertainty, there are analysts – be it stock prices, macroeconomic trends,
elections, or sports matches. Any major event summons numerous predictions of its outcome from
people who claim to be experts in the field. However, not all of these predictions are necessarily
backed by knowledge or understanding of the situation. This raises challenges for both sides of the
predictions market. The expert forecasters must find a way to signal their competence through
their predictions. The public, on the other hand, must find a way to identify informative predictions
by the experts among the quacks’ uninformative opinions.
This paper focuses on the timing of the forecaster’s prediction as a signaling device. We explore
the questions of how the choice of timing of the forecaster’s prediction can signal their competence
and how the amount of information about the state of the world contained in the predictions changes
over time. To motivate the question, consider the case of 2016 US President Elections. Figure 1
demonstrates the ratings of presidential candidates Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton in a span
of 9 month before the elections. Consider three different claims that Donald Trump will win, made
in February 2016 (before Republican Party presidential primaries), May 2016, and September 2016
respectively.2 Which of these predictions appears more credible ex post? Which of these predictions
appeared more credible at the time? Would the authors of the early predictions have benefited
from delaying it and, if yes, why did they not? Would the authors of the later predictions have
made their predictions earlier if they had the information? These are the questions we attempt to
answer in this paper.
We present a model of dynamic cheap talk with career concerns. In our model a forecaster, who
is privately aware of his competence, makes a choice of whether and when to make a prediction
about the outcome of some future exogenous event (state of the world). A competent forecaster (an
1This paper should be cited as A. Smirnov, E. Starkov. Timing of Predictions in Dynamic Cheap Talk: Experts







expert) may have some private knowledge about the outcome, while an incompetent forecaster (a
quack) never does. There is no direct conflict between the forecaster and the observer (the public)
in our model: the forecaster only cares about his reputation, while the observer only cares about
the information concerning the outcome. The conflict comes from within the forecasters market,
with the quacks trying to blend in with the experts in pursuit of reputation (and benefits that high







Mar 1 Apr 1 May 1 Jun 1 Jul 1 Aug 1 Sep 1 Oct 1 Nov 1
Clinton
Trump
Figure 1: Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton polling averages before the 2016 elections.
Dotted verticals represent the dates of news articles mentioned in the text. Poll data retrieved from
https: // elections. huffingtonpost. com/ pollster/ 2016-general-election-trump-vs-clinton ,
used under CC 3.0 BY-NC-SA license.
We discover that this conflict between the quacks and the experts imposes a lot of structure
on equilibrium outcomes. Our first finding is that in equilibrium, the later predictions are less
informative than the earlier ones. Otherwise – if later predictions are more informative – they
are also rewarded with higher reputation by the public, which would make the experts want to
delay their reports. Therefore, the informativeness of predictions must deteriorate over time to
incentivize the experts to reveal their information early, and to prevent a market shutdown when
no predictions are made until the very final moment.
A more surprising finding of our paper is that all predictions in such equilibria, although
considered informative, are received with solid scepticism by the public. This is in the sense that
making any prediction drops the forecaster’s reputation relative to what he could get by staying
quiet. Thus silence is indeed golden in our model – silent forecasters see their reputation gradually
improving. Those, on the other hand, who choose to make a prediction and take a hit to their
reputation, are gambling for the grand prize that is the reputation bonus for predicting the outcome
14
correctly.
A typical path of the forecaster’s reputation arising from our model is illustrated in Figure 2. In
this example the event occurs in period 6 and the forecaster starts with reputation b0. The forecaster
makes his report in period 4, and until then his reputation gradually increases. After the report
his reputation drops until the event outcome is revealed, at which point he receives a reputation
premium if his prediction turned out correct and is penalized by low reputation otherwise.
Given everything said above, it is not obvious why a forecaster would ever prefer to make any
prediction, i.e., take a risky gamble at the cost of short-run reputation, when staying silent would
yield a risk-free high reputation. As we show, equilibria of the form above only exist if forecasters
are sufficiently risk-loving or, alternatively, if gains from reputation are sufficiently convex – i.e., if
the gamble of making a report is appealing enough to the quack. Whenever this is not the case,










Figure 2: Example forecaster’s reputation path.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II contains a review of the relevant literature. Section
II presents our results in the simplest setting. In Section II we formulate the general model. The
main results are presented in Section II. Section II contains extensions and alternative specifications.
Section II concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Relation to the Literature
The current paper mainly contributes to two strands of literature: communication with career
concerns and the timing of communication.
3Under special assumptions there also exist degenerate equilibria, in which quack never makes any predictions
for the fear of being proved wrong. See Section II for details.
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The importance of career concerns for informative communication was first argued by
Holmström [1999]. One of Holmström’s original examples illustrates that an analyst may be
reluctant to truthfully reveal his private information for fear of making a mistake and appearing
incompetent, preferring instead to herd with public information or reports of other experts.4
Other papers have argued that some cohort of analysts – or even all of them in some settings
– may, conversely, resort to extreme reports, overstating their private signals in order to separate
themselves from “herders” (see Prendergast and Stole [1996], Graham [1999], Hong, Kubik, and
Solomon [2000], Lamont [2002], Ottaviani and Sørensen [2006b], Mariano [2012]). Either way, it is
generally agreed that analysts’ career concerns make information transmission noisy.5 Dewatripont,
Jewitt, and Tirole [1999], Prat [2005], Ottaviani and Sørensen [2006c], and Rodina [2017] give
various general characterizations of communication outcomes in the presence of career concerns
and their dependence on the information structure of the game.
Of all papers mentioned above only a few look at the dynamics of announcements. In the model
of Prendergast and Stole [1996] the expert obtains his private information gradually over time, and
his competence determines the speed of learning. They establish that the experts overreact to
early pieces of information in order to establish their reputation for competency early on, while as
time progresses, they become too reluctant to change their decisions and thus underreact to late
information. Predictions of a model by Graham [1999] can be interpreted in a similar way.6 Hong,
Kubik, and Solomon [2000] and Lamont [2002] find a completely opposite pattern in the data: as
the experts become older and more established, they usually make more extreme predictions. Li
[2007] shows theoretically that when an analyst acquires multiple pieces of information over time,
changing one’s prediction can act as a signal of competence. However, timing of the prediction or
a decision is never a choice variable for the analyst in these papers. Our paper fills this gap by
examining how an analyst can manipulate his reputation by strategically choosing the timing of
his prediction.
Keskek, Tse, and Tucker [2014] provide evidence from the field that competent experts tend
to make their reports earlier – so earlier reports are more informative and are perceived more
favorably, – and explain this through preemption mechanisms. We show that competition is not
4This idea was picked up and greatly extended upon by the literature that followed: see Scharfstein and Stein
[1990], Trueman [1994], Ely and Välimäki [2003], Ottaviani and Sørensen [2006a], Dasgupta and Prat [2008].
5Zábojnik [2001], Ely and Välimäki [2003] and Klein and Mylovanov [2017] argue that if all analysts are patient
enough then this noise vanishes and communication efficiency is restored. Backus and Little [2018] show that making
analysts admit uncertainty (not knowing the answer) is also not a trivial problem in the presence of career concerns.
6Bernhardt, Wan, and Xiao [2016] observe inertia in financial analysts’ predictions, but their explanation of this
phenomenon does not rely on career concerns.
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necessary for this phenomenon to arise. Bernhardt, Campello, and Kutsoati [2006] also explore
competitive prediction markets and discover strong anti-herding dynamics in the data.
The second large (and growing) strand of literature this paper contributes to is that on dynamic
communication and, especially, the timing of communication.7 Guttman, Kremer, and Skrzypacz
[2014] provide a notable illustration on the importance of timing in communication. In the context
of dynamic disclosure, they show that the same piece of hard (verifiable) information can induce
different reactions when disclosed at different times. In other related papers, Guttman [2010],
Acharya, DeMarzo, and Kremer [2011], Aghamolla and An [2015], and Gratton, Holden, and
Kolotilin [2017] also investigate optimal timing in the context of dynamic disclosure of verifiable
information. In contrast to these papers, we deal with soft information, which cannot be credibly
disclosed. Grenadier, Malenko, and Malenko [2016] study a setting in which the informed expert
uses timing of his (non-verifiable) report to manipulate the timing of the observer’s decision. A
separate literature explores dynamic revelation of static information and finds, to some surprise,
that even if all agents possess all of their respective information in period zero, allowing for multi-
period communication may sometimes allow for higher payoffs to some or all parties.8 All of the
aforementioned communication models assume direct conflict of interest between the sender(s)
and the receiver(s). Our model of career concerns is different in this regard, since all barriers to
truthful communication stem instead from the conflict within the senders’ market, namely between
competent and incompetent forecasters.9
Finally, our paper takes the market for predictions as given rather than designing it in such a way
as to extract the most information from the analyst. A general approach to dynamic mechanism
design when experts have evolving private information has been proposed by Pavan, Segal, and
Toikka [2014]. A sub-field of mechanism design explicitly deals with optimal statistical testing of
experts’ competence (knowledge of a signal-generating process): see Olszewski [2015] for a recent
survey.10 Our paper is different from this literature in that it does not give the observer the power
to design payoffs or information feedback. Instead, it asks the question of whether market forces
alone can enable informative communication.
7For dynamic models of repeated communication, where the sender does not have the choice of timing, see Sobel
[1985], Bénabou and Laroque [1992], Morris [2001], Pavesi and Scotti [2017], Alizamir, de Véricourt, and Wang [2018].
8See Aumann and Hart [2003], Krishna and Morgan [2004], Alonso and Rantakari [2013], Chen, Goltsman, Hörner,
and Pavlov [2017], and Lipnowski and Ravid [2019].
9Curiously, effects similar to career concerns models can be obtained in communication settings with sender-
receiver conflict where the sender’s deceit can be detected with positive probability. For examples of such models see
Dziuda and Salas [2019] and Drugov and Troya-Martinez [2019].




This section presents an example that showcases our main results in the simplest setting.
Suppose there are two periods t = 1, 2 and a binary state ω ∈ {G,B}, which is initially not
known to anybody and is publicly revealed in the end of period T = 2. Assume that players do not
discount the future, and that states are ex ante equally probable, i.e. Pr(ω = G) = Pr(ω = B) = 12 .
There are two players: a forecaster and an observer. The forecaster is, with equal probabilities,
either an expert, or a quack. The forecaster privately knows his type, but the observer does not.
The expert has a chance λt to privately learn the state in period t = 1, 2. With positive probability,
the expert also remains unaware of the state, i.e., λ1+λ2 < 1. The quack never receives any private
information about the state. In any of the two periods before the state is publicly revealed, the
forecaster can send one cheap talk report m ∈ {G,B} to the observer, indicating his prediction
about state ω. The report is not verifiable, i.e., the forecaster’s private information can not be
made observable to the public. At the end of each period the forecaster receives a “reputation
payoff” equal to the probability that the observer assigns at that moment to the forecaster being
an expert.
We will look for an equilibrium in which the expert is honest: he reports according to his private
information as soon as he obtains it and never makes an unfounded prediction or reports contrary
to his information (this behavior will be optimal in equilibrium). How would the quack behave in
such equilibrium, and how should the market react to either report and to a lack thereof?
There are five actions available to the forecaster in the game: he can report that the state
is G or B at t = 1, 2 or stay silent throughout. An honest expert plays all five actions with
positive probability. It is immediate then that the quack must do the same in equilibrium – if
either action is only taken by the expert and never by the quack, then following this path gives
the forecaster the highest possible reputation from that point onwards and, therefore, the highest
possible continuation payoff. This would strictly dominate any alternative path of play available
to the quack at the respective period.
Therefore, the quack must be indifferent, in particular, between reporting that the state is G at
t = 1 and t = 2.11 Denote by bt the belief about the forecaster’s competence at the end of period t
in case no report was made in period t; by b(m, t) the belief after report m at period t was made;
and by bω(m, t) the belief after report m at period t was made, and the state turned out to be ω.
11We will use message m = G to illustrate our results, but all arguments apply equally to either message.
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Note that the honest expert is never wrong, since he only makes a report if he knows the state.
Therefore, if the forecaster made a prediction which turned out to be incorrect, he is definitely a
quack: bB(G, 1) = bB(G, 2) = 0.
We have assumed that the expert always reveals his information at t = 1 if he has it. However,
he does have an option to delay his report until the second period if he already knows the state at
t = 1. To ensure that there is no delay, the following has to hold:
b(G, 1) + bG(G, 1) > b1 + b
G(G, 2). (2)
Note that the expert’s expected utility only differs from that of the quack in the probability of
guessing the state correctly – the expert knows that his private signal is correct. The two expressions
(1) and (2) together produce our main results described below.
Early correct reports are rewarded higher ex post. Subtracting equality (1) from (2), we
immediately obtain that bG(G, 1) > bG(G, 2). Early reports must thus be rewarded with higher
reputation to incentivize the expert to reveal his information in a timely manner. Note that this
only applies to reputation after the state was revealed.
Reporting harms reputation. Combining (1) and (2), we also infer that b(G, 1) 6 b1, and by
analogy we can obtain b(B, 1) 6 b1. Therefore, any report at t = 1 must be worse than not making
a report.
Reputation of a silent expert improves. By the martingale property of beliefs, we note that
b(G, 1), b(B, 1), and b1 must average out to b0. The inequalities we just obtained then imply that
b1 > b0: if reporting harms reputation then staying silent must improve it. With slightly more
work, one can also show that b2 > b1.
12
Early reports are more precise. The previous observations almost immediately imply that
earlier reports contain more information about the state. Indeed, bG(G, 1) > bG(G, 2) and
12By the martingale property, b(G, 2), b(B, 2), and b2 must average out to b1, and we know that b(m, 2) 6 b(m, 1) 6
b1 for m = G,B. Therefore, b2 > b1.
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bB(G, 1) = bB(G, 2) = 0, therefore b(G, 1) > b(G, 2), since by the martingale property of beliefs,
bG(m, t) and bB(m, t) should average out (from the observer’s perspective) to b(m, t). Because
b1 > b0 the latter inequality means that the earlier of the two reports is relatively more likely to be
made by the expert – which immediately implies that it is more informative than the latter one.
The following sections expand on the analysis of this example in a general framework and show
that the insights demonstrated above are quite general.
The Model
Primitives
Time is discrete and finite: t ∈ {0} ∪ T where T ≡ {1, . . . , T} for some T > 0. An underlying
standard probability space is implied throughout the paper. The probability measure on this space
is denoted by P .
State of the world. There is a binary state of the world ω which can be either good or bad :
ω ∈ {G,B}. The commonly held prior belief that the state is good is P (ω = G) = p0 ∈ [12 , 1).
Initially the state is uncertain; at the end of period T the state is revealed.
Players. There are two players: an observer (she) and a forecaster (he). Both players live for
T periods and do not discount the future.
The forecaster has a binary type γ ∈ {E,Q}: he can be competent or incompetent or, as we
call them, an expert (E) or a quack (Q) respectively. The type is privately known by the forecaster,
but is not known by the observer. The observer’s initial belief that the forecaster is competent is
b0 ∈ (0, 1).
The observer has no actions in the model.13 In every period t she updates her beliefs pt about
the state of the world and bt about the forecaster’s competence. It will prove convenient to represent







At some random time t∗ ∼ F (t), which is not known to anybody, the competent forecaster
observes a signal η∗ ∈ {G,B} about the state, with precision π := P (η∗ = G|ω = G) = P (η∗ =
B|ω = B). For most of the paper we assume π = 1, but in Section II we show that all results





, given some extra conditions. We assume
that F (t) is a measure with full support on T and that F (T ) < 1, i.e., there is a positive probability
13In the discussion surrounding the model, we assume that she is interested in information about state. To fix
ideas, one may think that the observer chooses a binary action from {G,B} at time T and receives a fixed reward if
and only if her action matches the state – but we do not model this decision explicitly.
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that the signal arrives at any time t and it is possible that it never arrives. We denote the conditional
probability (hazard rate) of signal arrival in period t as λ(t) := F (t)−F (t−1)1−F (t−1) .
The forecaster receives a per-period “reputation payoff” w (βt) which depends on the observer’s
belief about the forecaster’s competence held at the end of period t. We assume w(·) to be strictly
increasing in its argument. As a normalization, we let w(0) = 0. After the state is revealed, the
forecaster receives a terminal payoff wc (βT ), representing the forecaster’s continuation value from
the reputation he has accumulated. We assume that wc (·) satisfies the same requirements that
we impose on w (·). Payoffs are interpreted as coming from some external source rather than the
observer directly. A highly regarded analyst can bargain higher wage from employers in the labor
market, while all of the interested public acts as the observer in forming analyst’s reputation.
Communication. In any period t ∈ T the forecaster can send a report m ∈ {G,B} to the
observer, indicating his prediction about state ω. The report is not verifiable, i.e., the forecaster’s
private information is not ever observable and/or contractible. Additionally, we assume that the
forecaster can send at most one report throughout the game.14
Timing
At time t = 0, the state of the world ω and the forecaster’s type γ are realized; forecaster’s
private signal realization η∗ and signal arrival time t∗ are drawn from respective distributions. After
that, in every period t ∈ {1, ..., T − 1} the stage game proceeds as follows:
1. If t = t∗ and the forecaster is competent, he observes the realization of η∗;
2. The forecaster updates his belief about the state conditional on observed η∗ (if any) and
decides whether to send a report m ∈ {G,B} to the observer;
3. The observer updates her beliefs about the state p and about the forecaster’s competence b
conditional on the forecaster’s report or lack of thereof;
4. The forecaster receives payoff w (βt);
In period T steps 1 and 2 take place as above, but instead of steps 3 and 4 the following happens:
3. State ω is publicly revealed;
4. All players update their beliefs accordingly;
14This constraint should not be seen as restrictive since the forecaster receives at most one private signal by time
T .
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5. The forecaster receives a terminal lump-sum payoff wc (βT ).
Histories and State Variables
A message history is µt = (m, s) if report m has been made in period s 6 t and µt = ∅
otherwise. A public history hpt is a tuple consisting of the variables that are publicly observable
at the beginning of period t: hpt = (t, µt−1). The forecaster possesses private information about
his type and his private signal in addition to whatever is publicly known. We define a type-γ





γ), where ηγt describes forecaster’s private information:
• ηγt = ∅ if no signal was observed in period t or before,
• ηγt = G if signal η∗ = G was observed in period t or before,
• ηγt = B if signal η∗ = B was observed in period t or before.
Variable tγ indicates the arrival time of this information, with tγ = 0 meaning no information has
yet arrived. For quacks we have that tQ = 0 and ηQ = ∅. For experts these variables can be
expanded as tE = t∗ · I (t > t∗), and ηE = η∗ if t > t∗, and ηE = ∅ otherwise. Notably, values
(ηγt , t
γ) are only nontrivial for the expert, thus the quack’s private histories are equivalent to public
histories, and hereinafter we will treat them as such. We also let −η and −m denote the “opposites”
of η and m respectively: e.g., if η = G then −η = B.
The Forecaster’s Problem
At every history the forecaster decides whether to send a report and, if yes, which report to
send. The forecaster’s pure strategy is thus a mapping from private histories hγt to the set of
feasible messages (which equals {∅, G,B} if no report has yet been made and {∅} otherwise, since
we restrict forecaster to sending at most one message throughout the game). The forecaster’s mixed
strategy is, as usual, a probability distribution over pure strategies. To simplify the analysis, the
following restriction is imposed on strategies:
Assumption 1 (Amnesia). At any pair of histories h̄Et , h̄
E
t which differ only in signal arrival
times t̄∗ < t̄∗ 6 t, the strategy of the expert must be the same.
This assumption requires that after the private signal is observed, the expert’s reporting strategy
does not depend on its arrival time t∗. One may think of this as the expert not remembering when
he received the information (but the information itself is never forgotten). This restriction bans
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strategies like ”send a report two periods after receiving a signal”. This, however, should not be
considered a loss of generality, as the timing of signal arrival is neither observable by anyone except
the expert, nor payoff-relevant for any player, so can be seen as nothing more than the expert’s
private randomization device.
Amnesia together with the fact that only histories with µt−1 = ∅ involve non-trivial choice
of message allow us to define strategies on the smaller space of tuples (t, η) rather than on all
private histories hγt = (t, µt−1, η
γ
t , t
γ). Therefore, we introduce the forecaster’s behavioral strategy
as rγη (m, t), which denotes the probability of forecaster γ making report m at time t conditional on
having private information η = ηγt and having not made any report prior to t.
15 Finally, denote
rγ(m, t) := Eηr
γ
η (m, t). It represents the hazard rate of report (m, t) as perceived by the observer
who does not possess the forecaster’s private information η (but these objects are still conditional
on the forecaster’s type).
The forecaster’s optimization problem is hence as follows: at every private history hγt such that
no report has yet been made (µt−1 = ∅), the forecaster of type γ ∈ {E,Q} chooses a continuation
reporting strategy {rγη (m, s)}s>t as a solution to the following problem:













∣∣∣∣∣ t, η, µt−1 = ∅
]
(3)
subject to evolution of β(hps) described in the following subsection. The expectation is taken over
all future histories. We also introduce a shorthand notation for the forecaster’s continuation value
from making report m in period τ at history hγt :









∣∣∣∣∣ t, η, µτ = (m, τ)
]
.
With this notation we have that report (m, t) is optimal at t if and only if V γt,η = W
γ
t,η(m, t).
Moreover, we use W γt,η(∅) to denote the respective value from not making any report until the end
of period T (i.e., conditional on µT = ∅). Finally, as the quack never receives the private signal,
we suppress subscript η when talking about V Qt,η and W
Q
t,η(m, τ), and refer to these objects as V
Q
t
and WQt (m, τ) respectively.
15This is a game of perfect recall, hence by Kuhn’s theorem behavioral and mixed strategies are equivalent.
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Beliefs
Two important characteristics of any public history hpt are public beliefs about the type of the
forecaster and about state of the world, b(hpt ) and p(h
p
t ). Recall that h
p
t = (t, µt−1). We will use
this together with the structure of our model to introduce the following labels for beliefs:
b(m, t) := b(s, (m, t)) p(m, t) := p(s, (m, t))
bt := b(t,∅) pt := p(t,∅)
for all s > t. In this notation, b(m, t) is the belief about the forecaster’s type held by the observer
at any time s > t conditional on report m made at time t, and bs is the same belief held in the
absence of any reports. The same applies for the observer’s belief about state, and we will use the
same notation for ρ and β, where applicable. This notation is well defined because once a report
has been made, both beliefs are frozen in place since no further information can be conveyed from
the forecaster to the public.
Finally, we let bω(m, t) denote the belief about the forecaster’s type given a terminal history
hpT = (T, (m, t)) and given that the state was revealed to be ω.
Equilibrium Definition
We are looking for Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the game, which consist of a strategy
profile {rγη (m, t)} and a belief profile (b(hpt ), p(hpt )) such that:
1. strategies rγη solve (21) given the observer’s updating rule for b(h
p
t ),
2. all players update their beliefs via Bayes’ rule on path.
We further adopt three following refinements (in addition to restriction to amnesiac strategies):
(OP) Off-path Pessimism: off the equilibrium path the beliefs are p = p0 and b = 0, with the
exception that extreme belief b = 1 is not updated;
(ML) Message Labeling: rEG(G, t) · rEB(B, t) > rEG(B, t) · rEB(G, t) for any t;
(SY) Symmetry: rEG(G, t) = r
E
B(B, t) and r
E
G(B, t) = r
E
B(G, t) for all t.
Off-path pessimism (OP) only makes it easier to sustain any given strategy profile as equilibrium
because it makes deviations extremely unappealing for the forecaster. In particular, if there is some
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PBE with some off-equilibrium path beliefs, then the same profile of strategies and on-path beliefs
would still constitute a PBE when paired with off-path beliefs prescribed by (OP). The exception in
(OP) comes into play only if π = 1 (i.e., expert’s information predicts the state perfectly) and only
at histories at which the report was supposedly made by an informed expert for sure, but turned
out to be incorrect. The exception says that the forecaster is then still believed to be competent.
This behavior of beliefs can be explained as the limiting case of the model as π → 1.16
Message labeling (ML) requires that report m is more indicative of state ω = m than the other
report. This assumption is without loss, since at any history hpt we can assign message labels G
and B to the two messages in such a way that (ML) is satisfied.
The only requirement that imposes any actual restrictions is symmetry (SY). It requires that
the expert treats states and messages equally – if he has evidence of state G, he sends report G
with the same probability that he would have sent report B if he had evidence of state B. This
assumption is made for tractability, so that the observer’s belief about state stays at a constant
level p = p0 as long as no report is made.
17 We have no reasons to believe that the predictions of
our model would not hold in asymmetric equilibria.
Equilibrium Analysis
This section strives to characterize the set of all Weak PBE of the game. The main question
that is answered in this section is as follows: assuming that in some equilibrium reports are only
made at some set of periods S ⊆ T , how do the forecaster’s strategies look and how does the
informativeness of the reports change across different periods? It turns out that all equilibria have
quite a lot of common structure. Proofs of all statements presented in this chapter can be found
in the Appendix.
Belief Updating
This section specifies how exactly observer’s beliefs b and p evolve given the forecasters’ strategy
profile {rγη (m, t)}.
Conditional on the forecaster not making a report, the observer’s beliefs are updated as follows:
βt = βt−1 ·
1− rE(G, t)− rE(B, t)
1− rQ(G, t)− rQ(B, t) . (4)
16Section II discusses alternatives to (OP) in case of perfect signals.
17Silence is informative about the state only if the expert conceals his private signals, and does so differently
conditional on different information. Assumption (SY) explicitly prohibits the latter part of this.
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Conditional on no report by the end of period T and realized state ω, the observer’s terminal
belief is








which in a symmetric equilibrium reduces to βω(∅) = βT .
Similarly, employing the Bayes’ rule we can derive the observer’s belief β(m, t) following
forecaster’s report (m, t), and the observer’s terminal belief βω(m, t) given forecaster’s report (m, t)
and the realized state ω:












Finally, another relevant belief is the observer’s belief about the current state, pt. As mentioned
before, symmetry implies that in the absence of the report this belief is frozen at its initial level,
pt = p0. Following report (m, t) the belief is updated as:
ρ(m, t) = ρt−1 ·
(1− bt−1) · rQ(m, t) + bt−1 · Eη
[
rEη (m, t)|ω = G
]
(1− bt−1) · rQ(m, t) + bt−1 · Eη
[
rEη (m, t)|ω = B
] = ρt−1 ·
1 + βG(m, t)
1 + βB(m, t)
. (7)
Supports of the Reporting Times
Given γ ∈ {E,Q} and m ∈ {G,B}, define support S := {t1, t2, . . . , t|S|} ⊆ T as the set of times
t at which any report is made:18
S := {t ∈ T | rγ(m, t) > 0 for some γ,m} (8)
Proposition 1. In any equilibrium, any report (m, t) for m ∈ {G,B} is made with positive
probability by a quack if and only if it is ever made by an expert: rE(m, t) > 0 if and only if
rQ(m, t) > 0.
The reasoning behind this proposition is as follows. Suppose that there exists (m, t) such that
rQ(m, t) > 0 but rE(m, t) = 0, i.e., report m at t is only ever made by a quack. Then after report
(m, t) the observer infers that the forecaster is surely incompetent. This renders report (m, t) to be
a dominated reporting strategy for the forecaster – strictly so if we recall that the belief about the
18More generally, the support S is a subset of public histories hpt for which r
γ
η (m, t) > 0 for some γ, η,m. Since a
public history in our model consists of current time t and a messaging history µt, and reports can only be made at
histories with µt = ∅, it is without loss to define the support as a set of times.
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forecaster’s type is a martingale. Therefore, there must exist another continuation strategy at time
t – i.e., at the public history hpt = (t,∅) – that results in strictly positive reputation for at least
one period. No forecaster is willing to play strictly dominated strategies, hence this cannot happen
in equilibrium. A similar logic is in play in the opposite case – if rE(m, t) > 0 and rQ(m, t) = 0
for some (m, t) – except then reporting (m, t) is a strictly dominant strategy for any type of the
forecaster since it yields the maximal possible reputation starting from t for the rest of the game.
Reporting (m, t) is then strictly preferred by the quack to any other alternative, which again gives
a contradiction.19
Informative Reports and Babbling
If report (m, t) is made in equilibrium, this does not by itself mean that it contains any
meaningful information about the state of the world or the type of the forecaster. Following
Crawford and Sobel [1982], we refer to uninformative reports as babbling.
Definition 1. We say that report (m, t) is babbling if
b(m, t) = bt−1 (9)
p(m, t) = pt−1 (10)
Report (m, t) is informative if it is not babbling.
Condition (9) implies that the report is uninformative about the forecaster’s type, while (10)
implies that it contains no information about the state.
It turns out that due to restriction that a forecaster can send at most one report, babbling
reports in any equilibrium are organized in a specific structure. This is illustrated by the next
proposition.
Proposition 2. Every equilibrium contains a Godwin point t̄ := min{t ∈ T | V Et,∅ = V Qt } such
that:
1. All on-path reports (m, t) with t > t̄ are babbling.
2. No on-path reports (m, t) with t 6 t̄ are babbling. Moreover:
19One may easily show using the same kind of argument that rE(G, t) + rE(B, t) < 1 if and only if
rQ(G, t) + rQ(B, t) < 1. I.e., a quack stays silent up until time t with positive probability if and only if so does
expert. See the proof of Proposition 1 for details.
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• at every t < t̄ the expert does not make a report unless he has received the corresponding
signal, i.e., rE∅(m, t) = 0 and r
E
η (m, t) = 0 whenever η 6= m;
• at t = t̄ the informed expert always reports his signal, i.e., rEη (η, t̄) = 1.
“Godwin’s law” states that as a discussion on the Internet continues for long enough, the
probability of a comparison involving Nazis or Hitler approaches 1.20 At that point the informative
part of the discussion is usually considered finished, and what follows is just babbling. Along similar
lines, Proposition 2 says that in our model all equilibria feature at most two phases: early reports
are informative, while the late ones do not contain any relevant information about the state or the
type of the forecaster.
To understand Proposition 2 it is enough to note that by Proposition 1, t ∈ S only if an expert
is willing to report at t. His comparative advantage relative to quack is his ability to acquire
private signals. Therefore, the expert is only willing to participate in babbling if he has no option
to exploit his [current or possibly future] information by sending an informative report – i.e., if the
Godwin point t̄ has passed and the discourse has descended into babbling. Conversely, whenever
an option to make an informative report now or in the future is present (i.e., t < t̄), the expert is
not willing to report contrary to his private information or make an unfounded report. The only
kind of information distortion that he is willing to partake in is delaying information revelation –
but even in this case delaying beyond the Godwin point t̄ cannot be worth it.
It is worth noting that t̄ does not have to be in the interior of the support, so one of the phases
may be absent. In particular, if t̄ < t1 then all reports are babbling, while if t̄ = t|S| then no
babbling takes place in equilibrium. We shall refer to the latter type of equilibria as informative.
Definition 2. An informative equilibrium is an equilibrium where all reports in the support are
informative.
Note that in any informative equilibrium with support S, it must be that t̄ = t|S|, since the




t is satisfied for t = t|S|.
The next proposition shows that the babbling phase may be safely ignored altogether, and
without loss of generality we may consider only informative equilibria.
Proposition 3 (Babbling Irrelevance). For any equilibrium with support S and Godwin point t̄
there exists an informative equilibrium with the same Godwin point t̄ and support S̃ = S ∩ {t 6 t̄}
such that the two equilibria are:
20See “Meme, Counter-Meme” (Wired).
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1. payoff-equivalent for all players,
2. strategy-equivalent on S̃.
Propositions 2 and 3 together imply that any equilibrium strategy profile with some Godwin point t̄
can be obtained from a respective informative equilibrium with the same Godwin point by allowing
for some babbling in {t̄+ 1, ..., T}.
Finally, to simplify the statements of our results, we will also focus on reticent equilibria, as
defined below.
Definition 3. We call an equilibrium reticent if rE∅(G, t̄) = r
E
∅(G, t̄) = 0.
In informative reticent equilibria, we then have that for all t ∈ S: rE∅(m, t) = 0 for all
m ∈ {G,B} and rEη (m, t) = 0 for η 6= m. The expert in such equilibria only makes a prediction m
if he has received private signal η = m. The main remaining question is how the quack responds
to such an expert’s strategy. The following subsection answers this question in the context of
informative reticent equilibria, and in Section II we show how these results extend to equilibria
that are not reticent.
Main Results
This section fixes an arbitrary support S = {t1, t2, . . . , t|S|−1, t|S| = t̄} ⊆ T and explores
properties of informative reticent equilibria on S (assuming they exist). Other kinds of equilibria
are explored in Section II. For simplicity we also assume throughout the remainder of Section II
that the expert’s signals are absolutely precise (π = 1); this assumption is relaxed in Section II.
To start with, it is useful to understand how equilibria look conditional on the support.
Propositions 2 and 3 imply that the the expert only reports when he has already received a private
signal, except maybe at the last point of the support. Assumption (SY) then implies that if
rE(G, t) > 0 then rE(B, t) > 0 and vice versa. Proposition 1 together with the above leads to the
fact that in any informative equilibrium for any t ∈ S: (1) both reports m = G and m = B are
made at t in equilibrium, and (2) both types of forecasters make any given report m ∈ {G,B}
at t in equilibrium. Alternatively, one may say that S = {t | rEη (η, t) > 0} for any η, i.e., in any
informative equilibrium the support is a set of times at which the expert discloses some of the
information he possesses.
To talk about the informativeness of different predictions about the state of the world, we
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introduce the following measure:
i(m, t) := ln (ρ(m, t))− ln (ρt−1) = ln
(




1 + βB(m, t)
)
.21
This measure shows how likely report (m, t) is to be sent in state G as opposed to state B. Positive
values reinforce the observer’s belief in state ω = G after hearing this report, while negative values
do the same for state ω = B. Higher absolute values of i(m, t) mean that more information is
transmitted by message (m, t) to the observer, meaning that belief ρ(m, t) moves further away
from ρt−1.
Presented next is the central result of our paper, which describes the informational content
of reports and the informativeness dynamics. All monotonicity statements in this Theorem are
understood in the sense of weak monotonicity.
Theorem 1. Suppose that |S| > 2 and an informative reticent equilibrium on S exists. Then in
any such equilibrium the following are true for both m ∈ {G,B}:
1. later reports are less informative about the state: |i(m, t)| is a decreasing function of t on S;
2. the reputation of a silent forecaster improves over time: bt is increasing in t on S and constant
on T \S;
3. making any report decreases reputation as compared to no report: b(m, t) 6 bt for any t ∈ S.
Theorem 1 starts by stating that in any reticent informative equilibrium with |S| > 2 reports
should become [weakly] noisier over time. This is required to provide incentives for the expert to
disclose the information he possesses. To elaborate, Proposition 1 implies that a quack must be
indifferent between all reports (m, t) made in equilibrium. At the same time, the only difference
between the expert’s and the quack’s payoffs comes from their respective probabilities of guessing
the state correctly with their report. Therefore, conditional on the quack’s indifference, the expert
with information η ∈ {G,B} in period t effectively maximizes the net premium for guessing the
state correctly, as given by
∆wη(m, τ) := w





21Note that since Bayes’ rule is linear in log-likelihoods, |i(m, t)| shows exactly the “strength” of the signal
contained in (m, t) in terms of it’s effect on the posterior p(m, t) relative to the prior pt−1. That said, our results
are not specific to the particular functional form of i(m, t) and are compatible with any other measure of distance
between ρ(m, t) and ρt−1 which is increasing in |ρt−1 − ρ(m, t)| for any fixed ρ(m, t).
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over all reports (m, τ) with τ > t. From (ML) and (SY) we know that ∆wη(m, τ) is weakly positive
for m = η and is weakly negative for m = −η, hence it is enough to consider m = η. Moreover,
Propositions 1 and 2 together imply that in informative equilibria, t ∈ S if and only if an informed
expert reports at t. This means that for t ∈ S we have
(η, t) = max
m,τ∈S,τ>t
∆wη(m, τ)
or, simply speaking, ∆wη(m, t) must be a weakly decreasing function of t on S for m = η. Note
that in case π = 1, Proposition 2 implies that β−η(η, t) = 0 for all t ∈ S\{t̄}, and therefore
∆wcη(η, t) = w (β
η(η, t)). Finally, as w(·) is strictly increasing, its monotonicity is equivalent to
monotonicity of βη(η, t), which in the end directly translates into that of |i(η, t)|.
The second and the third statements can be shown using the monotonicity of βm(m, t) derived
above, but the main intuition behind them comes from the quack’s indifference between all reports
made in equilibrium. Take some tk ∈ S and suppose that b(m, tk) < btk for both m ∈ {G,B}. Then
it should be that b(m, tk+1) < b(m, tk) for both m, since otherwise any report (m, tk) dominates
any report (m, tk+1) – the former grants higher payoff at tk, higher payoff between tk+1 and T ,
and higher continuation payoff after T . By the martingale property of beliefs, b(m, tk+1) and btk+1
should average out to btk , so in the end we have that
b(m, tk+1) < b(m, tk) < btk < btk+1
whenever b(m, tk) < btk . The same argument extends to all t ∈ S, granting the second and
third statements of Theorem 1. This argument does not preclude monotonicity from going the
other way if we start from the inequality b(m, tk) > btk – but this case would generate a sequence
bm(m, t) that is increasing in t ∈ S, which is incompatible with the expert’s preferences discussed
previously. Finally, the argument above implies that penalties for reporting increase over time: if
tk, tk+1, tk+2 ∈ S then
btk+1 − b(m, tk+2) > btk − b(m, tk+1).
This is exemplified in Figure 3, where the red solid line shows the reputation path of a forecaster
who makes a report at t = 3, and the blue dashed line shows that for t = 4.
Finally, it is worth noting that even the third statement, which is inherently static, requires
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Figure 3: Report penalties increase over time.
b(m, t̄) > bt̄ for both m ∈ {G,B}. In such equilibrium either report is more likely to be made by
an expert than a quack. “Static” equilibria (those with |S| = 1) are in this sense potentially more
informative than “dynamic” equilibria, and allowing for reports to be made at more than one point
in time may actually be harmful to the informativeness of these reports.
Existence of Informative Equilibria
So far we have discussed properties of equilibria without proving that any equilibria actually
exist, but existence of informative equilibria is not a trivial concern.22 The following Proposition
outlines some necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of informative equilibria, which allow
to understand some driving forces behind their existence and non-existence.
Proposition 4. Suppose w(·) and wc(·) are continuous function. Then
1. For any t̄ there exists an informative equilibrium with S = {t̄};
2. If w(β) and wc(β) are convex and p0 =
1
2 then a reticent informative equilibrium with arbitrary
S exists;
3. If w(β) = βα and wc(β) = θβα with θ > 0 and α < 1, then no informative equilibrium with
|S| > 3 exists.
Part 1 of Proposition 4 states that at least some informative equilibria always exist. In
particular, there always exist equilibria with singleton support, whatever the single period in the
support is. At this period experts reveal all private information they have accumulated by then,
22Babbling equilibria, on the other hand, always trivially exist.
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and any forecaster without private information is also free to make a report in the hopes of guessing
the state correctly.
However, the main focus of this paper is on the dynamics of announcements, so we are
particularly interested in equilibria with |S| > 1. Part 2 of Proposition 4 gives a sufficient condition
for their existence, which is convexity of the payoff function w(·) and symmetry of the two states,
p0 =
1
2 . By the continuity of payoffs, the condition on p0 can be relaxed to some extent. All else
equal, for any convex wc(·) there exists ε > 0 such that an informative equilibrium for arbitrary
support S exists whenever p0 ∈
(
1
2 − ε, 12 + ε
)
.23
Necessary conditions, on the other hand, are not easily obtainable in our model. The reason lies
in the fact that the payoff functions w(·) and wc(·) are only invoked for a finite number of arguments
β in any given equilibrium. In particular, given some payoff function w(·) and some equilibrium of
the game, we can change values that w(·) and/or wc(·) take almost everywhere without affecting
the equilibrium. This makes necessary conditions difficult to formulate without restricting payoff
functions to a specific class, which is what the last part of Proposition 4 does. It states that for at
least some class of concave payoff functions the existence of equilibria with large supports (|S| > 3)
completely breaks down.24 Parts 1 and 3 together illustrate that the main hurdles to existence are
tied to intertemporal choice: if the forecaster has no choice of when to make a report then existence
is certain, while allowing predictions to be made at multiple points in time may in some settings
lead to complete breakdown of communication.
The reason for non-existence is connected to the expert’s dynamic incentive compatibility
constraints. This is because t ∈ S if and only if the informed expert makes a report at t, so
he should be willing to do so instead of delaying his report until a later date. This leads to
phenomena described in parts 2 and 3 of Theorem 1. In particular, any report has to reduce the
forecaster’s reputation, so the only reason to make the report for the quack is a gamble for the
terminal reputation: he should be willing enough to make a guess, understanding that it may be
incorrect. A certain degree of risk-loving on behalf of the forecaster is required for such a strategy
profile to constitute an equilibrium. Conversely, if the quack is too risk-averse then strategy profiles
with |S| > 3 cannot satisfy the incentives of both forecaster types at the same time.25 The formal
23An empirical inquiry by Bernhardt, Campello, and Kutsoati [2004] also proposed the convexity of payoffs in
reputation as an explanation of the observed dynamics of the analysts’ reports. In their case, the observed phenomenon
was strong anti-herding in predictions.
24The jump from |S| = 1 to |S| > 3 is tied to the special features of the Godwin point, which precludes us from
making sharp statements about equilibria with |S| = 2. See also Section II.
25Remember that w(βt) is a function of βt =
bt
1−bt
which itself is a convex function of bt. Therefore, even with
α = 1 the forecaster is still risk-loving, so all talks of risk-loving and risk-aversion are in the relative sense (one may
easily verify that coefficients of both absolute and relative risk-aversion are monotone in α).
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argument is somewhat more subtle and can be found in the Appendix.
The intuition above naturally leads to the question: do there exist equilibria, given enough risk-
aversion on forecaster’s behalf, in which the quack is too reluctant to make his report for fear of
guessing it wrong? Such equilibria do not require sustaining quack’s indifference between all reports,
so they should seemingly exist under a wider range of parameters and functional forms. In the
current setting the existence of such equilibria violates Proposition 1 and is therefore impossible. In
Section II we show that after adopting an alternative assumption on off-path beliefs such equilibria
can in fact exist, but only if π = 1.
Comparison of Equilibria
In this section we study how the informativeness of the reports depends on the shape of
equilibrium. Simply speaking, we are trying to answer the question of which equilibria are more
informative.
We have two characteristics that describe how informative a given equilibrium is: its support S
and two functions i(m, t) for m ∈ {G,B}.26 Their exact meaning, however, is worth clarifying. The
informativeness measure |i(m, t)| is effectively a signal-to-noise ratio: it shows how noisy a given
message is, conditional on the event that this message is sent. The probability of the latter, however,
is governed by S, so |i(m, t)| alone does not allow to conclude ex ante how much information will be
conveyed at t. Sparser support S means that reports arrive more rarely in equilibrium and it may
take longer for a given piece of information to be disclosed, but it does not necessarily imply that
less information is transmitted (as long as t̄ is unaffected). To elaborate, any piece of information
that is observed by the expert at t′ /∈ S is not lost to the void – its revelation is delayed until
t′′ = min{t ∈ S|t > t′} but it is reported eventually.
Proposition 5 below summarizes our knowledge of how different equilibria of the game compare
to each other in terms of informativeness, given some fixed underlying fundamentals.
Proposition 5. Assume that two reticent informative equilibria exist with respective supports
S = {t1, ..., tk} and S̃ = {t1, ..., tk, tk+1, ..., tk+n}, and informativeness measures i(m, t) and ĩ(m, t).
Then |i(m, t)| 6 |̃i(m, t)| for m ∈ {G,B} and all t ∈ S̃.
The proposition says that expanding support to the right increases the informativeness of all
reports as long as the expert makes no uninformed reports. In other words, this says that “extending
26This discussion implicitly focuses on the observer’s welfare. forecaster’s type is not of interest to the observer,
hence g(m, t) is not a variable of interest for us.
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the deadline” for reports – in the sense of switching to an equilibrium with larger S – is always good
for the observer. It both allows more information to be transmitted by the informed expert (in case
he observes his private information between tk and tk+n) and decreases noise of all informative
reports (weakly for all t 6 tk and strictly for all t > tk). The intuition behind the latter phenomenon
follows from Theorem 1. Simply speaking, the more reporting options are available to quack in a
given equilibrium, the thinner he spreads over them. A more detailed argument follows.
Ceteris paribus, extending the support to the right (i.e., adding later dates) implies that the
reputation bt of the silent forecaster should improve at the new dates. This makes an option of
staying silent (or making a report at the last point) more attractive to the quack and does not
affect his payoff from making a report. By Proposition 1, the quack should be indifferent between
these options, so to restore this indifference after expanding the support we have to make reports
more appealing to him – which is achieved by prescribing point-wise lower rQ(m, t) in equilibrium,
thereby improving b(m, t) and bω(m, t) and at the same time depressing bt.
Discussion and Extensions
Delay Equilibria
Although Proposition 2 states that the expert only reports at t < t̄ if he has already received a
signal, it is still possible that he may delay his report, making it some time after he has received a
signal (but no later than t̄). If this happens, we call an equilibrium a delay equilibrium. Conversely,
if the expert always discloses his information immediately then we call it a relay equilibrium.
Definition 4. We call an informative equilibrium:
1. a relay equilibrium if rEη (η, t) = 1 for η ∈ {G,B} and for all t ∈ S;
2. a delay equilibrium otherwise.
Delay equilibria are very special in two respects. Firstly, unlike relay equilibria, they only exist
under knife-edge conditions on parameters. In other words, a generic informative equilibrium is a
relay equilibrium, in which the expert discloses his signals immediately. Secondly, delay equilibria
necessarily possess more concrete properties than relay equilibria. In particular, Proposition
6 describes how the equilibrium properties described in Theorem 1 specialize in case of delay
equilibria.
Proposition 6. Suppose that |S| > 2 and a reticent delay equilibrium on S exists. Then in any
such equilibrium the following are true for both m ∈ {G,B}:
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1. the report informativeness |i(m, t)| is constant for all t ∈ S;
2. the silent forecaster’s reputation is independent of time: bt is constant on T ;
3. the forecaster’s reputation is not immediately affected by his report: b(m, t) = bt for any t ∈ S.
Both observations above (that existence conditions and equilibrium properties of delay equilibria
present a special case of those for relay equilibria) stem from a common source. In comparison to
relay equilibria, delay equilibria impose an extra set of restrictions on players’ payoffs: the informed
expert must be indifferent between revealing his signal today and delaying his report until the next
t ∈ S. Given that this should be satisfied for both kinds of private signals together with quack’s
indifference, the set of compatible equilibrium belief profiles shrinks significantly which allows us
to provide a significantly stronger version of Theorem 1 for delay equilibria.
Informative Equilibria without Reticence
When presenting the main result of the paper in Theorem 1 and in Proposition 6, we restricted
the set of possible equilibria to reticent equilibria. The main result, however, holds without this
assumption so long as we exclude t̄ from parts 2 and 3 of the statement.
Proposition 7. Suppose that |S| > 3 and an informative equilibrium on S exists. Then in any
such equilibrium the following are true for both m ∈ {G,B}:
1. later reports are less informative about the state: |i(m, t)| is a decreasing function of t on S;
2. the reputation of a silent forecaster improves over time: bt is increasing in t on S\{t̄} and
constant on T \S;
3. making any report decreases reputation as compared to no report: b(m, t) 6 bt for any
t ∈ S\{t̄}.
Proposition 7 differs from Theorem 1 and Proposition 6 in two respects: it requires |S| > 3 and
excludes t̄ from statements 2 and 3. The common reason behind both of these changes is that the
Godwin point t̄ differs from other points in S. Its distinctive feature is allowing rE∅(m, t̄) > 0 – that
an uninformed expert makes a report, – while from Proposition 2 we know that rE∅(m, t) = 0 for all
t < t̄. This can generate situations in which statements 2 and 3 are no longer true at t̄, i.e., some
report m may have b(m, t̄) > bt, while silence would decrease bt. This, however, does not affect the
first part of the proposition: the reports made by the uninformed expert at t̄ are uninformative,
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and thus only add more noise, amplifying the effect of decreasing informativeness as compared to
reticent equilibria.
Ideal Equilibria
Informative equilibria with nontrivial supports need not exist with non-convex payoffs, as
evidenced by Proposition 4. A question arises: are babbling and small-support equilibria the
only possible outcomes when forecasters are too risk-averse? The answer is “not necessarily”.
The key to answering this question is assumption (OP). It requires that once a forecaster has
gained perfect reputation it persists forever – even if a forecaster’s prediction turned out to be
wrong when it could not happen in equilibrium (which is the case if the expert is supposed to
report in equilibrium only if he has the respective signal). This is a limiting case of the model
as π → 1, i.e., it can be supported by a perturbation of the model in which the expert’s signal is
incorrect with vanishing probability – and thus so are his predictions (see Section II for a more
extensive discussion of this setting).
However, this is not the only possible perturbation of the model in case π = 1. One may
alternatively think of a version of the model with the infinitesimal number of “crazy” forecasters
who are not strategic in their reports and just voice their opinions at random times. Since their
number is infinitesimal, Bayes’ rule still prescribes that b(m, t) = 1 for any (m, t) such that
rEη (m, t) > 0 = r
Q(m, t) = rE∅(m, t) with η = m. However, since an informed expert is never
wrong, if such prediction (m, t) turns out incorrect, this would imply that it was actually made
by one of the few crazy forecasters who may be competent or not. This could lead to any belief
b−m(m, t) ∈ [0, 1].
In this section we substitute (OP) by an alternative assumption (OP’) which prescribes the
worst possible off-path belief after an incorrect prediction supposedly made by an expert, same as
any other off-path history:
(OP) off the equilibrium path the beliefs are p = p0 and b = 0, with the exception that the extreme
belief b = 1 is not updated ;
(OP’) off the equilibrium path the beliefs are p = p0 and b = 0.
The alternative assumption (OP’) allows for the existence of ideal equilibria:
Definition 5. Ideal equilibria are characterized by rQ(m, t) = rE∅(m, t) = 0 for all (m, t),
rEη (m, t) = 0 for η 6= m, and rEη (m, t) > 0 for some (m, t) with m = η.
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Simply speaking, in ideal equilibria the only reports that are ever made are those by informed
experts; quacks never voice their opinion. This type of equilibrium is enforced by the worst possible
terminal reputation if the forecaster’s report turned out incorrect. For this threat to enforce such
an equilibrium, the quacks should be afraid of bad reputation more than they should love good
reputation in the short term. In other words, the payoff from reputation w(·) must be relatively
concave. While we cannot state the necessity of concavity (see Section II for discussion of necessary
conditions), we can show the converse: if w(·) or wc(·) is convex then ideal equilibria do not exist.
Proposition 8. Under (OP’), if w(·) or wc(·) is convex then no ideal equilibria exist.
This is the exact opposite of part 2 of Proposition 4, meaning that ideal equilibria are, informally
speaking, complementary to informative equilibria in the sense of existence. On the formal side,
the proof of Proposition 8 contains the necessary and sufficient condition for existence of an ideal
equilibrium with support S, but this condition is not particularly insightful, and for that reason
we do not state it here.
Imperfect Private Signals
In this section we relax the assumption that the expert’s signals are perfectly informative about
the state and explore the case π < 1. Note that there is nothing in the intuition behind Theorem
1 implying that π = 1 is a necessary condition. As long as π > 12 , the expert’s signal is somewhat
informative about the state, so his informed report about the state is more likely to be supported
by the ex post evidence than the quack’s random guess. Therefore, the results should continue to
hold.
The proofs of Propositions 1, 2, and 3 continue to hold in case π < 1 with no further
modifications. Proposition 9 below shows that the remaining results continue to hold as well if
wc(·) is either convex, or at least not too globally concave, and the private signal is sufficiently
precise.27
Proposition 9. Theorem 1, Propositions 4–7 are true for π < 1 if either of the following holds:
1. wc(·) is convex;
2. wc(·) is continuously differentiable and there exist 0 < d 6 d̄ < +∞ such that dwc(β)
dβ
∈ [d, d̄]
and π > d̄
d+d̄
.
27The exception is Proposition 8, since assumption (OP’) is equivalent to (OP) when π < 1.
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When describing the intuition behind Theorem 1, we have mentioned that in order to provide
incentives for the informed expert to reveal his private information immediately instead of waiting
for a later date, the premium ∆wη(m, t) for guessing the state correctly should be a decreasing
function of t on S. An important part of the proof of Theorem 1 consists of showing that decreasing
∆wη(m, t) is equivalent to decreasing b
m(m, t). The three statements of Theorem 1 then follow
almost directly from the latter statement (using the Bayes’ rule and the martingale property of
beliefs).
The equivalence relation above is simple when π = 1, since then b−m(m, t) = 0, and wc(·) is
a strictly increasing function. Proposition 9 provides two alternative conditions under which the
equivalence holds in case π < 1. If wc(·) is convex it holds because bm(m, t) and b−m(m, t) are
scalar multiples of each other.28 The second condition relaxes convexity to just bounded derivative
of wc(·) but the idea is the same: if dwc(β)
dβ
is bounded so that wc(·) is not too concave globally, and
the signal is precise enough, we can establish the connection between ∆wη(m, t) and b
m(m, t).






This is because the forecaster who is believed competent with probability one can no longer be
punished after his prediction was revealed to be wrong – he can credibly claim that the mistake
was made because of an incorrect private signal, rather than due to low competence.
Commitment
Suppose now that the forecaster can commit to a reporting strategy at t = 0 after learning
his type but before receiving any private information. The forecaster’s strategy is not publicly
observable. This modification relates our problem to the literature on Bayesian Persuasion
and information design, since the forecaster now designs the disclosure strategy subject to the
constraints on the information available to him.29
The literature on Bayesian Persuasion has demonstrated that commitment power often allows
the sender to strictly improve his payoff whenever the optimal communication mechanism is
informative.30 In contrast, it is easy to see that in our setting all forecaster’s strategy profiles
that were optimal in the absence of commitment remain optimal even if he has commitment power.
In particular, the quack is indifferent between all reports sent in equilibrium and not reporting, if
28This follows from the observer’s belief pt regarding state being constant in the absence of reports and the rate
of arrival of expert’s private signal being the same in both states. Due to these assumptions, ratio of bm(m, t) to
b−m(m, t) equals the relative probability of expert having correct versus incorrect information about the state.
29The seminal contribution is Kamenica and Gentzkow [2011]; see Bergemann and Morris [2019] for a recent
survey.
30See Lipnowski, Ravid, and Shishkin [2018].
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allowed in equilibrium. This means that his payoff from any action played in equilibrium is the
same, and (OP) implies that playing off-path actions is no better. Therefore, conditional on the
expert’s strategy, the quack cannot improve by committing to a different strategy. On the other
hand, the expert’s strategy is also optimal given the quack’s indifference: given information η, it is
optimal for him to send the report (m, t) that maximizes ∆wη(m, t), and given no information it
is optimal to wait for information (until at least t̄). Therefore, the forecaster’s commitment power
does not affect the equilibria identified above.
Conclusion
The paper presents a model of dynamic cheap talk in the presence of career concerns. We
discover that the competition between competent (experts) and incompetent (quacks) forecasters
imposes plenty of structure on equilibrium outcomes. In particular, we show that to incentivize the
experts – whose reports drive the whole market, – to make early predictions, it must be that early
reports are perceived more favorably by the public than later reports. Perhaps more surprisingly, we
discover that the presence of quacks in the market together with the monotonicity above generates
an automatic penalty for any report: a forecaster who makes a prediction will see his reputation
plummeting, and he will only be redeemed if his prediction will turn out to be correct. This does
not discourage quacks from speaking up, but disciplines their incentives. Moreover, this reputation
dynamics implies that for non-trivial equilibria to exist, forecasters’ payoffs must be sufficiently
convex in reputation, which is the case if, e.g., the premium for being the top forecaster in the field
is very large.
These predictions are novel in the literature, and are driven by us explicitly modeling the
dynamic payoff structure of the forecasters. Our model accounts for both flow payoffs while the
public is still uncertain about the correctness of the forecaster’s prediction, and terminal payoffs
realized after the true state is revealed.
The model can be extended in multiple directions, e.g., to account for competition among
forecasters, or for arrival of public signal in the background. Richer private news processes for
forecasters can also add another strategic layer to the timing decision of the forecaster’s prediction.
All of these are prospective avenues for future research.
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Bad News Turned Good: Reversal Under Censorship31
joint with Egor Starkov
Introduction
Word of mouth has long been a significant source of information about product features and
quality. One of its manifestations in the digital age is online product reviews. Opinions of fellow
consumers often seem more trustworthy than sellers’ product descriptions, and the sheer numbers of
reviews offer a great diversity of viewpoints. However, sellers can undermine this learning channel,
and one instrument they often have for doing so is censorship, i.e., removing unfavorable reviews
of their own product.32
It is reasonable to expect that whenever censorship is possible and its cost is low, it will be
employed to at least some extent. A naive conjecture would be that if the seller can censor at will,
then no meaningful bad reviews ever remain, and those that do convey absolutely no information.
This is because the seller would delete any review that harms sales. However, in practice we observe
plenty of informative bad reviews even when costless censorship opportunities exist. This paper
asks why sellers may be willing to not censor unfavorable reviews.
We demonstrate that disclosing adverse information can be justified in a dynamic disclosure
model with heterogeneous audience. In particular, we build a model of the market where two groups
of consumers are present: naive consumers are not aware of the seller’s ability to censor, while the
sophisticated consumers are fully aware of it and make proper inferences from the lack of reviews,
among other events.33 In this model a long-lived seller offers a good of privately known quality to a
sequence of short-lived consumers. Consumption generates information about the product quality,
and this information is relayed to future consumers through product reviews, which may be deleted
by the seller.
The main result of the paper (Theorem 3) states that if some – but not too many – consumers
in the market are naive, then there exist equilibria in which bad reviews are revealed in a payoff-
relevant way. This result is surprising in that it requires that both groups of consumers are present
31This paper should be cited as A. Smirnov, E. Starkov. Bad News Turned Good: Reversal Under Censorship.
mimeo, 2020. The paper has been accepted to American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.
32This is plausible when we are talking about the seller’s own online store, where he has absolute power over the
content posted on the website – including product reviews. However, censorship is possible in other settings as well,
see Section II for the discussion.
33See Section II for references to literature providing empirical evidence of consumers’ naivetè when making
inferences from product reviews.
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in the market for bad reviews to be worth revealing. Indeed, if all consumers are naive, then any
bad review decreases their belief in product quality, while the absence of reviews makes them think
that no one is buying the product – an event which does not by itself contain information about
product quality. In this situation, deleting bad reviews is trivially optimal for the seller. On the
other hand, if all consumers are sophisticated, then even though they know that the lack of reviews
is likely explained by censorship, they still give the seller a benefit of doubt and allow for the
alternative explanation (no one having bought the product). It is then still optimal for the seller
to delete all bad reviews.
With both naive and sophisticated consumers in the market a richer dynamic arises. What we
show is that presence of naive consumers affects the inference that sophisticated consumers make
from observing a bad review. In particular, the seller can now signal the quality of his product to
sophisticated consumers by revealing bad reviews. This is costly for the seller, since it decreases
sales to naive consumers. The cost, however, is smaller for the seller with a high-quality product.
This is because he expects more good reviews in the future, and it is thus easier for him to regain
the reputation among naive consumers. The dynamic aspect, therefore, also plays an important
role in our results.
We show that signaling is the only motive to reveal bad reviews in our model: Theorem 2
states that a bad review is revealed by the seller only if it will increase his reputation among
sophisticated consumers. The meaning of bad reviews is thus reversed for sophisticated consumers.
On the surface, the necessity of such reversal for bad reviews to be worth revealing can be explained
by a very simple argument: bad reviews harm the seller’s sales to naive consumers, hence to be
worth revealing they must improve sales to sophisticated consumers. However, we show that the
link between sales and reputation is much more subtle than this argument makes it seem. This
subtlety, in particular, leads to the result that bad reviews must improve the seller’s reputation
among sophisticated consumers even if they do not directly harm sales to naive consumers.
The reversal is achieved by the dependence of the seller’s censorship strategy on the quality of his
product. We show that the seller with a high-quality product will never censor bad reviews, while
the one with a low-quality product will use a mixed strategy, which assigns positive probabilities
to both deleting and revealing every bad review. Therefore, where the naive consumers take
bad reviews at face value and perceive them as negative information about the product quality,
the sophisticated consumers also extract a positive signal from the fact that this bad review was
revealed by the seller, and this positive signal outweighs the inherent negativity of the review.
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Taking a step back, the main focus of this paper is on product reviews – and for sake of clarity
we will stick to this interpretation throughout – but the model translates naturally to other settings
that feature censorship or dynamic disclosure of verifiable information. For example, instead of a
seller censoring bad reviews, one may think about a political incumbent censoring news stories in
media in an attempt to retain citizens’ support. In the context of venture financing, a startup may
choose whether to disclose temporary setbacks to the investors or not. A bank may disclose or
withhold information about its temporary liquidity deficit in an attempt to prevent a bank run.
Our paper implies that in all of these settings, it may be beneficial for the sender to disclose bad
news or failures if some receivers are naive, since the rational receivers would take the mere fact of
disclosure as a positive signal.
Clearly, even in the context of product reviews, censorship is not the only way the seller can
manipulate the information available to the consumer. Posting fake reviews, be it fake positive
reviews of own product or fake negative reviews of competing products, is another activity the
seller can engage in.34 While we mostly focus on censorship in this paper, Section II shows that
our result continues to hold in the presence of both censorship and fake reviews.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the plausibility of
censorship in product reviews and reviews the relevant literature. Section II presents a short
example to convey the main idea of the paper. In Section II we formulate the full model. The main
results are presented in Section II. Section II contains some further discussion of the model and its
extensions, while Section II concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Background and Literature Review
Censorship
The main setting considered in the paper is that of a platform that the seller owns or has
moderation rights in. Examples include seller’s own website, forum, or Facebook page. In all of
these cases the seller is able to remove bad reviews directly. Such deeds are by definition difficult
to document, but some claims may be found.35
However, it is important to note that the seller does not need to have direct power to remove
34About 16% of Yelp reviews are marked as potentially fake (Luca and Zervas [2016]).
35The links below lead to articles accusing corrupt employees of Amazon, Reddit, and AirBnB respec-





bad reviews – he merely needs to convince whoever has this power. For example, some platforms
(such as Etsy) allow sellers to try to address buyers’ dissatisfaction and ask buyers to remove their
negative review if all issues were resolved. While most review aggregators (such as Amazon, Yelp or
TripAdvisor) do not allow the sellers to directly remove reviews, convincing, bribing, or harassing
consumers into deleting their own reviews are all viable options in those cases. Promising free
items or politely asking to contact the company before writing a bad review both have a chance of
succeeding at making the consumer remove or alter their bad review, or even not write one in the
first place. One extreme method of consumer harassment is SLAPP – Strategic Lawsuit Against
Public Participation, – when a seller sues a reviewer primarily to deter other critics from writing
negative reviews. While these suits are rarely won in court, they are likely to succeed at forcing
the person to delete their review before the suit even reaches court, and/or at intimidating other
potential reviewers.36
Finally, in some settings the seller may get to choose more favorable reviewers – e.g., a movie
distributor picks the critics that get to write the pre-release reviews. In this setting the seller
may also ensure that no bad review gets through – either by screening the reviews directly, or by
choosing ex ante more favorable reviewers, or through repeated interaction mechanisms.37
Academic literature on manipulations in product reviews has focused on the issue of fake reviews
(in part because those are easier to observe in the data than deleted reviews which are, by definition,
missing from the sample). We are not aware of any papers that deal with censorship in product
reviews explicitly, apart from Hauser [2020] who models censorship as depressing the rate of reviews
arrival (i.e., censorship is indiscriminate in that model). Political censorship, on the other hand, has
received a lot more attention in the literature. Sun [2020] explores a model of dynamic censorship
similar to ours, but without naive receivers. Besley and Prat [2006] present a model, in which an
incumbent may bribe the media to conceal a bad signal about himself, but focus on the effects of
media diversity and independence on political outcomes.38
36Some examples of [unsuccessful] application of this technique are described in the fol-




case of such lawsuit being won is described by CBC: https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/
chinese-wedding-weibo-defamation-1.4556433. It is by definition more difficult to find documented instances
when such harassment was successful – not in the sense of suit being won but in the sense of it forcing consumers to
remove their bad reviews.
37A recent case here is Disney banning LA Times from pre-release screenings of its movie in retaliation
for other recent articles. More details in an ArsTechnica article: https://arstechnica.com/gaming/2017/11/
la-times-you-cant-read-our-thor-review-because-disney-is-mad/.
38Other papers about political censorship include Shadmehr and Bernhardt [2015], Edmond [2013], Egorov, Guriev,
and Sonin [2009], Ozerturk [2019], and Chen and Yang [2018], but all of them explore issues that are very different
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Disclosure
Our paper belongs to the literature on disclosure of verifiable information, since in our model the
seller can only decide whether to disclose any bad reviews written by consumers, but cannot write
fake reviews on his own.39 For a recent survey of the literature on static disclosure see Dranove
and Jin [2010].
There is a certain progression that can be observed in this literature.40 The earliest papers
(Grossman [1981]) arrive to the “unraveling” result: if the sender is known to possess a disclosable
signal, this signal will be disclosed in equilibrium. “Known to possess information” was later
identified as a crucial assumption, without which this result breaks down: the sender has no
incentives to disclose adverse information unless it is certain that he has it (see Dye [1985] and
Jung and Kwon [1988]).
In the real world very few things are certain, so the question emerged: why can it be profitable
to reveal adverse information when it is not certain that the sender has any?41 Teoh and Hwang
[1991], Marinovic and Varas [2016], and Corona and Randhawa [2018] show that bad news may
be worth revealing in settings where they may with some probability be discovered by the receiver
regardless. Thordal-Le Quement [2014] and Ispano [2018] show that revealing bad news can be
used as a signal of the amount of information the sender possesses. Our paper provides a novel
motivation for revealing bad reviews, which originates from dynamic incentives in the presence of
mixed audience.42
In our model, the high-type sender has stronger incentives to reveal adverse information than
the low type. This connects us to the literature on countersignaling (see Harbaugh and To, Quigley
and Walther [2020], Guo and Shmaya [2019]). That literature, however, derives its results from the
presence of an exogenous public signal, which we do not rely on. Heinsalu [2017] obtains a similar
kind of signal reversal in the context of dynamic costly signaling (as opposed to disclosure) with no
reliance on public signals. The source of this reversal is, however, different from that in our model.
from those that we focus on.
39Although we allow for fake reviews in an extension, see Section II.
40We thank the anonymous referee for making this progression salient to us.
41E.g., in the context of product reviews, some of the empirical evidence points to the fact that bad reviews are not
necessarily harmful and may, in fact, have positive effects on sales or reputation: see Resnick, Zeckhauser, Swanson,
and Lockwood [2006], Berger, Sorensen, and Rasmussen [2010] and Maslowska, Malthouse, and Bernritter [2017].
42The above only relates to models with fully strategic senders. If one assumes that there exists a behavioral type
of the sender which always reveals all information, then the strategic sender would typically have an incentive to
mimic it. See Sobel [1985], Kartik and McAfee [2007], Dziuda [2011], and Beyer and Dye [2012] for some examples.
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Naivete
Evidence of consumers’ naivete when making inferences from product reviews has been provided
by Brown, Camerer, and Lovallo [2012] and Li and Hitt [2008]. These papers show that at least
some consumers ignore the correlation between other players’ actions and their private information.
This notion of naivete (which is also implied in our model) has been formalized by Eyster and Rabin
[2005], who use the term “cursedness” for this type of irrationality.
More broadly, a wide array of empirical and experimental literature has demonstrated that
people play naively even in the very basic disclosure games (see Jin [2005], Deversi, Ispano, and
Schwardmann [2020], Jin, Luca, and Martin [2018], and Montero and Sheth [2019]). In particular,
Deversi et al. [2020] and Jin et al. [2018] show that people on the receiving side of their disclosure
games either play in a way that is very close to a rational player’s strategy, or play in way that
is very naive. I.e., their players can be separated relatively well into naive and rational receivers.
At the same time, when put in the senders’ role, all the same people play rationally. These papers
demonstrate that naivete is very robust in disclosure setting: even after adopting the role of the
sender and going through full strategic reasoning of the sender, people still play naively when
switched back to the receiving side.
Crawford [2003] shows that sender’s uncertainty about the receiver’s sophistication can lead to
meaningful communication even in a zero-sum game. We show how these forces manifest themselves
in the context of disclosure.
Illustrative Example
This section presents an example that demonstrates our results in the simplest setting. Assume
there are three periods t ∈ {1, 2, 3}. A long-lived seller offers for sale a product of privately known
persistent quality θ ∈ {H,L} that he has in infinite supply. Price is fixed at c = 1/3. Low-
quality product always yields utility zero to consumers. High-quality product yields utility 1 with
probability q = 2/3 and utility 0 with probability 1− q = 1/3.
In each period one short-lived consumer arrives at the market with probability λ = 3/4. Each
consumer’s prior belief assigns probability p1 = 2/3 to θ = H. The consumer observes past
reviews (if any) and updates her belief using Bayes’ rule. She then makes a decision on whether
to purchase the product. Conditional on the purchase, she consumes the product immediately and
leaves a review, which honestly reveals the utility that she received from consuming the product.
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Table 1: Three-period equilibrium
Period
Review Naive Sophisticated L-type H-type
history consumers consumers seller seller
action belief action belief
1 - Buy 2/3 Buy 2/3 Mix 50/50 Reveal
2 ∅ Buy 2/3 Pass 4/9 Delete Reveal
2 B Pass 2/5 Buy 4/7 Mix 50/50 Reveal
3 (∅,∅) Buy 2/3 Pass 1/6 - -
3 (∅, B) Pass 2/5 Buy 1 - -
3 (B,∅) Pass 2/5 Pass 8/23 - -
3 (B,B) Pass 2/11 Pass 8/17 - -
Note: Seller’s strategy in period 3 is not specified since it is payoff-irrelevant. In review histories,
∅ and B mean “no review” and “bad review” respectively. Histories with good reviews are
omitted, since after any such history all consumers assign probability one to θ = H and buy the
product, and the seller’s further censorship strategy is irrelevant.
We call reviews after utilities one and zero “good” and “bad” respectively. The seller then decides
whether to reveal the review. Let rθt denote the [endogenous] probability with which the seller
of type θ discloses a bad review conditional on its arrival (and it never makes sense to delete a
good review). With probability µt the consumer in period t is sophisticated and uses the seller’s
equilibrium censorship strategy in her inference. With probability 1−µt the consumer at t is naive
and assumes the seller never deletes reviews. We let µ2 = 3/4 and µ3 = 1/2.
We claim that players’ strategies and beliefs as described in Table 1 constitute a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium of the game. In this equilibrium, the high-type seller reveals all bad reviews, while the
low type either deletes the review for sure, or flips a coin, depending on history. To verify that this
is indeed an equilibrium, we need to check that:
1. seller’s strategy is optimal given consumers’ strategies,
2. consumers’ strategies are optimal given their beliefs, and
3. consumers’ beliefs are consistent with the seller’s strategy.
Verifying the correctness of the consumers’ beliefs is mechanical and can be easily done by
the reader using the Bayes’ rule. Consumer strategy optimality is also straightforward given
beliefs: in period t she buys the product if and only if her utility from doing so is positive, i.e.,
p · q > c ⇔ p > 1/2. It is, however, instructive to explore the patterns in consumer behavior in
this equilibrium, especially since most of the chosen parameter values serve the goal of generating
this particular behavior. Period-one consumer buys the product by assumption: p1 = 2/3 > 1/2
(otherwise the market shuts down). After that, any bad review drives the naive consumers away –
47
until a good review arrives, – since they only perceive it at face value. Sophisticated consumers, on
the other hand, continue buying after one bad review because they realize that a high-type seller is
more likely to have revealed it. This positive connotation mitigates or even outweighs the negative
face value of the bad review.43 For the same reason, they treat silence (which means that either
no consumer arrived, or no sale was made, or the review was deleted) as bad news.
We proceed to argue that the seller’s strategy is optimal. As mentioned in the description of
Table 1, we only need to look at histories with t ∈ {1, 2} such that the seller has received no good
review. This leaves us with three histories: h1 = (), h2 = ∅ and h2 = B. Censorship strategies are
only relevant if the seller has received a bad review in the current period, so hereinafter we assume
this is the case. At h2 = B the seller is indifferent regardless of type: neither type of consumer will
purchase the product in period three without a good review.
At h2 = ∅ the seller faces a more meaningful choice. Deleting a bad review means that naive
consumers will continue buying the product: today’s purchase came from a naive consumer, and
tomorrow only naive consumers will buy as well. Sophisticated consumers will continue to find
the lack of reviews disturbing – they will assume that it is due to censorship, hence due to seller
knowing his product is bad. On the other hand, revealing a bad review earns the seller credibility
in the eyes of the tomorrow’s sophisticated consumer, but this comes at the cost of driving away
the naive consumer. Revealing a bad review makes the seller lose naive consumers, hence should
increase sales to sophisticated consumers. In our example µ3 = 1/2, hence the seller is exactly
indifferent between both options, regardless of own type θ.
Now consider the root history h1 = (). If the seller has not received a good review, he is
bound to lose at least one type of consumers in period two: revealing a bad review loses the naive,
having no review loses the sophisticated. In the absence of good news, the two news yield the same
expected sales: bad review at t = 1 yields a sale w.p. µ2 = 3/4 at t = 2 and none at t = 3, while
no reviews at t = 1 result in sale w.p. 1− µ2 = 1/4 at t = 2 and 1− µ3 = 1/2 at t = 3, for a total
of 3/4. The low-type seller is thus indifferent between the two. The high type, however, expects
a positive chance to receive a good review from every sale. Ceteris paribus, it is better to receive
this good review sooner rather than later: a good review in period two would generate more sales
in period three, while a good review in period three is worthless. In our example, revealing a bad
review in period one frontloads the demand to period two, thereby increasing the probability that
the seller will have a good review by period three. This logic incentivizes the high-type seller to
43Observe also that timing of revelation matters: history (B,∅) is not equivalent to history (∅, B). In this sense,
this example also illustrates on a very basic level the idea of Guttman, Kremer, and Skrzypacz [2014].
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reveal the bad review at t = 1.
The core ideas of the example can be summarized as follows:
• Revealing bad reviews is only worth it if doing so does not decrease total sales, meaning that
at least some consumers are expected by the seller to be sophisticated and make strategic
(positive) inferences from bad reviews.
• High-type sellers have incentive to front-load demand in order to generate good reviews early.
If there are more sophisticated than naive consumers in the market then this entails revealing
bad reviews in order to sacrifice naive consumers in an attempt to signal to and attract
sophisticated consumers.44
The remainder of the paper extends these ideas from the simplified setting of this example to
a general environment. Note that generating the right incentives in the example above required
varying consumer sophistication over time (µ2 > 1/2 = µ3). This assumption should be seen as an
artifact of the example and is not carried over to the main model.
The Model
Time is continuous and infinite, t ∈ [0,+∞). A long-lived seller offers for sale a product of
privately known persistent quality θ ∈ {H,L}, high or low, that he has in infinite supply. Quality θ
is hereinafter referred to as the seller’s type. The price of the product is fixed at c > 0.45 Short-lived
consumers with a unit demand arrive at the market according to a Poisson process with intensity
λ. In other words, the probability that a consumer arrives in any given time interval [t, t + dt) is
λ ·dt. All players are assumed to be risk-neutral and evaluate outcomes according to their expected
monetary values.
Once a consumer arrives, she and the seller instantaneously play the following stage game,
specific elements of which are described in more detail in the following subsections. The consumer
who arrives at the market observes all information available to her and decides whether to buy the
product. If she does, she receives random utility depending on product quality. After the utility is
realized, the consumer leaves a review describing her experience and then leaves the market forever.
The seller then decides whether to reveal the review or delete it. If the review is revealed, it is then
observed by all future consumers before they make their purchase decisions.
44We show in the main model that if there are few sophisticated consumers in the market then full censorship is
the only equilibrium.
45Allowing the seller to set the price would allow for price signaling, while in this paper we focus solely on signaling
through censorship.
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We let ht denote a complete history of the game up to (but not including) time t. It includes
current time, the purchase decisions of all consumers who arrived before t, all reviews they wrote,
and all respective censorship decisions of the seller. The following subsections elaborate on various
parts of the game and introduce notation that will be used throughout.
Consumers
Consumers arrive at the market according to a Poisson process with intensity λ. Each arriving
consumer observes the current time and all reviews written by previous consumers that were not
deleted by the seller. The consumer does not observe the purchase decisions of the previous
consumers and does not observe whether any reviews were deleted.
The consumers’ payoffs are as follows. If a consumer leaves the market without buying the
product, she receives utility 0. Consuming a high-quality product yields utility 1 with probability
q and utility 0 with probability 1 − q, while a low-quality product always yields utility 0.46 The
cost of buying a product is given by its price c.
Each arriving consumer has a “cognitive type” γ ∈ {s, n}, hereinafter referred to as consumer’s
type. Sophisticated consumers (γ = s, share µ ∈ [0, 1) of the population) go through full Bayesian
reasoning to infer product quality based on published reviews, taking the seller’s censorship strategy
into account. Naive consumers (γ = n, share 1 − µ) use Bayesian updating for any reviews they
observe but are unaware of possible moderation, i.e., they assume that the seller never removes
any reviews. For technical reasons, we also assume that naive consumers do not observe or ignore
the times at which reviews were written (unlike sophisticated consumers).47 Consumers’ types are
i.i.d. within the sequence of arriving consumers.
Let pγ(ht) denote the probability that consumer of type γ assigns to the product being of high
quality given history ht. She then buys the product at ht if and only if her expected consumption
utility exceeds price c, i.e.,
pγ(ht) · (q · 1 + (1− q) · 0) + (1− pγ(ht)) · 0 > c,
or, equivalently, pγ(ht) > p̄ where p̄ := c/q. This behavior will be taken for granted for the
46High utility is thus a conclusive evidence that the product is of high quality. This assumption of “conclusive
good news” is relatively standard in the experimentation literature (see Keller, Rady, and Cripps [2005] and the
subsequent literature) since it makes the models a lot more tractable. We relax this assumption in Section II and
show that the main result survives under arbitrary information structures. On the other hand, it is crucial for our
results that bad news are suggestive rather than conclusive, see Section II.
47This assumption can be easily disposed of at the cost of more complicated assumptions about off-equilibrium-
path beliefs (described in Section II).
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remainder of the paper. To avoid triviality, the parameters are assumed such that p̄ ∈ (0, 1) and
the consumers’ prior is pγ(h0) > p̄. We further assume that consumers buy the product when
indifferent.
In addition, it will prove convenient to have a separate piece of notation for updated beliefs.
Let fγ(ht) denote the belief p
γ of a consumer arriving in the moment t + dt following history ht
and observing that a bad review was posted at t.
After the utility is realized, the consumer leaves a review. We assume that all consumers leave
reviews and do so truthfully: if the consumer received utility 1, she leaves a “good review”, while
after utility 0 she leaves a “bad review”.48
The Seller
The seller is long-lived and discounts future at rate r > 0. He always observes the complete
history ht of the game so far, as well as his own type θ. We assume that the seller has zero cost
of producing the product and thus receives profit c from every purchase. Therefore, instantaneous
expected flow profit for type θ seller at history ht, given that consumers’ purchasing decisions are
as described above, is equal to λcπ(ht) where π(ht) measures expected sales per arriving consumer:
π(ht) = (1− µ) · 1(pn(ht) > p̄) + µ · 1(ps(ht) > p̄),
with 1(·) being an indicator function. Then the seller’s discounted future profit (normalized by
1/λc) is given by






e−r(u−t)π(hu)du | ht, θ

 , (11)
where the expectation is taken over future histories hu. Note that seller’s type θ enters (21) only
through this expectation. Also, conditioning on ht implies that this value function is evaluated
before the seller knows whether a consumer (and, consequently, a review) arrives at time t.
The seller only has a nontrivial choice of action at those histories at which a consumer arrives
and writes a review. The seller then has to decide whether to disclose it or not.49,50 Any good
48All results continue to hold if only some positive share of all consumers leave reviews.
49We assume that deleting a review is costless. This may seem to contradict some motivating examples in which
deleting reviews is costly, as the company/government has to sustain a customer service/censorship apparatus.
However, we argue that if the company engages in censorship, the marginal cost of deleting another review is
essentially zero.
50We assume that reviews cannot be held in a “moderation queue” and revealed later, as well as that published
reviews cannot be deleted in the future. The former assumption is made mostly for convenience and has no effect on
our results, but the latter assumption is crucial. It can be justified by the folk wisdom that “nothing can be deleted
from the Internet” (see the “Streisand effect”). We further do not allow the seller to modify review contents (see
51
review perfectly reveals the high quality of the product, guaranteeing that all future consumers of
any type will buy the product, and is thus never censored by a seller. Therefore, the seller only
faces a nontrivial choice when a bad review arrives. We denote by rθ(ht) the probability with which
seller of type θ reveals (or discloses) a bad review that arrives at history ht.
Equilibrium Definition
All consumers in our model are short-lived, so their behavior is myopic. The only strategic player
is the seller. At every history ht he maximizes his continuation value (21) given the consumers’
behavior, and the latter only depends on their current and future beliefs p := (pn, ps). Given that
all available information about future beliefs is contained in current beliefs and the seller’s strategy,
and that the seller observes all the information that the consumers see, current beliefs p(ht) are
a sufficient statistic of history ht. Therefore, we can essentially without loss of generality focus
on Markov setting with state p and redefine all objects accordingly.51 For example, the seller’s
strategy in such a setting is described by rθ(pt) = r
θ(p(ht)) := r
θ(ht).





and updating rules for beliefs p such that
1. at any state p strategy rθ maximizes V θ(p) for θ ∈ {L,H} given the updating rules for pt
and the initial condition p0 = p;




in such a way that
• ps is updated using Bayes’ rule whenever possible;
• pn is updated using Bayes’ rule whenever possible under the assumption that rH(p) =
rL(p) = 1 for all p;
• pγ = 0 at histories that a consumer of type γ perceives as being off the equilibrium path.
The latter condition about off-path histories is made purely for convenience and is without loss
of generality: if there exists an equilibrium with some off-path beliefs, it can as well be sustained
by the most pessimistic off-path belief.
Section II for references to papers that do).
51Formally, some equilibria are lost as a result of the restriction to Markov strategies. In particular, many states
p admit multiple possible continuation equilibria. In this case we lose [Perfect Bayesian] equilibria which prescribe
different continuations at different histories ht which generate the same state pt. However, this is not a meaningful
loss in the sense that any payoff profile attainable in some PBE of our model can also be generated by some MPE
augmented by a public randomization device.
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Equilibrium Analysis
This section contains the characterization of equilibria of the game, which culminates in the two
main results. Formal proofs of all statements can be found in the Appendix. We start, however,
with discussing some preliminaries.
Preliminaries: Multiplicity
Like most communication games, our model features a multiplicity of self-fulfilling equilibria.52
The loop for any given state p proceeds as follows: if no bad reviews are ever revealed at p,
then sophisticated consumers can have arbitrary beliefs in case a bad review is revealed at p. In
particular, consumers can ascribe f s(p) = 0 after such an off-path event, which makes revealing
a bad review at p a weakly dominated action for any seller because the naives’ demand cannot
increase after a bad review, thus closing the loop. Using this reasoning, we can “ban” disclosure
of bad reviews on any subset of the state space.53 We do not refine such situations away, but our
main interest lies in the regions where bad reviews are disclosed.
One particular equilibrium deserves special attention:




= (0, 0) for all p ∈ [0, 1]2.
In the fully censored equilibrium, all bad reviews are always deleted. This equilibrium is
special in the sense that it always exists, as the verbal reasoning above implies. One of the main
contributions of our paper is showing that equilibria exist that are not fully censored (and not
payoff-equivalent to fully censored equilibrium), i.e., bad reviews are revealed in a payoff-relevant
way in such equilibria. In other words, censorship is a trivial phenomenon in equilibrium; it is the
lack of censorship that is not trivial.
To make the classification of equilibria easier, consider the following piece of notation. Given
some equilibrium, let R ⊆ [0, 1]2 denote the set of states in which bad reviews are revealed on




6= (0, 0)}. Then after observing
a bad review at some p ∈ R the sophisticated consumer updates her belief ps using Bayes’ rule,
while a bad review at p 6∈ R leads to f s(p) = 0 according to our off-path updating rule. The fully
censored equilibrium is characterized by R = ∅.
52“Self-fulfilling equilibrium” is used as a heuristic notion and not in the sense of any formal definition.




This section explores how beliefs p = (pn, ps) are updated throughout the game. At any given
history, one of three mutually exclusive events can happen: a good review is posted, i.e., written
by a consumer and not deleted by the seller, a bad review is posted, or no new reviews are posted.
After any single good review the product is revealed to be good, and beliefs of both types of
consumers jump to pn = ps = 1. Conditional on the other two events, the two types of consumers
update their beliefs differently.
Recall that fγ(p) denotes the posterior belief of a consumer of type γ who has observed a bad
review posted in state p. For a sophisticated consumer, Bayes’ rule prescribes that the belief is
updated as
f s(p)
1− f s(p) =
ps
1− ps ·
(1− q) · rH(p)
rL(p)
. (12)
A naive consumer uses the same Bayes’ rule to update her beliefs but under the assumption that




1− pn · (1− q) . (13)
Note that the right-hand side does not depend on ps or equilibrium strategies rθ(p). The (1− q)
term in (12) and (13) is the “inherent meaning” of a bad review – the fact that absent any other
information, the belief should decrease. The rH(p)/rL(p) ratio in (12) represents the information
about quality θ contained in the seller’s strategies.











(1− λπ(p)dt) + λπ(p)dt · (1− rL(pt))
.
By the usual argument, which involves taking logarithms of both sides and using the approximation
ln(1 + x) ≈ x for small x, we obtain




















, so the expression above can be written as
ṗs = λps (1− ps) · π(p)D(p). (14)
For naive consumers, the similar procedure under the assumption rH(p) = rL(p) = 1 yields
ṗn = 0. Since the intensity λ of reviews’ arrival in the absence of censorship is the same for high-
and low-quality products, the lack of reviews is uninformative for naive consumers, and their belief
stays frozen until a new review is published.
Preliminaries: Bands and Patience
In the analysis it will prove useful to have measures of demand for the two groups of consumers.
Demand here is understood not in the sense of “how much a given consumer buys” but rather “how
long it takes until type-γ consumers stop buying the product.” We introduce these measures of
“how long” in different ways for naive and sophisticated consumers.
Belief pn of naive consumers in the absence of good reviews is fully determined by the prior
and the number of posted bad reviews. In particular, it is independent of time, so naive consumers
do not change their purchasing behavior as long as no new reviews are posted. We can, however,
keep track of how many more bad reviews they are ready to observe in the absence of good reviews
before they stop buying the product. We do this by partitioning the state space (pn, ps) into
“bands” {Bk}k>0, where k corresponds to the number of bad reviews needed to drop the naive
consumers’ belief pn below the threshold p̄. In particular, let B0 := {p | pn ∈ [0, p̄)} and for
k ∈ N let Bk := {p | f(p) ∈ Bk−1}\Bk−1. Additionally, let Bk+ := ∪k′>kBk′ . We further split each
band into two parts according to whether ps is above or below p̄, with B↑k := Bk ∩ {ps > p̄} and
B↓k := Bk ∩ {ps < p̄}.
Figure 4 illustrates bands together with an example path of beliefs from time zero until a point
where all consumers stop buying the product in the absence of a good review. Solid arrows show
how beliefs drift over time in the absence of reviews, dotted arrows show how beliefs jump when a
bad review is disclosed, and p̄ is such that fn(p̄, ps) = p̄ for arbitrary ps.
On the other hand, to measure sophisticated consumers’ demand we use their “patience” τ(p)
– the time it takes sophisticated consumers to quit the market in the absence of any reviews.
Formally, for any k and all p ∈ Bk, let












Figure 4: state space, “bands” and an example path of beliefs
where the evolution of pt is given by (14).
54 Let τ(p) = +∞ if pt never reaches B↓k from p.
Since “deleting all future bad reviews” is an available strategy, τ(p) gives a lower bound on
time for which a seller can keep sophisticated consumers in the market starting from p. As we will
see in Section II, the low-type seller can actually do no better than this, meaning that τ(p) is the
exact measure of residual demand from sophisticated consumers faced by the low-type seller.
Two important properties of τ(p) are worth noting. Firstly, it follows directly from (14) (see






λz (1− z) · π(pn, z)D(pn, z)dz.
Secondly, we claim that τ(p) is actually finite for interior ps:
Lemma 1. In any equilibrium, τ(p) < +∞ and, thus, D(p) < 0 for all p with ps < 1.
The formal proof is contained in the Appendix, although the intuition behind it is simple.
Assume by way of contradiction that there exists p such that τ(p) = +∞. Then once in state p,
54To clarify, τ(p) is not the “calendar time” of the game when it reaches B↓k, but rather the time it takes beliefs
to drift from p to B↓k. If the origin state p was reached at some time t then B
↓
k will be reached at time t+ τ(p) in the
absence of posted reviews. This interpretation of time is used throughout the paper, and calendar time is ignored
throughout.
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the seller is able to retain sophisticated consumers forever by deleting all future bad reviews. On
the other hand, τ(p) = +∞ implies that deleting bad reviews will bring the seller either to a state
with zero drift, or to an interval of states that requires infinite time to drift through. In either
case, this means that for any small ε > 0 there exists some state p̂ = (p̂n, p̂s) with: (1) D(p̂) > −ε,
and (2) τ(p̂) > 1/ε. The former property implies that some type of the seller should be willing
to reveal a bad review at p̂ (since otherwise D(p̂) = −q by (14)), and that f s(p̂) < p̂s by the
martingale property of beliefs.55 The latter fact – that τ(p̂) is effectively infinite – implies that
revealing a bad review should also retain sophisticated consumers for an arbitrarily long time (i.e.,
τ(f(p̂)) ≈ +∞), as otherwise neither type of the seller would have any incentives to reveal (since a
bad review cannot increase sales to naive consumers). However, then we arrive at a state f(p̂) with
f s(p̂) < p̂s and arbitrarily large τ(f(p̂)), so the same argument can be applied again. By iterating
the procedure we are bound to eventually arrive at a state with ps < p̄ where the sophisticated
consumers no longer buy the product. This leads to a contradiction, since in that state τ(p) = 0.
Main Results
The remainder of Section II is devoted to characterizing the equilibria of the game. Sections
II to II provide a detailed characterization, while the current section summarizes the main results
and provides a condensed version of the intuition behind them.
The first main result, Theorem 2, states that if sophisticated consumers are buying the product,
then any bad review they observe when ready to buy the product will weakly improve their belief
in product quality. In particular, this implies that if a sophisticated consumer is willing to buy the
product after observing current time, then reading bad reviews cannot change her mind. We dub
this result “reversal”, since sophisticated consumers’ reaction to bad reviews is reversed from its
natural direction – instead of decreasing ps, any bad review manages to increase it.
Theorem 2 (Reversal). In any equilibrium of the game with R 6= ∅: if p ∈ R and ps > p̄ then
f s(p) > ps.
Condition ps > p̄ ensures that the sophisticated consumers’ opinion actually matters. This is a
sufficient condition for reversal in our model but not a necessary one (as we see below, f s(p) > ps
for p ∈ B↓1 ∩ R, even though by definition ps < p̄ for all p ∈ B
↓
1). Further, the theorem only has
55Given that ps strictly increases after a good review, it has to go down either after a bad review, or in the
absence of reviews. We show that D(p) = −q is required for fs(p) = ps (see Lemma 10 in the Appendix), while if
D(p) = −ε > −q, then it should be that fs(p) > ps.
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any power when looking at equilibria in which bad reviews are revealed – although the statement
itself formally holds for the fully censored equilibrium as well.
While Theorem 2 may seem trivial at first – “if a seller reveals bad reviews then it must be
profitable for him to do so” – the devil, as per the tradition, is in the details. In particular, it is
not obvious that “more profitable” corresponds to f s(p) > ps, since the latter property does not
guarantee τ(f(p)) > τ(p). Before discussing the intuition behind Theorem 2, we state one of its
corollaries, which claims that in any equilibrium, the high-type seller is less likely to conceal any
bad review than the low-type seller.
Corollary 1. In any equilibrium of the game with R 6= ∅: if p ∈ R and ps > p̄ then rH(p) > rL(p).
This corollary is an immediate consequence of equation (12) and Theorem 2. While formally
trivial, this corollary is valuable in that it describes the mechanics of Theorem 2: reversal is achieved
via the low-type seller deleting more bad reviews than the high type. The fact that a bad review
was not deleted is then a strong signal of high quality, which in the end outweighs the inherently
negative information contained in the review.
The reasoning behind Theorem 2 proceeds in two steps. First we show that in any equilibrium
the low-type seller must be indifferent between revealing and deleting a bad review at any p ∈ R
(see Lemma 2 below). Then we show that any strategy profile that satisfies this indifference also
necessarily satisfies the first statement of the Theorem.
Arguably the more interesting part of the proof is the second step: from indifference to
f s(p) > ps. This result comes through two main channels: the compensation effect and the
expectancy effect. The compensation effect states that if p ∈ B1, i.e., pn > p̄ > fn(p) – naive
consumers are close to quitting the market and one more bad review drives them out, – then the
seller’s decision to disclose a bad review should be rewarded by higher demand from sophisticated
consumers. This comes from equilibrium reasoning: if a bad review is disclosed then it is beneficial
to do so for some type of the seller, meaning that if the seller loses naive consumers, demand from
sophisticated consumers should increase. This higher demand requirement then translates to an
increase in reputation requirement.
The expectancy effect is more subtle and can be seen as ripples on the water, propagating the
original effect away from B1 into the B↑2+ region. By the martingale property of beliefs, values of
f s(p)−ps andD(p) are negatively associated for any given p.56 Therefore, the situation in B1 creates
very high expectancy for sophisticated consumers; either outcome affects their belief significantly.
56We use “negatively associated” as an informal term; its exact meaning is given by Lemma 10 in the Appendix.
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Any bad review that is revealed improves it by a lot, but in the absence of reviews this belief
deteriorates rapidly. In particular, high expectancy makes sophisticated consumers impatient: for
a given p, more expectancy in the near future leads to lower patience τ(p), which is disliked by
the seller. Therefore, in order to incentivize the seller to reveal bad reviews in B↑2 – and expose
himself to this state of high expectancy, – the seller should be rewarded with a reputation premium
for doing so. This premium, in turn, increases expectancy above baseline in B↑2, and the whole
reasoning unravels to bands B↑k with k > 2. Noteworthy is the fact that if expectancy in B
↑
1 is high
enough to start this chain reaction, then strictly positive reputation premia are required in B↑2+ to
incentivize the seller to reveal a bad review – even though this does not lead to immediate loss of
naive consumers’ demand.
Our second main result, Theorem 3, demonstrates existence of equilibria in which bad reviews
are revealed in a payoff-relevant way. It claims that there exist equilibria that
1. are non-trivially different from the fully censored equilibrium in terms of payoff, and
2. admit strict reversal: f s(p) > ps for all p ∈ R.
We construct one family of equilibria that exhibit both features, but one can easily construct an
equilibrium that has one of the above features and not the other.
Theorem 3 (Revelation). In the set of all equilibria for any given parameter values
1. if µ ∈ [0, 1/2], then all equilibria are payoff-equivalent to the fully censored equilibrium;
2. if µ ∈ (1/2, 1), then there exist equilibria with R 6= ∅, which have f s(p) > ps for all p ∈ R,
and which are not payoff-equivalent to the fully censored equilibrium.
The first statement of Theorem 3 follows from Proposition 11 below, which implies that if
µ < 1/2, then R∩B1 = ∅. Therefore, naive consumers’ demand cannot be affected by any sequence
of bad reviews in equilibrium – bad reviews can only be revealed in B0 and B2+, where pn and
fn(p) are always on the same side of p̄. In other words, bad reviews can never work as a costly
signal because they are never actually costly in terms of driving naive consumers out of the market.
Sophisticated consumers then ignore bad reviews altogether. In the end, while some bad reviews
may be revealed in equilibrium, they do not have any payoff-relevant effects.
The second statement of Theorem 3 is ex ante not trivial. Basic models of disclosure (such as
Grossman [1981] and Jung and Kwon [1988]) predict that revealing bad news to a sophisticated
audience is always suboptimal. It is straightforward that revealing bad news to a purely naive
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audience is also suboptimal. However, Theorem 2 shows that the presence of naive consumers in
the market affects sophisticated consumers’ reaction to bad news, rendering it positive.57 The main
message of Theorem 3 is that this reversal can justify the revelation of bad news as long as naive
consumers do not dominate the market. Furthermore, the value of Theorem 3 is in saying that
bad news can be revealed in a payoff-relevant way. This is in contrast to, e.g., Grossman [1981],
where the lowest type may disclose his information in equilibrium, but this would be equivalent to
an equilibrium in which bad news are never revealed.
The main idea behind Theorem 3 is as follows. Reversal – which is satisfied by all equilibria
as per Theorem 2, and hence is a necessary condition for equilibrium – requires that the high-type
seller reveals more bad reviews than the low type (Corollary 1). Therefore, the high type must be
weakly more willing to reveal bad reviews at all p ∈ R. We show that this preference indeed exists
when µ > 1/2 because the high type faces higher rate of arrival of good reviews and is thus less
afraid to lose naive consumers to bad reviews than the low type.
The remainder of Section II characterizes the game’s equilibria in greater detail. A reader who
is not interested in these details is invited to skip to Section II. Section II argues that the low-type
seller has to always be indifferent between revealing and deleting bad reviews, and demonstrates
the implications of this indifference for equilibrium strategy profiles and belief dynamics. Theorem
2 relies on Section II only. Section II explores the incentives of the high-type seller conditional
on low type’s indifference. Section II describes an example of the equilibrium that satisfies the
conditions of Theorem 3.
Characterization: Low Type’s Preferences
The first big step in understanding the equilibria of the game relates to incentives of the low-
type seller. In particular, we show that for any bad review that can be revealed in equilibrium, the
low-type seller must be indifferent between revealing this bad review and deleting it.
Lemma 2. In any equilibrium, all rL(p) ∈ [0, 1] are optimal at all p ∈ R. Consequently, deleting all
future bad reviews is an optimal continuation strategy for the low-type seller at all p. Furthermore:
1. τ(p) = τ(f(p)) for all p ∈ B↑0 ∩R,
2. e−rτ(p) = 1−µ
µ
+ e−rτ(f(p)) for all p ∈ B↑1 ∩R,
57Recall that we only allow µ ∈ [0, 1) in the model. It is argued in Section II that in case µ = 1, all equilibria are
payoff-equivalent to the fully censored equilibrium. Therefore, naive consumers are necessary for bad reviews to be
revealed in a payoff-relevant way.
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3. τ(p) = τ(f(p)) for all p ∈ B↑2+ ∩R.
The intuition behind this result is best understood from reasoning by contradiction. Fix
arbitrary p ∈ R. If out of the two actions (deleting a bad review and not) at p the low type only
ever does one but not the other, then “the other” becomes a strong positive signal for sophisticated
consumers – so strong that the low-type seller should always find it strictly optimal to pick the
“other” action. The details of the argument differ for the two actions, but the essence boils down
to the reasoning above.
The behavioral strategy rL(p) = 0 (deleting a bad review at p for sure) is weakly optimal for low-
type seller at any p ∈ R by Lemma 2 and strictly optimal at any p 6∈ R due to the assumption that
f s(p) = 0 for p 6∈ R. Therefore, deleting all bad reviews is trivially a weakly optimal continuation










In particular, notice that V L(p) only depends on τ(p) and the indicator 1(pn > p̄).
Finally, given the optimality of deleting all future bad reviews, the equalities in Lemma 2
follow directly by ensuring that V L(p) = V L(f(p)) for all p ∈ R. The patience of sophisticated
consumers should increase in such a way as to exactly compensate for the loss of naive consumers
from revealing a given bad review. In particular, it should be unchanged if the purchasing behavior
of naive consumers is unaffected by the revelation.
We now move on to exploring the implications of Lemma 2 for belief dynamics. We essentially
unravel the game by backward induction on the state space, analyzing different regions separately.
Band B0
In B0 = {p|pn ∈ [0, p̄)}, naive consumers are too pessimistic about the product quality to make
a purchase. If in addition ps < p̄ (i.e., p ∈ B↓0), then the same applies to sophisticated consumers,
and the market collapses – no purchases are made and no reviews are written. Region B↓0 is thus
an absorbing state and serves as a starting point for the “unraveling” of the state space.
If ps > p̄ (that is, p ∈ B↑0), then only sophisticated consumers buy the product. Since pn is
frozen absent any reviews, only two escapes are possible from B↑0: either a good review is posted and
consumers’ beliefs jump to pn = ps = 1, in which case the seller’s strategy becomes irrelevant and
all consumers stay in the market forever, or the sophisticated consumers become too pessimistic
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and the game arrives at the region B↓0 described above (from Lemma 1, we know this happens in
finite time). This structure allows us to characterize continuation equilibria of the game starting
from any state p ∈ B↑0.
Proposition 10 states that disclosure of a bad review should not affect the belief of sophisticated
consumers in B↑0. Whenever naive consumers have quit the market, the seller can no longer signal
his credibility to the sophisticated consumers by sacrificing naive consumers’ demand.




constitutes an equilibrium if and only if f s(p) = ps
for all p ∈ B↑0 ∩R.
From Lemma 2 we already know that since revealing a bad review at p ∈ B↑0 ∩ R does not
affect the purchasing behavior of naive consumers, it should also have no effect on sophisticated
consumers’ patience: τ(p) = τ(f(p)). It is relatively straightforward that an equilibrium with
f s(p) = ps for all p ∈ B↑0 ∩R would satisfy this requirement. The value of Proposition 10 hence lies
in showing that the converse is also true: sophisticated consumers’ belief has to stay unaffected in
order to warrant τ(p) = τ(f(p)), since in any other case the equilibrium cannot be sustained. This
also implies that all equilibria are payoff-equivalent in B0.
Corollary 2. All continuation equilibria starting from any given p ∈ B0 are payoff-equivalent to
the fully censored continuation equilibrium.
This Corollary follows from the fact that at any given p, drift speed D(p) is the same whether
p 6∈ R or p ∈ R and f s(p) = ps – if bad reviews are irrelevant for sophisticated consumers then it
does not matter whether they are revealed in B0 or not.
It is worth noting that Proposition 10 and Corollary 2 apply to the whole state space (i.e., all
histories) in case µ = 1 when all consumers are sophisticated. While this case is purposefully not
included in the model setup (all following results only apply to µ ∈ [0, 1)), this is mostly for the
sake of narrative clarity. The fact that Proposition 10 applies globally when µ = 1 means that
in the absence of naive consumers, bad reviews are completely irrelevant under censorship. Even
though some bad reviews may be revealed in that case (since f s(p) = ps requires rL(p) < 1 for any
p ∈ R as per (12)), those that are revealed carry no useful information whatsoever and have no
effect on [sophisticated] consumers’ behavior. Furthermore, revealing bad reviews in that setting
has no value to either the seller or the consumers, so all equilibria are payoff-equivalent to the fully
censored equilibrium.58 Therefore, all following results rely on nonzero market presence of naive




Continuing to band B1 = {p | pn ∈ [p̄, p̄)}, one should notice that starting from B1 the beliefs
may only jump to pn = ps = 1 after a good review, band B0 after a bad review, or stay in B1
forever absent any reviews. Therefore, having full knowledge of continuation equilibria in B0, we
can describe the continuation equilibria that start in B1. The parts of most interest are given by the
two following propositions. Proposition 11 states that bad reviews are only revealed in B1 if there
are sufficiently many sophisticated consumers in the market (µ > 1/2) and they are sufficiently
close to quitting the market (ps is low enough). Proposition 12 then concludes that whenever a
bad review is disclosed in B1, it strictly improves sophisticated consumers’ belief ps.







r + (1− p̄)(1− µ)λr
.
Proposition 12. In any equilibrium of the game f s(p) > ps for all p ∈ B1 ∩R.
By Lemma 2 the low-type seller should be indifferent between revealing and deleting a bad
review at any p ∈ B1 ∩ R. He can retain naive consumers in the market forever starting from
any p with pn > p̄ and can never bring them back to the market starting from any p with pn < p̄.
Revealing a bad review at some p ∈ B1 and losing naive consumers forever is then always worse than
deleting it and retaining naive consumers forever – even if revealing the review brings sophisticated
consumers to the market and retains them forever. Therefore, any reason to allow bad reviews in
B1 only arises if µ > 1/2, i.e., if sophisticated consumers are more prevalent in the market than
naive consumers. This gives the first condition in Proposition 11.
The second condition in Proposition 11 comes from the fact that at some states p ∈ B↑1 patience
τ(p) is so large that even a jump to the most optimistic belief f s(p) = 1 – which grants the seller
sales to sophisticated consumers from now until eternity – is not sufficient to compensate the seller
for the loss of naive consumers. This leads to an upper bound on ps at which bad reviews may be
disclosed.
The fact that any revealed bad review trades off naive consumers’ demand for that of
sophisticated consumers is the basic idea behind Proposition 12: τ(p) should increase following
disclosure, which implies that ps should increase as well. This implication is not as trivial as may
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seem at first because the speeds at which the belief of sophisticated consumers drifts toward p̄ in
B0 and B1 are not the same in general.
Band B2+
Analogous to before, from B2 the beliefs may only escape to pn = ps = 1 after a good review,
into B1 after a bad review, or else stay in B2 if no reviews are posted. Therefore, we can apply our
knowledge of continuation equilibria in B1 to explore the continuation equilibria originating in B2
and then unravel to include Bk with k > 2. This will conclude our analysis of the implications of
the low type’s incentives, since the set ∪k>0Bk covers the whole state space, so any equilibrium of
the game is a continuation equilibrium starting in one of these bands.
Proposition 13. In any equilibrium of the game f(p) > ps for all p ∈ B↑2+ ∩R.
While Proposition 13 may look very similar to Proposition 12, the reasoning behind it is more
subtle. An extremely informal explanation follows.
By the martingale property of beliefs, values of f s(p)− ps and D(p) are negatively associated:
the stronger is the positive reaction to a bad review, the stronger should be the negative reaction
to the absence of reviews.59 We use the informal term “expectancy” to denote the common factor
underlying both values: high expectancy is associated with high drift speed |D(p)| (i.e., very
negative D(p)) and strong reversal f s(p)− ps, and vice versa.
Recall from Lemma 2 that the low-type seller must be indifferent between disclosing a bad
review and deleting it in all p ∈ B2+ ∩ R, so it must be that τ(p) = τ(f(p)). We know from
Proposition 12 that f s(p)−ps > 0 for all p ∈ B1∩R, so expectancy is high in B1 and hence D(p) is
strongly negative there. This means that sophisticated consumers are relatively impatient – τ(f(p))
is “small” for f(p) ∈ B↑1. Therefore, the expectancy in B
↑
2 should also be high. If it is not then τ(p)
is “large” for p ∈ B↑2, while f s(p) − ps is “small”, which together with sophisticated consumers’
impatience in B1 implies that τ(f(p)) is “very small” – a contradiction to τ(p) = τ(f(p)). Iterating
the same argument over bands, we then get that f s(p) > ps for all p ∈ B↑2+ ∩R.
The argument above is, admittedly, not very believable without defining what “small” and
“large” mean. It also largely ignores the possibility that the revelation set R may look very
differently in the two bands (and the expectancy is different in and out of R – there is no reason
to grow very pessimistic in the absence of reviews if bad reviews are effectively banned at p 6∈ R),
59Although drift speed |D(p)| and degree of reversal fs(p) − ps are not connected one-to-one, what matters for
the argument is that D(p) > (>)− q if and only if fs(p)− ps 6 (<)0 (see Lemma 10).
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as well as the fact that even different states in a given Bk ∩R can have different expectancy. The
formal proof in the appendix addresses all these issues properly.
Unlike in B1, we cannot make any hard statements about the area below the cutoff, B↓2+. The
reasoning for p ∈ B↑2+ ∩R relies on the fact that the cutoff p̄ is always reached in finite time from
any ps < 1. Under the cutoff there is no such terminal point. All states under the cutoff are
inherently similar – they all can warrant the status quo forever, where the sophisticated consumers
are out of the market until a good review arrives and the naive consumers buy the product forever.
Therefore, as long as the seller is guaranteed to arrive at a state with τ(p) = 0 (i.e., ps < p̄), he does
not care about the exact f s(p). This means that there is no problem in having arbitrary jumps
of ps. On the other hand, this also means that there are no impediments to constructing specific
equilibria in which f s(p) > ps for all p ∈ B↓2+ ∩R.
Characterization: High Type’s Preferences
This section investigates the high-type seller’s preferences conditional on the low type’s
indifference. In doing so we retrace the same path over bands that we followed in the second
step of the proof of Theorem 2. For B↑0, Corollary 2 states that all continuation equilibria at any
p ∈ B↑0 are payoff-equivalent: when all bad reviews are completely uninformative, it does not make
much difference whether any of them are revealed on equilibrium path or not.
The key insight into the high type’s incentives lies in B↓1. In any state p ∈ B
↓
1 ∩ R, the seller
with a bad review in hand faces the following choice. Deleting this and future bad reviews retains
naive consumers in the market forever but cannot attract sophisticated consumers. Revealing the
review, on the other hand, brings sophisticated consumers to the market for some time τ(f(p)),
but drives the naive consumers away. Figure 5 demonstrates this trade-off graphically, showing
expected sales per consumer π(pt) as a function of time for the two strategies outlined above. Time
zero on the graph corresponds to states p or f(p) respectively. This graph is valid for arbitrary
p ∈ B1 ∩R; in the special case of p ∈ B↓1 we have τ(p) = 0.
The low-type seller must be indifferent between deleting and revealing a bad review at any
p ∈ B1∩R, meaning that expected sales in the absence of future reviews should be equal in the two
scenarios.60 Visually, it means that the areas under the two intertemporal demand curves in Figure
5 should be equal (after discounting future sales appropriately). The graph makes it obvious why
µ > 1/2 is necessary to render the low type indifferent in B1 (and thus generate a strategy profile
60It is enough to consider the case when no reviews arrive after p because the low type can never receive good










Figure 5: Intertemporal demand starting from some p ∈ B1 ∩R and f(p).
with nonempty B1 ∩R) – otherwise deleting the review and staying at p is strictly better.
We next argue that the high type prefers to reveal at p ∈ B1 ∩R, conditional on the low type’s
indifference. To see this, note that the only difference between the payoffs of the two types is the
option value of receiving a good review for the high-type seller. Because a good review generates
the best possible continuation payoff (all consumers buying forever), the high type prefers that this
good review arrives sooner rather than later. The rate of arrival of reviews is exactly proportional
to sales per consumer. Therefore, conditional on total expected discounted sales being the same in
both scenarios (to satisfy the low type’s indifference), the high-type seller prefers to frontload sales.
In other words, he wants to sell as much product as possible early on in an attempt to generate a
good review as early as possible. By looking at Figure 5 it is easy to see that if τ(p) = 0 – which
is the case for all p ∈ B↓1, – then revealing a bad review and jumping to f(p) generates a more
frontloaded demand schedule than deleting a bad review and staying at p. The high type prefers
to reveal the bad review because it makes the first good review arrive sooner on average.
At the same time, this can be seen as a costly signaling story. The high-type seller strictly
prefers to reveal a bad review and lose naive consumers because this is less costly for him than
for the low type. In particular, the high type knows that with positive probability he will receive
a good review in the future, which will bring naive consumers back to the market. On the other
hand, the fact that revealing a bad review is less costly for the high type than for the low type
makes this signal credible for sophisticated consumers, who then react positively to bad reviews.
One can see from Figure 5 that the reasoning for B↓1 presented above also extends by continuity
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to p ∈ B↑1 ∩R as long as τ(p) is low enough. However, it does not need to extend all the way to p∗
as given by Proposition 11, meaning that the high type’s incentives may provide a tighter bound
on ps for which bad reviews can be revealed in B1.
Finally, this preference to reveal bad reviews extends from B1 to B2+ (as long as B1 ∩R is non-
trivial). The intuition is as follows. Deleting or revealing a bad review in any p ∈ B2+ ∩R has no
immediate effect: it affects neither the naive consumers’ decision to purchase the product, nor the
sophisticated consumers’ patience τ(p) (which again follows from Lemma 2). However, revealing
a bad review – and sufficiently many bad reviews after it – will bring the high-type seller to some
p′ ∈ B1. With positive probability he can then receive another bad review in some p′′ ∈ B1 ∩ R
and reveal it, which, as we have established above, is a strictly preferred option. Thus revealing a
bad review at p ∈ B2+ ∩R is strictly better than deleting it because it gives the high-type seller a
chance to eventually arrive at B0, which he strictly prefers to staying in B1 and, by analogy, B2+.
Existence Example
The argument in II implies that the strategy profile akin to the one represented in Figure 6
(the formal construction is in the Appendix) could constitute an equilibrium. In particular, this is
exactly the equilibrium that is constructed in the proof of Theorem 3. The orange shaded region is
the set (0, 1)× (0, 1)\R where no bad reviews are ever revealed. It includes B0, most of B↑1, and the
line {p | pn > p̄, ps = p̄}. The white region is the revelation setR = {B1 | ps < p̄+ε}∪{B2+ | ps 6= p̄}
for some ε. The argument above has shown that the equilibrium conditions (low type’s indifference
and high type’s preference to reveal) can be satisfied for all p within such R.61 The purple dotted
lines show the set of states p that are on equilibrium path given p0. The blue arrows create a
“phase diagram,” pointing from p to f(p) for some selected p ∈ R.
We now want to show that the equilibrium with the revelation set R described above can satisfy
the two properties we are seeking for Theorem 3: it generates payoffs that are different from the
fully censored equilibrium and it generates strict reversal in all p ∈ R. We will start with the latter.
We have B0 ∩R = ∅, and Proposition 12 already gives strict reversal for all p ∈ B1 ∩R. Therefore,
it is only left to show strict reversal for B2+. In the case of p ∈ B↓2+ any action profile can satisfy
the equilibrium conditions as long as f s(p) < p̄, so we can easily construct it in such a way that
f s(p) > ps. Finally, the channel through which reversal works in B↑2+ has been described in section
II. Importantly, that channel relied on high expectancy (i.e., high drift speeds |D(p)|) in B↑1, which















Figure 6: An example of equilibrium with strict reversal.
in turn requires B↑1 ∩R 6= ∅. Therefore, it is important to include the ε-slice of B
↑
1 in our revelation
set R to generate strict reversal in B↑2+.
The other property – payoff-nonequivalence – is easy to deduct given the strict reversal. In fully
censored equilibrium D(p) = −q for all p. In the equilibrium we have constructed, f s(p) > ps for
almost all p ∈ B↑2+, which by Lemma 10 implies that D(p) < −q for all p. Using representation (77)
of τ(p), we immediately obtain that for any given p ∈ B2+ (with ps > p̄), sophisticated consumers’
patience τ(p) is lower in the equilibrium we have constructed than in the fully censored equilibrium.
From Lemma 2 and the consequent optimality of deleting all bad reviews for the low-type seller,
one can then conclude that V L(p) is also lower for such p in the equilibrium of Figure 6 than in
the fully censored equilibrium.
Discussion and Extensions
This section presents additional observations resulting from our model, which are not directly
related to Theorems 2 and 3. We then consider some extensions of the baseline model.
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Seller’s Profit
One topic that persists throughout the model is multiplicity of equilibria, which differ in terms
of R – the set of states at which bad reviews are revealed on the equilibrium path. It is then
natural to ask which types of players prefer which equilibria. Theorem 3 says that in case µ 6 1/2
all equilibria are payoff-equivalent. Therefore, from this point onward assume that µ ∈ (1/2, 1).
Proposition 14 below addresses the question of seller’s profit. The next subsection discusses issues
related to consumers’ welfare.
In general, multiple equilibria may exist with the same revelation set R, and payoff comparison
across such equilibria is ambiguous. Therefore, we employ the following equilibrium selection.
Definition 7. An equilibrium (rL(p), rH(p)) is called semi-separating if rH(p) = 1 for all p ∈ R.
This class of equilibria is non-empty, since our constructive proof of the second part of Theorem 3
presents one such equilibrium.62 As discussed above, Corollary 1 directly implies that at any p ∈ R
we have rH(p) > rL(p) > 0, so the high-type seller should at least weakly prefer to disclose a bad
review at p. The refinement above then only rules out the case when the high-type seller is exactly
indifferent and deletes bad reviews with positive probability.
Proposition 14. Suppose that µ ∈ (1/2, 1) and consider two semi-separating equilibria with
revelation sets R′ and R′′ ⊂ R′, respectively. Then the low-type seller weakly prefers equilibrium
with R′′ to equilibrium with R′ at all p.
Larger R means more bad reviews are revealed in equilibrium, but it also leads to higher
expectancy, making sophisticated consumers less patient. The latter implies the larger is R, the
smaller is τ(p) for all p ∈ B↑, which in turn makes the low-type seller strictly worse off at those
states.
As for the high-type seller, he (weakly) benefits from revealing bad reviews, so he prefers
equilibria with larger B↓1+ ∩ R conditional on f(p) being the same in both equilibria for all
p ∈ B↓1+ ∩ R. However, in B
↑
1+ the two effects described above – less-patient consumers given
larger R but more opportunities to reveal a bad review – work in the opposite directions, so the
high type’s final preferences are ambiguous. Intuitively, in state p ∈ B↑1+ where both pn and ps are
small enough, the high-type seller prefers large R because option value of signalling outweighs the
lower patience of sophisticated consumers. On the other hand, by the same reasoning, if either pn
62In fact, if there exists some equilibrium with a given R, then there exists a semi-separating equilibrium with
that R.
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or ps is large then the seller evaluating his perspectives in state p would prefer to be in equilibrium
with small R. This intuition is confirmed by numerical simulations (python code available upon
request).
Asymptotic Learning
The expected utility of a consumer arriving at time t would depend on reviews revealed up to t
and is thus tough to measure, even in expectation. However, it is possible to make limit statements.
This subsection examines whether the seller’s type is learned by the consumers asymptotically as
t→ +∞.
Assume that p0 > p̄ to avoid triviality. We say that the seller’s type is asymptotically learned
by consumers of type γ if the probability that the purchase decision made by consumer of type γ
is correct if it approaches 1 as t→ +∞.63 Asymptotic learning is trivially connected to the welfare
of consumers who arrive sufficiently late: if the seller’s type is learned, then consumers have full
information and thus make efficient purchasing decisions. Not perfectly identifying either type of
seller is associated with losses from either buying a low-quality product or not buying a high-quality
product.
The bad news for consumers is that learning both sellers’ types, by the design of our information
structure, is impossible in any equilibrium. To see this, suppose there exists some time t such that
absent a good review, both types of consumers stop buying the product by time t with positive
probability. With probability e−λqt > 0, a high-type seller receives no good review by time t,
meaning that with positive probability consumers stop purchasing a high-quality product. On the
other hand, if no such time t exists, then consumers never stop buying a low-quality product.
Therefore, in any equilibrium at most one type of seller can be identified by all consumers.
In the absence of good reviews, sophisticated consumers always stop purchasing the product in
finite time, so they always reveal a low-type seller. Therefore, they can reveal a high-type seller if
and only if naive consumers stay in the market forever so that a good review eventually arrives. In
this case the naive consumers also reveal a high-type seller. This happens only if sufficiently many
bad reviews are deleted (which is the case in all equilibria if µ < 1/2). Conversely, if sufficiently
many bad reviews are revealed in equilibrium (R is sufficiently dense), then absent a good review,
naive consumers also stop buying the product almost surely as t → +∞. In this case they reveal
a low-type seller, but neither group of consumers is guaranteed to reveal a high-type seller.
63Correct decision is purchasing the product if and only if it is of high quality. Asymptotic mislearning is related
to herding on suboptimal alternatives, see Banerjee [1992], Bikhchandani et al. [1992].
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General Information Structures
Following the literature on experimentation, we have adopted the “conclusive good news”
structure in our model, so that any good review is a conclusive evidence of θ = H. However, it has
been noted that in experimentation models some interesting results disappear with the transition
to “conclusive bad news” case (see, e.g., Keller and Rady [2015], Halac and Kremer [2020]). In the
context of our model this information structure would mean that both types of sellers can generate
good reviews but only the low-type seller can receive bad reviews. The following proposition says
that in this case no bad reviews are ever revealed.
Proposition 15. In all equilibria under “conclusive bad news” R = ∅.
The intuition behind the proposition is trivial. Under conclusive bad news, any bad review
reveals to all future consumers that θ = L, meaning they have no reason to buy the product.
Therefore, revealing any bad review is a weakly dominated strategy, and a short proof shows that
it is actually strictly dominated.
Of course, possible information structures are not exhausted by the conclusive news cases.
Another setting we explore below is one where both good and bad reviews are inconclusive. In
particular, consider a “general” setting, defined as follows: the low-quality product yields utility 1
with probability qL+ and utility 0 with probability q
L
− = 1− qL+. The respective probabilities for the
high-quality product are qH+ and q
H
− = 1− qH+ , with qH+ > qL+. Let p̄ be such that
p̄qH+ + (1− p̄)qL+ = c.
Denote bad and good reviews in this setting as l ∈ {−,+} respectively. Let rθ−(p) and rθ+(p) denote
the probability with which seller of type θ reveals a bad review and a good review, respectively, in
state p. Let Rl := {p | (rHl (p), rLl (p)) 6= (0, 0)} for l ∈ {−,+}. Let f
γ
l (p) denote the belief of type-γ
consumer who observes a review l ∈ {−,+} posted in state p.
Note that even though this “general” setting is binary, for purposes of our result any setting
with more than two reviews/utility levels can be reduced to this general setting by banning (i.e.,
setting Rl = ∅ for) all but two reviews. For simplicity we also assume that qH+ · qH− > qL+ · qL− (so
that fn+(f−(p)) > p
n), but this is not a vital assumption.
The following proposition says that in this setting we can still construct an equilibrium in
which all revealed bad reviews (and good reviews alike) improve the seller’s reputation among
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sophisticated consumers – and again bad reviews are revealed in a nonempty set of states in a
payoff-relevant way.
Proposition 16. If µ ∈ (1/2, 1), then there exists an equilibrium in the general setting such that
1. f sl (p) > p
s for all p ∈ Rl and all l ∈ {−,+};
2. R− 6= ∅;
3. this equilibrium is payoff-distinct from fully censored equilibrium.
Fully censored equilibrium in this case can mean either one with R− = R+ = ∅ (i.e., one
in which all good and bad reviews are censored), or one with R− = ∅ and same R+ as in the
equilibrium under consideration. The latter definition ensures that payoff-nonequivalence is driven
by differences in R− and not R+.64
The equilibrium constructed in the proof is somewhat more restrictive than that in Theorem
3. In particular, the construction involves R− = B↓1+ and R+ = B
↑
−1 (where B−1 = {(pn, ps) ∈
B0 | (fn−)−1(pn) > p̄}). The important part is that the equilibrium constructed in the proof of
Proposition 16 still exhibits relevant economic forces. In particular, now both seller types can
bring naive consumers back to the market after driving them out, but this is still cheaper for the
high-type seller because he faces a higher rate of arrival of good reviews. Consequently, the high
type is more willing to lose naive consumers in the first place, which enables bad reviews’ signaling
function for sophisticated consumers.
Fake Reviews
Suppose that in addition to reviews written by consumers, the seller is able to post fake reviews
of his choice. As we show below, our main result (Theorem 3) survives in this case.
Adopt the general setting presented in the previous subsection. Suppose that now the seller
also receives opportunities to post any fake review he wants (good or bad) in addition to releasing
consumers’ real reviews. Future consumers cannot distinguish real reviews and fake reviews. Fake
review opportunities arrive with some finite Poisson intensity λφ, which serves as a proxy for the
cost of posting a fake review.65 This rate λφ can be arbitrarily high.
64One can also compare the equilibrium constructed in Proposition 16 to the one with R− = ∅ and R+ = [0, 1]
2
with similar results.
65We interpret the low opportunity arrival rate λφ as high posting cost, which makes the seller reluctant to post
fake reviews very frequently, and vice versa.
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For simplicity we impose the same assumptions on fake review opportunities as we do on
censorable reviews. Most importantly, opportunities are perishable: given that an opportunity has
arrived in some state p, the seller has to decide whether to exercise it immediately, otherwise the
opportunity vanishes. The seller also cannot delete fake reviews that he posted in the past.
Let φθl (p) ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability with which seller of type θ fakes review l ∈ {−,+} in
state p given that the opportunity. An obvious restriction is φθ−(p) + φ
θ
+(p) 6 1 for any θ, p.
A type-θ seller’s strategy in the fake reviews setting is then given by {rθl , φθl } for l ∈ {−,+}.
Rational consumers’ beliefs are updated as
f sl (p)













after review l ∈ {−,+}, and as























in the absence of reviews. We assume that naive consumers ignore the possibility of fake reviews
in the same way that they ignore censorship; hence their belief pn is still frozen in the absence of









To show that our main result survives in this setting, we take the equilibrium constructed in
the proof of Proposition 16 and show that an analogous strategy profile is an equilibrium in fake
reviews setting.
Proposition 17. If µ ∈ (1/2, 1), then there exists an equilibrium in the general setting with fake
reviews such that
1. f sl (p) > p
s for all p ∈ Rl and all l ∈ {−,+};
2. R− 6= ∅;
3. this equilibrium is payoff-distinct from fully censored equilibrium.
Fully censored equilibrium here has the same possible meanings as in Proposition 16. The
equilibrium constructed in the proof features φθ+(p) = 1 whenever p ∈ R+, i.e., both types of seller
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post fake positive reviews at every opportunity. This dilutes the positive signal contained in good
reviews but does not eliminate it completely: f s+(p) > p
s but f s+(p) → ps as λφ → ∞.
More interestingly, the equilibrium also features φH− (p) = 1 for all p ∈ R−: the high type strictly
prefers to post fake negative reviews for his own product.66 This is because, as in the baseline model,
the low-type seller is always indifferent between revealing bad reviews and deleting them, while the
high type extracts a strictly positive value from signaling through bad reviews (at least in B↓1+).
The high-type seller writes fake bad reviews only so that he can impress sophisticated consumers
with them. Sophisticated consumers then do indeed improve their opinion about product quality,
even despite (and actually thanks to) the fact that they are fully aware that bad reviews they
observe are likely fake and do not stem from any consumer’s actual experience.
Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that the presence of naive consumers in the market may incentivize
the seller to reveal bad reviews even in the presence of an opportunity to costlessly delete them.
We show that bad reviews in this setting can be used as a signaling device by the seller with a
high-quality product. Revealing bad reviews hurts sales to naive consumers, which he can regain
through good reviews more easily than a seller with a low-quality product. This extra information
contained in the fact that a bad review was not deleted makes sophisticated consumers perceive
bad reviews more favorably than in the absence of censorship. Furthermore, this between-the-
lines information outweighs the inherent negativity of the review, making sophisticated consumers
improve their opinion about the product upon observing a bad review.
Important simplifying assumptions incorporated in the model include the seller’s monopoly in
the market and his inability to set the price freely, which are in some sense contradictory. Whether
the effects demonstrated in this paper survive under competition and/or free pricing of the product
is a possible direction for future work.
66To clarify, the two features – φθ+(p) = 1 whenever p ∈ R+ and φ
H
− (p) = 1 whenever p ∈ R− – can coexist in the
constructed equilibrium because R− ∩R+ = ∅.
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The Limits of Social Learning67
joint with Egor Starkov
Introduction
Whenever information is dispersed in the society, the question of social learning arises: can
the society aggregate this information and achieve an efficient outcome for its members? In recent
times, online customer reviews have become a powerful tool of social learning: according to multiple
surveys of internet users, at least a half of respondents use ratings and online reviews “always” or
“often” to inform their purchasing decisions, and most respondents find reviews to be at least
“mostly reliable” (Competition & Markets Authority [2015], Mintel [2015], eMarketer [2018]).
Curiously, only about 10% of respondents to one of the aforementioned surveys say that they
find product reviews “very reliable” (eMarketer [2018]). This skepticism can arise due to a variety
of reasons, which mostly include various ways in which sellers can meddle with reviews, such as
censorship and fake reviews.68 However, in this paper we show that even in the absence of any
intervention from sellers, reviews can get noisy organically.
To understand the source of this noise, which stems from how customers write reviews, one
must first ask why customers write reviews. Surveys consistently produce a few modal answers
to this question, with one of the most popular ones being “to help other consumers” (Trustpilot
[2018]). Caring about other consumers making the right choice is often a sufficient incentive for
people to spend their time and effort writing a review. These altruistic concerns, however, seem
to only appear ex post – after the consumer has purchased and consumed the product – rather
than ex ante. In particular, when choosing which product to buy, the consumers appear to focus
primarily on their own expected utility from consumption, rather than on their desire to provide
helpful information to others.
This inconsistency in altruism, as we show, must lead to noise in product reviews. When
product quality is uncertain, purchases have an informational externality, since in addition to direct
consumption utility they allow informative reviews to be written, which allow future consumers to
make more efficient decisions. However, when deciding on the purchase, a self-interested consumer
does not internalize this information-generating effect, and so their private expected value from
67This paper should be cited as A. Smirnov, E. Starkov. The Limits of Social Learning. mimeo, 2020.
68See, e.g., Luca and Zervas [2016] for an exploration of the effects of fake reviews and Smirnov and Starkov [2020]
for a model of censorship in product reviews.
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buying a product is always lower than social value. This discrepancy is, in turn, recognized by an
altruistic reviewer, who may in some circumstances want to mislead a future consumer into buying
a product when it is not individually optimal to do so.
We formalize the argument above in a model of product reviews, in which a sequence of
consumers decide whether to buy a product of some uncertain quality and, if they do, what kind of
review to write about their experience. A consumer in our model only purchases the product if her
expected consumption utility warrants this. The realized utility is informative about the product
quality. The consumer can leave a review describing her consumption experience, and when doing
so she wishes to maximize welfare of consumers that arrive at the market after her.
The myopic behavior at the purchasing stage and the altruistic desire to induce some
experimentation with the product at the reviewing stage conflict with each other. We show that
this conflict creates noise in communication through reviews. Instead of reporting their experiences
truthfully, the consumers obfuscate their reviews to foster experimentation. This is true regardless
of whether consumers can commit to some communication strategy (which should be interpreted
as a shared social norm among consumers) or not. In the latter case, every consumer leaves a
review they believe to be socially optimal given their experience. This scenario produces even more
interesting results.
In particular, we show that if a consumer cannot commit to a communication strategy, then
despite the conflict arising only in a special set of circumstances – when the product is believed to
be good enough to experiment with socially, but not good enough to buy just for the sake of doing
so, – we show that the effects of this conflict propagate and distort communication in other cases
as well. More specifically, communication must then take the interval structure known in the cheap
talk literature, when senders with similar private beliefs pool on the same message.
Two conclusions may be drawn from our results. Firstly, coarse categories in product reviews
(such as one- to five-star ratings) are almost sufficient for information transmission in the presence
of the aforementioned experimentation conflict. Allowing free-form reviews in addition to – or
instead of – such ratings will not significantly increase the amount of information available to
future consumers (unless the original categories were too coarse). Secondly, our paper provides a
possible explanation for inflation in product reviews, namely that reviews are inflated in order to
deceive future consumers into purchasing the product they would not have bought otherwise. This
complements other possible explanations, including positive ratings being sponsored or just fake.
Contrary to those explanations, in our case inflation arises endogenously as a result of interaction
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between consumers, with no intervention from the firm whatsoever.
This paper contributes to the social learning literature. A lot of the existing literature has
focused on non-strategic learning in local settings, such as networks. This is driven by recognition
that we as consumers receive a lot of our information second-hand, so it may be distorted by other
agents’ perceptions and beliefs. In turn, the part of the literature that deals with strategic learning
has mostly focused on strategic information acquisition, forcing the agent with a limited learning
capacity to choose their information sources carefully. Our paper focuses instead on social learning
with strategic information provision. For a detailed literature review, see below.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II contains a review of the relevant literature. In
Section II we formulate the general version of the model. Section II presents the main result –
that no perfect communication is possible in our setting – and explains the intuition behind it.
Sections II and II then discuss what communication structures can arise in our model, with Section
II exploring an illustrative three-period example, and Section II generalizing the insights to an
infinite-horizon problem. Section II concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Literature Review
The current paper mainly contributes to two strands of literature: social learning and dynamic
cheap talk.
The literature on social learning is vast. Our paper is closest to the literature on herding
and cascades in sequential learning (Banerjee [1992], Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch [1992],
Smith and Sørensen [2000]). In these models the agents choose actions which are payoff-relevant
for agents themselves and, at the same time, signal their private information to subsequent agents.
Smith and Sørensen [2011] provide an excellent overview of the topic. The most recent general
treatment of the setting is provided by Xu [2018]. Most relevant are works by Ali and Kartik
[2012] and Smith, Sørensen, and Tian [2017], who consider sequential observational learning with
others-regarding preferences. However, in the observational learning framework agents receive
private information and act on it; actions are the only source of information for future agents who
observe neither past signals, nor past outcomes, while our paper explores learning under strategic
communication. Wolitzky [2018], in contrast, considers sequential learning when players observe
outcomes of previous players, but not their actions. This is closer to our paper, except outcomes
in our model are observed through noisy communication rather than directly. Ali [2018] studies
observational learning with costly information acquisition.
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Social learning with strategic information provision was explored by Swank and Visser [2015]
when the conflict arises from senders’ career concerns. Liang and Mu [2019] consider a model where
agents can, similarly to our paper, be tempted by exploiting myopic benefits which prevents future
generations from learning the state correctly. Au [2019] presents a model of (non-social) learning,
in which experts’ recommendations to the agent are distorted even despite the seeming absence of
conflict between the parties.
A separate strand of the social learning literature focuses exclusively on learning from customer
reviews (e.g., Acemoglu, Makhdoumi, Malekian, and Ozdaglar [2017] and Vaccari, Maglaras, and
Scarsini [2018]).
The decentralized literature of decision-making and communication in our model relates us
to literature on social learning on networks, which are inherently decentralized. Lobel and Sadler
[2015] and Arieli and Mueller-Frank [2019] study sequential social learning when agents are arranged
in a network or into anm-dimensional integer lattice, respectively. Campbell [2013] explores pricing
and advertising in networks of friends who learn via word-of-mouth communication. Galeotti,
Ghiglino, and Squintani [2013], Schopohl [2017] and Foerster [2019] analyze various games of
strategic information transmission in networks. Migrow [2018] studies how a manager should design
a communication network in an organization to optimally elicit the information from employees.
The conflicts explored in these papers are different from what we focus on in this paper.
Literature on the design of social learning considers the information structures that incentivize
short-lived agent to experiment for the sake of society. Notable references include Kremer, Mansour,
and Perry [2014], Che and Hörner [2018], Mansour, Slivkins, and Syrgkanis [2019], and Cohen and
Mansour [2019].69 We explore what effectively is a decentralized version of these models, with
each agent trying to communicate in a way so as to create optimal experimentation incentives, but
lacking the commitment power and memory of a single principal.70
Our paper models communication via cheap talk a là Crawford and Sobel [1982]. Other models
(apart from ours) of sequential communication include Ambrus, Azevedo, and Kamada [2013],
Renault, Solan, and Vieille [2017], and Chiba [2018]. Le Quement and Patel [2018] explore cheap
talk with preferences for reciprocity.
Our model presents consumers as altruistic when they are writing reviews. It has been argued
for a long time that the economic model of homo economicus as a self-interested agent does not fully
69Optimal experimentation by a group of long-lived agents with incentives for free-riding was studied by Bonatti
and Hörner [2017], Keller, Rady, and Cripps [2005], and Hörner, Klein, and Rady [2015]. Heidhues, Rady, and Strack
[2015] move from observable to private payoffs and explore communication in this setting.
70We also consider the case when consumers can commit to a specific message structure.
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capture real-world behavior, which often exhibits regard for others. Various classical explanations
are Andreoni [1990] (impure altruism), Fehr and Schmidt [1999] (inequality aversion) and Becker
[1974] (pure altruism). The literature is surveyed in Fehr and Schmidt [2003], Konow [2003], and
Meier [2006]. More recently, an attempt to provide an axiomatic foundation for such preferences
has been made by Galperti and Strulovici [2017].
Within the context of social learning, experiments by March and Ziegelmeyer [2016] and Peng,




Time is discrete and infinite: t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , }. All agents share a common discount factor β < 1.
Seller. There is a single long-lived seller, who offers for sale a single product that he has in infinite
supply. Product quality θ, which represents the average consumption utility of the product, can
be either low or high: θ ∈ {L,H}, with 0 6 L < H. The price of the product is fixed at c > 0; to
avoid triviality we assume that L < c < H.
Consumers. Each period a single short-lived risk-neutral consumer arrives at the market. The
consumer can either purchase the good at cost c or leave the market forever, receiving the reservation
utility normalized to 0. In case of purchase, the consumer receives random consumption utility s,
distributed according to quality-contingent cdf F θ with mean θ and respective pdf fθ. We assume
that both FL and FH have full support on the same open interval S = (s, s) ⊆ R.71 Both measures
are absolutely continuous on S, and their respective densities are continuously differentiable and
bounded from above. In addition, we assume that MLRP holds:
Assumption 2 (MLRP). Ratio f
H(s)
fL(s)










The consumer does not observe product quality θ, so her purchasing decision is based on her
belief p = P(θ = H). In particular, the consumer purchases the product if and only if her expected
71Here s = −∞ and s = +∞ are both admissible values.
72Also note that MLRP implies that FH first order stochastically dominates FL.
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consumption utility exceeds the cost of purchase:
θ(p) := Hp+ L(1− p) > c ⇔ p > p̄,
where p̄ := c−L
H−L .
73 This purchasing strategy will be taken as given in what follows.
Reviews. If the good was purchased, the consumer then sends a cheap talk message m ∈ M
(writes a review) to subsequent consumers, describing her experience with the product. The
message set M is assumed to be arbitrarily rich, with [0, 1] ⊆ M. When leaving a review, the
consumer maximizes the expected discounted sum of consumption utilities of all future consumers.
We consider two regimes. Under the commitment regime a consumer can commit to some
utility-contingent reporting strategy (s, s) → M before a purchase. The interpretation of this
regime is that there exists a welfare-maximizing social norm, which prescribes the mapping from
experiences to reviews. Under the no commitment regime, the consumer chooses m after observing
her consumption utility s. The latter regime is also referred to as the decentralized scenario.
Timing. Within a given period, the order of events is as follows:
1. Time-t consumer arrives at the market and observes all past reviews (m1,m2, . . . ,mt−1) and
forms belief pt about the quality of the product.
2. The consumer decides whether to purchase the product at cost c or not.
3. After a purchase she receives random consumption utility st ∼ F θ and updates her belief
about the product quality.
4. After a purchase the consumer leaves review mt about her experience observable to all
subsequent consumers. A consumer who has not purchased the product leaves no review:
mt = ∅.
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Histories and State Variables
Review history Rt := (m1,m2, . . . ,mt−1) is a tuple consisting of all messages sent by consumers
before period t. It constitutes the public history at the beginning of period t. We denote the public
73We assume that the consumer purchases the product when indifferent.
74For simplicity, we assume that ∅ /∈ M, i.e., a purchasing consumer cannot stay silent and must leave a meaningful
review.
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belief about the quality of the product as pt := P(θ = H | Rt). The prior p1 = P(θ = H|∅) is
exogenously fixed and commonly agreed upon.
The private posterior belief of time-t consumer in case she purchased and consumed the product




ptfH(st) + (1− pt) fL(st)
. (19)
Let µθ(bt | pt) denote the cdf of a distribution of bt induced by st conditional on pt and true state
θ.75
The belief pt contains all payoff-relevant information available to time-t consumer at the time she
decides whether to purchase the product. The pair of beliefs pt and bt summarizes all payoff-relevant
information available to time-t consumer when she decides which message to send to subsequent
consumers. In what follows, we will focus on a setting, in which we treat belief pt and current time
t as a sufficient statistic of the review history Rt.
76 Because of this, we call the tuple (pt, bt, t) the
private state of time-t consumer, and we refer to (pt, t) as the time-t public state. We will typically
omit t from the description of states, given that it can be inferred from belief indexing.
Given that the consumers’ purchasing decisions are myopic and described by “buy iff
pt > p̄”, from this point onward we will be focusing on consumers’ communication strategies.
The time-t consumer’s behavioral strategy is r, where r(m|pt, bt) is the probability with
which the time-t consumer sends message m ∈ M in private state (pt, bt). Let M(pt) =
{m ∈ M | ∃ bt : r(m | pt, bt) > 0}. Then the public belief pt+1 induced by message m ∈ M(pt)
is given by













We let P(pt) = {q(pt,m) | m ∈ M(pt)} denote the set of all posteriors which are induced
by time-t consumer in equilibrium. We partition this set into S(pt) ∪ E(pt) = P(pt). Here
E(pt) = {q ∈ P(pt) | q > p̄} includes all posteriors for which the next consumer purchases the
product, while S(pt) = {q ∈ P(pt) | q < p̄} contains all posteriors which deter the next consumer






















76This is not without loss: if two time-t review histories produce the same pt, they will be treated as equivalent.
This would preclude the possibility of having different continuation equilibria after the two histories.
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from the purchase. Note that if pt > p̄ then E(pt) 6= ∅, as the public belief pt is a martingale.
Further, note that if pt < p̄ then the market shuts down: time-t consumer does not purchase the
product, does not write a review, hence at t+1 the next consumer has exactly the same information
at the time she makes her purchasing decision (i.e., pt+1 = pt) and does not purchase the product
either. Therefore, all q ∈ S(pt) are equivalent in the sense of shutting the market down. Hereinafter
we will without loss only consider a representative element of S(pt) whenever it is nonempty.
Maximization Problem
When a consumer sends message m at private state (pt, bt) and induces public belief pt+1 = q,
her value (the discounted sum of future consumers’ utilities) from doing so is equal to





βj−t−1 · I (pj > p̄) · sj
∣∣∣∣ pt+1 = q

 . (21)
The expectation is taken over all future histories that start with public belief pt+1 = q. Implicit in
(21) is the correlation between future sj and future pj stemming from future consumers’ equilibrium
strategies. Maximizing (21) over all available messages, we get the consumer’s optimal value in
private state (pt, bt):
V (pt, bt) = max
p∈P(pt)
V (p | pt, bt).77
For a given equilibrium, the time-t consumer’s ex ante expected continuation value conditional
on public belief pt is given by











When talking about values, we will use superscripts C or D to distinguish commitment and no-
commitment (decentralized) solutions.
Equilibrium Definition
We are looking for Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the game, which consist of a strategy profile
r(m|pt, bt) and updating rules for beliefs pt and bt such that
77This representation implies that the consumer chooses a message from M(pt) rather than M. This is a
simplifying assumption: we do not allow to send out-of-equilibrium messages so that we do not have to keep track of
beliefs after such messages. This restriction is without loss.
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Belief Consistency: (19) holds at all private histories (pt, bt), and (20) holds after all pt and
m ∈ M(pt);
C-Optimality: For commitment regime: r(m | pt, bt) is chosen so as to maximize V C(pt) for all
pt;
D-Optimality: For decentralized regime: if m ∈ M(pt) and r(m | pt, bt) > 0 then V D(pt, bt) =
V D(q(pt,m) | pt, bt).
Belief consistency condition ensures that consumers use Bayes’ rule whenever possible to update
their belief. C-Optimality states that in the commitment scenario, the consumer chooses a mapping
from private belief bt to messages (conditional on pt and subject to Belief Consistency) so as to
maximize the ex ante value. In the decentralized game, D-Optimality requires that the consumer
maximizes her ex post value (after learning st).
No Perfect Communication
This section demonstrates the main idea of this paper: that truth-telling is neither an optimal
social “norm” for writing reviews (i.e., it’s not a commitment solution), nor it is an equilibrium
in the decentralized market. This conclusion is driven by the implicitly lexicographic nature of
consumers’ preferences. When buying the product, a consumer maximizes own expected utility,
but when writing a review, she cares about all future generations. The consumer can thus be
represented as having lexicographic preferences: the first-order preference is for own well-being,
while the warm glow from social welfare is second-order. The consumer is thus unwilling to sacrifice
her consumption utility for sake of the society. This creates a conflict, since time-t consumer would
like the consumer at t + 1 to conduct socially efficient experimentation, possibly by buying the
product even when it is not myopically optimal, so that more information about product quality
is generated. This conflict introduces noise into communication between the two generations of
consumers, i.e., into the review of time-t consumer.
To formulate the result, we first need to introduce the notion of a cascade. Cascades are
prominent in the observational learning literature, where this label is used whenever the society
gets locked into one of the available alternatives (possibly at a loss to efficiency). We use it in the
same context.
Definition 8. Message m ∈ E(p(Rt)) at public history Rt starts a cascade if p(Rs) > p̄ for all
Rs = (Rt,m, . . .).
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In other words, we say that a recommendation to purchase issued at Rt leads to all future
consumers buying the product, regardless of any of the interim consumers’ experiences and reviews.
Once a cascade starts, no new reviews can change the consumers’ behavior. There are two things
to note in relation to cascades. First, any message m ∈ S(pt) starts a cascade as well, in the
sense that no future consumers buy the product again, as discussed in Section II.78 Second, in
the no-commitment scenario there always exists a continuation equilibrium in which any given
m ∈ E(p(Rt)) starts a cascade. One example is the babbling equilibrium, one in which all future
reviews are uninformative and are perceived as such, and thus the public belief remains frozen
at p(Rt,m).
79 However, in general, a cascade need not shut down the information transmission
completely: reviews may be informative and affect the public belief pt as long as they do not affect
future consumers’ actual purchasing decisions.
The following proposition presents the main result of this section, which motivates further
discussion. This result shows that truth-telling (fully revealing communication) is neither a welfare-
maximizing social norm, nor it is an equilibrium in a decentralized game.
Proposition 18. In the commitment regime, P(pt) = [0, 1] for all pt does not deliver a maximum
for V C(pt).
In the no-commitment regime, P(pt) = [0, 1] if and only if any message available at pt starts a
cascade.
Proposition 18 shows that the conflict between the sender and the receiver of a review precludes
perfect communication. If the sender’s (time-t consumer’s) posterior bt is just below the myopic
cutoff p̄, she generally wants the next consumer to purchase the product and generate information
about quality for the sake of future generations. The receiver (consumer at t+ 1), however, would
not buy the product if she learned that given all available information, the product is good only
with probability bt < p̄. The sender thus wants to misrepresent her posterior as if it was barely
above p̄. As we show in the following sections, in the absence of commitment this noisiness of
communication unravels – even though the sender-receiver conflict only exists for some bt < p̄ the
noise propagates to all bt > p̄.
The statement for the no-commitment regime also illustrates that the noise arises exactly from
the sender’s regard for consumers beyond time t+1. In particular, if no informative communication
78The definition above relates to positive cascades, while m ∈ S(pt) starts a negative cascade.
79Babbling is prominent in cheap talk literature; to see that it is an equilibrium note that neither player has
a profitable deviation. The sender cannot benefit by sending informative messages because they are ignored by
the receivers regardless, and the receivers cannot benefit by following the sender’s recommendation since it is
uninformative.
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is possible at t + 1 or afterwards, then time-t consumer has no reason to induce experimentation
that the consumer at t+1 is trying to avoid, because the information from these experiments would
not be conveyed to the subsequent generations either way.
In case of commitment, the reasoning behind the result is more involved. On the one hand, it
is still desirable for the sender to pool the states just below p̄ with those just above it to induce
more experimentation at t + 1. On the other hand, however, distorting communication of states
bt > p̄ is costly, since this is not only concealing some information about the state from the future
consumers, but it may also decrease the amount of experimentation from t + 2 onwards. The
latter statement holds because pooling depresses beliefs pt+1 induced after bt > p̄, as compared to
truth-telling. However, the gains from pooling states bt ∈ (p̄− ε, p̄+ ε) are approximately equal to
V C(p̄) · ε > 0, while the losses are of order O(ε2) because V C(pt) is continuous in pt. Truth-telling
is thus not optimal under commitment either. A more detailed exposition of this logic is presented
in Subsection II.
In this section we explored how equilibria cannot look. The following sections provide more
insight into how they do look, with and without commitment. We begin with exploring the most
basic version of the model.
Three-Period Example
This section demonstrates the main insights in the most basic three-period setting. For sake
of this example, assume that consumption utilities st are normally distributed with mean θ and
variance σ2. Suppose further that there is no discounting. We shall denote the three consumers as
C1, C2, and C3 respectively. We solve the example by backward induction.
C3 purchases the product if and only if θ(p3) = Hp3+L(1−p3) > p̄, and her messaging strategy
is irrelevant, since no consumers arrive at the market after her.
Second Period
If p2 < p̄ then, as mentioned in the model setup, the game effectively ends: C2 does not buy the
product, so writes no review, so p3 = p2 < p̄, and C3 does not buy the product either. All payoffs
starting from t = 2 are zero in this case. Conversely, if p2 > p̄ then C2’s continuation value equals
C3’s expected consumption utility: V (p3|p2, b2) = θ(p3)− c. Therefore, there is no conflict between
C2 and C3, and truthful communication, where C2 reports m2 = p2, is possible in equilibrium (in
both regimes – with and without commitment).
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Note, however, that the only information relevant to C3 is whether to buy the product or
not. She cannot make use of more precise information to make better recommendations to
future consumers because there are no future consumers. Therefore, all continuation equilibria
from p2 with S(p2) 6= ∅ are payoff-equivalent to the one where only two messages are used:
M = {“buy”, “do not buy”}. In this case “buy” is sent by C2 whenever b2 > p̄, and “do not
buy” is sent when b2 < p̄. Then
V (p2, b2) = max{θ(b2)− c, 0}.
If S(p2) = ∅ then any message at p2 starts a cascade, so V (p2, b2) = θ(b2)− c in this case.
First Period
In this section we analyze V (p2|p1, b1), C1’s continuation value from inducing prior belief p2
for C2, when her own private belief is b1. We again look at states p1 > p̄ (otherwise all values
are zero). For simplicity we assume that all time-2 continuation equilibria are informative, i.e.,
S(p2) 6= ∅ for all p2 > p̄.80 Note that since truthtelling is both a first-best and an equilibrium
outcome at t = 2 – and any informative continuation is equivalent to truth-telling, as shown above
– the value V (p2 | p1, b1) for given p2 and b1 is the same in both commitment and no-commitment
regimes. The difference between the two only lies in what communication strategies can be optimal
for C1 given V (p2|p1, b1). These strategies are explored in sections II and II.
With p1 > p̄, C1 buys the good and receives utility s1. If she sends a message m ∈ S(p1) that
induces no further purchases, her continuation value equals zero. When she sends m ∈ E(p1), C2
purchases the product and obtains utility s2. Following that, C3 purchases the product if and only




































80The case when a cascade is started at t = 2 (after any message at t = 1) is trivial, since then truthtelling is an
equilibrium by the same argument as in the second period. The case when a cascade is started by some but not all
messages m ∈ E(p1) is non-trivial, but we do not deem it worthy of careful consideration.
86
Therefore, if C2 buys the product, C1’s continuation value from inducing some belief p2 is given by
V ∗(p2 | p1, b1) = E [s2 + s3 · I{s2 > s̄2(p2)} | b1] . (23)
Given C2’s sequential rationality, C1’s continuation value is




V ∗(p2 | p1, b1) if p2 > p̄,
0 if p2 < p̄
From the point of view of C1, the good is of high quality with probability b1. In that case
C3 buys the good with probability 1− FH(s̄2) and receives H − c in expectation. Similarly, with
probability 1− b1 the good is of low quality, and then C3 gets L− c conditional on purchase which
occurs with probability 1− FL(s̄2). In the end, expression (23) can be rewritten as








(L− c) , (24)
where s̄2 is given by (22).
Analyzing (24), we can identify several important properties of V ∗(p2 | p1, b1). Firstly, it is
strictly positive at b1 = p̄ for all p2. This follows from the fact that F
H(s̄2(p2)) < F
L(s̄2(p2)). The
function is continuous in b1, hence it is also strictly positive in some neighborhood of b1 = p̄. This
implies that C1 strictly prefers to induce p2 > p̄ for at least some values of b1 < p̄: she wants C2
to purchase the product despite believing that this is not myopically optimal. This is due to the
social value of experimentation (i.e., of information generated by the purchase at t = 2), which is
internalized by C1 in her review strategy, but not by C2 in her purchasing strategy. There is thus
a conflict between the two.
Secondly, the expression in (24) is strictly increasing in p2 on [0, b1] and is strictly decreasing
on [b1, 1], i.e., it is single-peaked with a peak at p2 = b1. This means that when b1 > p̄, C1 would
prefer to tell the truth to C2 and induce the correct belief p2 = b1. To see this, observe that
∂V (p2 | p1, b1)
∂p2

















is strictly decreasing in p2 from +∞ to 0, and the fraction multiplying the bracket
is positive, we get that V (p2 | p1, b1) is single-peaked. We can find the peak by equating ∂V (p2|p1,b1)∂p2
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Figure 7: V ∗(p2 | p1, b1) as a function of p2.



























which together with (22) gives condition p2 = b1.
Expression in (24) as a function of p2 for different values of b1 is plotted in Figure 7. Since (24)
only coincides with V (p2|p1, b1) for p2 > p̄ (and V (p2|p1, b1) = 0 otherwise), we use dashed lines
for values p2 < p̄.
The two properties of V ∗(p2 | p1, b1) outlined above – that it is positive for b1 = p̄ − ε for at
least some ε > 0, and that it peaks at p2 = b1 – will be used heavily in the analysis that follows.
Interval Structure of Equilibrium Communication
We now show that in the no commitment regime, communication in the first period must have
interval structure. In other words, there exists a partition 0 = ∆0 6 ∆1 < ∆2 < . . . = 1 and
messages m1,m2, . . . such that if b1 ∈ (∆j−1,∆j) then rmj (p1, b1) = 1.
First note that if S(p1) is nonempty – i.e., if there is a review that will prevent C2 from buying
the product, – this review will be used by C1 after at least some b1 low enough.
81 Assume that
this is the case in what follows.
Consider now the smallest posterior belief among those available in equilibrium that leads C2
to purchase the product, e1 = min E(p1). Let ∆1 denote the level of posterior belief b1 with which
81For b1 ≈ 0, expression (24) reduces to V
∗(p2 | p1, b1) = (L− c) ·
(
1 + 1− FL(s̄2(p2))
)
, which is negative because
L < c.
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C1 is indifferent between leaving a review in S(p1) and review e1. From the fact that V ∗(p2 | p1, b1)
is positive at b1 = p̄ it is immediate that ∆1 < e1. The fact that V
∗(p2 | p1, b1) has a peak at
p2 = b1 implies, in turn, that all types b1 of C1 also prefer to leave review e1 rather than any review
p2 > e1.
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In other words, if there exists a way to make the “most cautious recommendation to buy”, then
C1 would like to adopt that phrasing for a wide range of posteriors b1. This is because she wants
C2 to purchase the product, thus generating information, even when it is not myopically optimal
for C2 – but does not want to distort the information that C2 passes onwards. These two goals
conflict with each other, since C1 only has one stone – her review – to hit both birds.
Recall, however, that C2 is rational and Bayesian – in particular, when forming her belief
p2 she takes C1’s incentives into account. Therefore, it must be the case that the prior belief
p2 = e1 of C2 must incorporate the information contained in the posteriors b1 of the versions of
C1 who write reviews that induce e1. We have argued above that there are types b1 < e1 that
induce p2 = e1, so there must also be types b1 > e1 that do the same. Consider the supremum
of such types b1 and denote it by ∆2. C1 with posterior b1 = ∆2 must (by continuity of V
∗)
be indifferent between inducing e1 and the next-lowest available posterior e2. However, we know
that V ∗(p2 | p1, b1) is single peaked in p2 with a peak at p2 = b1, hence the indifference condition
V ∗(e1 | p1,∆2) = V ∗(e2 | p1,∆2) implies that e2 > ∆2. By iterating the argument, we get that
... < ∆j < ej < ∆j+1 < ej+1 < ...
Plainly speaking, the fact that the aforementioned “most cautious recommendation to buy” is
noisy and not perfectly revealing of b1 implies eventually that all other messages must be noisy as
well. Notably, perfect communication is thus impossible even for high posteriors b1, when there is
no conflict between the sender and the receiver.
Figure 8 plots the continuation payoff of C1 in an interval equilibrium with three messages:
e1 = p̄, e2, and “stop experimentation”. This payoff coincides with the unconstrained maximum
(when C1 can choose any p2 and force C2 to purchase the item) whenever b1 = e1, but is strictly
lower for all other posteriors. The noise in communication thus hurts C1 by making the purchasing
decision of the third consumer less efficient, but this is compensated by the more efficient purchasing
decision of C2 as compared to the case when C1 can choose any p2 but cannot force C2 to buy.







V ∗(b1 | p1, b1)
V D(p1, b1)
Figure 8: V ∗(b1 | p1, b1) and value V D(p1, b1) in an interval equilibrium.
Note: H = 3, L = 0, c = 1, σ = 2. To illustrate convexity, it is also assumed for this graph that C1 cares about third
consumer’s utility 9 times as much as about C2’s (one can think that 9 consumers arrive in the third period).
Commitment Solution
By committing to truthful communication, C1 can achieve value




V ∗(b1 | p1, b1) if b1 > p̄,
0 if b1 < p̄
Our goal in this section is to demonstrate that C1 can do better than this (in expectation over b1
for a given p1). The source of improvement lies in the discontinuity of V (b1 | p1, b1) at b1 = p̄.
To evaluate the trade-offs introduced by imperfect communication of posteriors b1, it is useful
to understand how V (p2 | p1, b1) depends on the induced prior p2 for a given posterior b1. To do
this, we ask the dual question and visualize the dependence of V (p2 | p1, b1) on b1 for a given p2. In
particular, (24) is a linear function of b1, meaning that once we fix p1 and p2, value V (p2 | p1, b1) as
a function of b1 is given by a tangent to the maximal value V
∗(b1 | p1, b1) at b1 = p2. This means
that V ∗(b1 | p1, b1), as well as V (p1, b1) in any equilibrium, are convex in b1, since all of these are
upper envelopes of respective sets of linear functions.
This convexity implies that C1 cannot benefit from sending messages that pool different
posteriors b1 above p̄. On the other hand, it is also strictly optimal to stop experimentation for all
private beliefs below p̄, where p̄ is determined from condition V (p̄ | p1, p̄) = 0. Therefore, benefits
can only arise from pooling posteriors b1 in the neighborhood of p̄, and perfect communication is
optimal for posteriors b1 above the pooling region. The benefits of pooling come from inducing
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V (b1 | p1, b1)
b110 p̄p̄
V ∗(b1 | p1, b1)
V C(p1, b1)
V (b1 | p1, b1)
b1p̄p̄
Figure 9: V ∗(b1 | p1, b1) and the commitment value V C(p1, b1).
Note: H = 3, L = 0, c = 1, σ = 2. To illustrate convexity, it is also assumed for this graph that C1 cares about third
consumer’s utility 9 times as much as about C2’s. The left panel plots functions for all b1 ∈ [0, 1]; the right panel
focuses on the neighboorhood of p̄.
experimentation after b1 < p̄, which means that the posterior induced by pooling must exactly
equal p̄. Indeed, otherwise C1 can lower the cutoff above which perfect communication occurs,
forcing C2 to buy the item for all the same b1 < p̄, and conveying better information for some
b1 > p̄, which is an improvement.
Finally, it is always optimal to pool at least some private beliefs to the left and to the right
of p̄. Indeed, suppose that a consumer sends the same message m for all private beliefs ε-below
and C · ε-above p̄ such that resulting q(pt,m) = p̄.83 This is equivalent to substituting value from
truth-telling in this interval with a line tangent to V (b1 | p1, b1) at b1 = p̄. The gains from it are
approximately equal to V (p̄ | p1, p̄) · ε > 0, because V (p̄ | p1, p̄) > 0. Losses associated with pooling
above the cutoff are less then C(H−L)2 ε
2 = O(ε2). Therefore, there always exists ε > 0 such that it
is optimal to pool at least some small neighborhood of private beliefs bt around p̄. Figure 9 plots
the value attained by C1 under this communication mechanism. Although this argument shows
that it is always beneficial to pool private beliefs below and above p̄, it does not however show how
it is optimal to pool beliefs. It tuns out that in the general case the set of pooled private beliefs
can take more complicated forms.
General Case
This section describes the equilibrium outomes and the commitment solution arising in the
infinite-horizon version of the game. We show that neither of the two feature perfect communication,
with the exception that it may be an equilibrium outcome in some period as long as future




We begin by looking at the commitment solution this time around. The main result and the
argument behind it mirror those that we have discovered in the three-period example: the reviewer’s
desire to inflate the review of a marginally-bad item for sake of social experimentation results in
him pooling moderately bad experiences with some good experiences so as to push the posterior of
the next consumer up to p̄. After all other experiences the reviewer reports truthfully. This idea is
formalized in Theorem 4 below.
Theorem 4. At every public state pt the optimal commitment solution is characterized by a cutoff
lC(pt) < p̄ and a set of points I
C(pt) above p̄ such that:
1. for all bt 6 l(pt) consumer sends message m ∈ S(pt), i.e., experimentation stops.
2. for any bt 6∈ IC(pt) consumer truthfully transmits his private belief bt (or what is the same
his private payoff) to the public, that is pt+1 = bt.
3. for all bt ∈ (l(pt), pt)
⋃
IC(pt) consumer sends message m such that q(pt,m) = p̄.
The proof of the theorem in the appendix proceeds in three main steps. First, we show that
V (bt | pt, bt) is continuously differentiable and [weakly] convex in bt above p̄. This implies that
pooling is only beneficial around the cutoff. Since V (pt, p̄) > 0, there are potential gains from
pooling posteriors bt < p̄ with posteriors above the cutoff. This, however, would at the same time
decrease the quality of information transmitted after those bt > p̄ that are pooled with posteriors
below the cutoff, which is socially costly. The second major step of the proof is thus in showing that
the gains from pooling over an arbitrarily small interval of posteriors will be of first order, while the
losses will be of second order. Finally, we show that the optimal commitment strategy exists within
the class of strategies restricted to such combinations of pooling around the cutoff and truthtelling
otherwise. This existence is proved with the help of Arzela-Ascoli Theorem. Furthermore, we show
that the optimal strategy is Markovian, i.e., depends only on public belief pt but does not explicitly
depend on t.
It is straightforward that the commitment solution induces underexperimentation relative to
the first best (in which the consumer can transmit the information perfectly while also having
perfect control over the future consumers’ actions). This is because experimentation is costly:
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to provide incentives for future consumers to experiment with the product after bt < p̄, the
sender must distort the information transmitted after bt > p̄. In particular, this distortion is
downwards, meaning it makes all future consumers more pessimistic and so exacerbates the problem
of underexperimentation after those histories. In other words, the reviewer in period t has to trade
off underexperimentation at t+ 1 against underexperimentation from t+ 2 onwards.
It is also worth pointing out the differences between our model of commited sender and the
model of Che and Hörner [2018]. One obvious difference lies in the signal structure, where we allow
for a wide class of private signals compared to binary (good news Poisson) signals in their case. This
allows us to give a richer characterization of within-period outcomes at the cost of the tractability
of the dynamics in the model. However, a more substantial difference between the two models lies
in the technologies: in the model of Che and Hörner [2018] the principal is long-lived, and has
memory of old information even if it was not publicly disclosed at the time, so this information
may be disclosed at a later time. In our model, in contrast, all consumers are short-lived, hence the
public record of product reviews is the only past information available today. This constraint to a
public memory limits the principal designing a reviewing mechanism to “now-or-never” revelation
schemes, eliminating the opportunity to delay.
Decentralized Equilibrium
We now move on to exploring the equilibria of the decentralized game. The analysis is
complicated by the fact that an equilibrium at t is determined by the continuation equilibria after
various induced priors pt+1, which in turn depend on continuation equilibria after pt+2 and so on.
Backwards induction is not available in an infinite-horizon game, and even restricting ourselves to
Markov setting, where strategies only depend on the public prior p but not calendar time t, does
not render the problem tractable enough to provide a full characterization of the set of equilibria.
We are, however, able to provide a partial characterization of equilibria. In particular,
Theorem 5 below provides two statements pertaining to such characterization. First, it claims
that commitment is always valuable in the sense that no equilibrium of the decentralized game can
generate a higher lever of social welfare. Second, it shows that experiences bt in some neighborhood
of the myopic cutoff p̄ are always pooled together into a single review – this applies to any
equilibrium of the game.
Theorem 5. 1. For any equilibrium in the decentralized game, V D(pt) 6 V
C(pt) for any pt.
2. For any pt for which there exists a p ∈ P(pt) that does not start a cascade, there exist lD(pt),
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rD(pt) > l
D(pt) and m ∈ M such that p̄ ∈ [l(pt), r(pt)], and for all bt ∈ [l(pt), r(pt)] we have
r(m | pt, bt) = 1.
The first statement is relatively straightforward, since the principal in the commitment scenario
has access to any communication structure that can arise in the equilibrium of a decentralized game.
The second statement mostly mirrors the intuition from the three-period example. The part that
is worth pointing out is the qualifier on pt: in particular, communication at pt is noisy only if at
least some message is available in M(pt) that does not start a cascade. The complementary case
was discussed in Proposition 18: if all messages in M(pt) start a cascade then perfect comunication
is possible.
Conclusion
This paper builds a theoretical model of social learning through product reviews, focusing on
the issue of information provision. We look closely at the empirically observed tension between
self-interest in purchasing behavior and prosocial motives when writing a review, and we investigate
how this tension affects the informational content of the reviews. The conflict emerges from the
reviewers’ desire to deceive future consumers into buying a potentially subpar product for sake of
generating information beneficial for the society.
We show that truthful communication through reviews cannot be sustained in the equilibrium
of such a model. Moreover, despite the conflict only arising under specific circumstances, the
noise created by it propagates, making all communication noisy in equilibrium. If, however, the
reviewer can commit to a particular communication strategy before experiencing the product or,
equivalently, a social norm can be chosen by a welfare-maximizing principal that all consumers will
have to follow, then the noise in communication is more confined, and perfect communication is
possible when the reviewer sees the product as very good.
This paper contributes to the broader literature on social learning, helping to identify the
issues that can deteriorate the quality of learning via product reviews, demonstrating that even
in the absence of any kind of interference from the firm, reviews may not be the perfect source of
information about products with uncertain characteristics.
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Rigid Experimentation84
Introduction and Relation to the Literature
Implementing risky alternative of ex ante unknown quality is sometimes hard to reverse.
Consider a firm who decides on whether to launch its chain of stores in a new country. It does not
initially know whether their product will match the local tastes. However, the only way to know
the answer is to actually enter the new market. Expanding and maintaining capacity is costly and
can eventually be not worth it in case the product does not match the local tastes. Thus the firm
should potentially be cautious in expanding its capacity. But at the same time larger capacity
means faster learning about the quality of the match and therefore provides incentives to invest
into it. Within this paper we examine how optimal expansion path looks like for a single firm
and when multiple firm strategically interact and have perfectly (positively) correlated demands
for their products.
We contribute to three strands of literature. First strand, represented by now-classical papers
by Bolton and Harris [1999] and Keller, Rady, and Cripps [2005], deals with experimentation models
with pure information extenality. In these models in each moment an agent chooses an intensity
of experimentation. The higher this intensity is, the more information the agent receives. However
actions taken by the agent in previous periods do not restrict his choice today. In contrast, this
paper builds a model where intensity choices can only be slightly adjusted through time. This
creates a correlation between intensities of experimentation in any two moments in time. The
rigidity in the intensity is modeled as an upper bound on the speed with which the intensity of
experimentation can be increased. For simplicity we also assume that the agent can not decrease
its intensity even when it becomes pessimistic enough about the quality of the risky option. The
closest to this paper is the one by Julia Salmi and Murto [2019]. They study the same question,
but model the news process with a Brownian motion rather than a Poisson process.
Second, the model features similarities with to the problem of when to exercise an option. In
irreversible investment setting this question is extensively studied by Dixit and Pindyck [1994].
Daley and Green [2012], similarly, examine when a seller should sell a good of privately-known
quality to a market of uninformed buyers when price for it evolves stochastically. The difference
with these papers is that an action today not only affect the payoff the agent receives today, but
also affects the speed with which an underlying uncertainty is resolved.
84This paper should be cited as A. Smirnov. Rigid Experimentation. mimeo, 2020.
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Finally, the paper contributes to the literature on infant industries development, see for instance
Caplin and Leahy [1993], Rob [2001], Rob and Vettas [2003], Decamps and Mariotti [2004].
The Model
Within the current section we present a model of a single firm. Firm starts to operate with
zero initial capacity on the market with unknown demand. The demand can be of two types: good
or bad. If demand is bad there are no consumers for the firm’s product, whilst if it is good and
the installed capacity of the firm is α > 0 consumers willing to buy the good arrive as a Poisson
process with intensity αλ where λ > 0 is a parameter of the model. From each purchase the firm
receives a fixed benefit normalized to 1. Initial belief held by the firm that the demand is good is
p0. The firm can irreversibly invest into its capacity. Per unit of installed capacity the firm incurs
flow maintenance costs of amount c. To capture the riskiness of investments and to rule out trivial
cases we assume that λ > c > 0. Time is continuous and the discount rate is r.
At every point in time the firm
1. observes the current state variable - a pair (α, p) where α is already installed capacity and p
is the current belief that the demand is good.
2. decides whether to expand the capacity and by how much up to the limit of i. We allow
only for marginal increases in capacity, in other words the firm cannot increase its capacity
by more that i × dt in a time interval of the length dt. For simplicity of exposition we aslo
assume that the firm cannot decrease its capacity.
3. observes whether a consumer has arrived and updates its belief about the demand accordingly.
In the baseline model we allow the firm to decide only on whether to invest into capacity not
allowing the firm to exit the market when its belief about the demand becomes pessimistic enough.
Equilibrium Analysis
Belief Update
If in the beginning of the period of the length dt firm’s state variable is (α, p) and it has
invested a total amount of Idt into its capacity in it, a consumer arrives with subjective probability
of p(1 − e−(α+Idt)λdt) ≈ pαλdt. As that event perfectly reveals the demand quality the belief
instantly jumps to p = 1. If however no consumer has arrived, which happens with probability
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(1− p) + pe−(α+Idt)λdt ≈ 1− pαλdt, firm’s updated belief at the end of the period is
p+ dp =
(1− αλdt)p
(1− αλdt)p+ (1− p)
according to Bayes’ rule. Simplifying and canceling higher-order terms we arrive to the well-known
expression
dp = −λαp(1− p)dt.
Note however the difference in interpretation of α in our model and the model of Keller, Rady, and
Cripps [2005]. Within latter it is an instant intensity of experimentation whilst in our model it is
an accumulated intensity.
Maximization Problem
Denote by V (α, p) associated with the state value function. The objective of the firm is to











subject to the investment constraints
α̇t = It,
0 6 It 6 i,
and the evolution of belief. Following the literature on strategic experimentation we express the
value in per-period terms multiplying all flow payoffs by r.
When p = 0 or p = 1 the firm knows the quality of the demand with certainty and therefore its
decision is based solely on the quality of demand, but not on the learning externalities generated
by the capacity. With p = 0 and arbitrary α the firm disinvests and therefore




re−rtαcdt = −αc. (25)
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With p = 1 the firm always invests and accumulates ever growing capacity:











By the Principle of Optimality, the value function satisfies the “discrete version” of Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation
V (α, p) = max
I
[
−rαcdt+ pαλdt(r + e−rdtV (α, 1)) + (1− pαλdt)(e−rdt(V (α+ Idt, p+ dp))
]
.
Within the period of time of the length dt with subjective probability p(α + Idt)λdt ≈ pαλdt a
consumer arrives and the firm earns lump-sum profit of r · 1 from the transaction, pays its flow
costs of r · (α+ Idt)cdt ≈ rαcdt and shifts to the new state from the “next” moment. If however no
consumer has arrived the firm pays flow costs and updates its belief about the market accordingly.
Substituting V (α, 1) from (26), using 1− rdt to approximate e−rdt and canceling out the terms
of order dt2 and higher we obtain the HJB equation for the value function:













− αcr + ItV ′α(α, p)− αλp(1− p)V ′p(α, p)
]
.
The resulting investment rule is particularly simple: invest i if and only if V ′α(α, p) > 0, do not
invest when V ′α(α, p) < 0 and invest any It ∈ [0, i] when V ′α(α, p) = 0.
Disinvestment Region
If I∗t = 0 we do not have term V
′
α(α, p) and therefore we can treat α as a parameter in a
first-order linear differential equation












− αcr − αλp(1− p)V ′p
]
. (27)
General solution to it is given by










where K(α) is an arbitrary differentiable function. From (25) we infer that K(α) ≡ 0, i.e. the
value function is linear in p in the no-investment region.
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Investment Region
When I∗t = i we obtain a first-order linear partial differential equation












− αcr + iV ′α − αλp(1− p)V ′p
]
. (28)
To solve it we need to find its particular solution and a first integral of a modified homogeneous
equation.85 The final answer is given by




























where G1(·) is an arbitrary differentiable function.
Equilibrium Conditions
In this section we summarize the optimal behavior of a single firm. Our approach relies on a
standard verification argument resulting in a simple threshold strategy. In our framework threshold
strategy is a function pS(α) such that in state (α, p) it is optimal to invest if and only if p > pS(α).
Strictly speaking, verification argument is not fully applicable in our framework as resulting
value functions are unbounded in α. It happens because upon a breakthrough the firm is certain
about the demand quality and its capacity becomes arbitrarily large resulting in linearly growing
value function. However for any p0 < 1 there is a maximal capacity a firm can accumulate on
the equilibrium path not yet achieving a breakthrough. That implies that before a breakthrough
found V replicates the optimal decision making whilst after the breakthrough the optimal decision
making is evident without any reference to optimal control. More formally one can consider the
same Bellman equation with modified Ṽ = V −α(λp−c), solution to which will always be bounded.
85To be more precise, first we eliminate non-homogeneous summand and then make a substitution V (α, p) =
perα+λ
α2
2 Ṽ (α, p) which eliminates the LHS. Finally we guess the first integral of the resulting equation.
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To find the equilibrium we induce the following set of conditions:
V S0 (α, p
S(α)) = V S1 (α, p
S(α)) (V alueMatching)
V ′S0p (α, p
S(α)) = V ′S1p (α, p
S(α)) (Smooth− Pasting)
V ′S0α(α, p) 6 0 for all p 6 p
S(α) (LeftOptimality)
V ′S1α(α, p) > 0 for all p > p
S(α) (RightOptimality)
V ′S0α(α, p
S(α)) = 0 (InvestmentSmooth− PastingLeft)
V ′S1α(α, p
S(α)) = 0 (InvestmentSmooth− PastingRight)
First four conditions are standard for the experimentation literature. The last two emerge because
of two-dimensional structure of the state variable. Although they are not needed for optimality of
an investment strategy, we show that they both hold. Additionally, (IS −PL) significantly easens
the calculation of the threshold function pS(α).
Lemma 3. (IS − PR) follows from (VM) and (SP ).
Proof. Equations (27) and (28) differ only in one summand. If both (VM) and (SP ) are satisfied
it automatically implies the remaining summand must be zero.
For now we ignore (LO) and (RO) conditions. We will check them explicitly afterwards.
Therefore in total we have three equations ((VM), (SP ) and (IS − PL)) for two unknowns: the
threshold function pS(α) and function G(·). We first look at (IS−PL) and calculate the resulting
threshold. Then we solve (VM) and (SP ) system separately and verify that the resulting threshold
actually coincides with the one obtained from (IS − PL).
(IS − PL) implies that











Finally note that LHS in (29) is increasing in p and therefore (LO) is satisfied. Now turn to (VM)
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and (SP ). They constitute the following system of equations:86


















λ− e ri αG− (1− p)e ri α 1
λp(1− p)G
′.
We first solve for G and G′.
ci
r
− (λ− c) i
αλ+ r
p














We can treat (31) as an equality where functions of α are on both sides and, as they coincide as
functions, to equate their derivatives (we can do the same with (SP ), but there is no good reason
for that). Also for simplicity let us denote s := p1−p - the odds ratio. Then we get
− (λ− c) i
αλ+ r
s′ +
















































λ (λ− c) i
αλ+ r
s.
As can be easily seen, s′ cancels out and we obtain an expression for s(α) from which we easily
restore pS(α). Occasionally, the resulting threshold coincides with the one obtained earlier in (30).
The following proposition summarizes the established fact.
Proposition 19. Let the state variable for the single-firm problem be (α, p). Then the firm invests




and does not invest if p 6 pS.
Figure 10 illustrates the optimal strategy. The firm starts with zero initial capacity on the
horizontal axis and gradually accumulates it. If a breakthrough is achieved then the firm eternally
accumulates capacity. If, conversely, no breakthrough is achieved until the orange threshold is
reached in state space (p, α) then the firm stops further investments.




In the next two sections we enrich our model with a possibility of interaction between several
firms. First, as a benchmark model, we solve the cooperative problem of N firms all operated by
a welfare-maximizing social planner. Then we compare it with the strategic problem where each
of the firms makes an individualistic decision to identify potential inefficiencies of a decentralized
equilibrium.
For both scenarios we first clarify the timing and informational structure of the game particularly
stressing the differences with a single-firm framework.
At every point in time each of N firms
1. observes the current state variable - a pair (α, p) where α = (α1, α2, . . . , αN ) is an N -
dimensional vector of already installed capacities of all firms and p is the current belief that
the demand is good.
2. decides whether to expand the capacity and by how much up to the limit of i. The firm
cannot decrease its capacity.
3. observes whether a consumer has arrived to any firm and updates its belief about the demand
quality accordingly.
Similar to the discrete version of the Bellman equation for a single firm we can write one for
the individual firm in the presence of N − 1 other firms. Define α :=
N∑
i=1
αi, α−i := α − αi and
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α−i := (α1, . . . , α̂i, . . . , αN ). Then




−rdtV (αi, 1)) + (1− pαλdt)e
−rdtV (αi + Iidt, α−i + I−idt, p+ dp)
]
.
Canceling out the terms of order dt2 and higher, substituting the belief update and V (αi, 1) from
(26) we obtain the HJB equation for the value function in oligopoly problem:






















Within this section we assume that all firms are operated by the social planner who maximizes
the total welfare (the sum of individual value functions). Therefore summing up (34) among
individual firms we obtain





















Vi. Due to the symmetry of the firms to the social planner V
′
αi
does not depend on
i and therefore V depends only on aggregate installed capacity. Consequently, we can treat it as a
2-dimensional function of (α, p) instead of an (N + 1)-dimensional function, reducing the problem
to the one considered in the previous section. Going through the same steps as in the single-firm
problem we establish the following proposition.
Proposition 20. Let the state variable for the cooperative oligopoly problem be (α, p) and α =
N∑
i=1





and do not invest if p 6 pOC .
Strategic Solution
Within this section we identify unique symmetric equilibrium of the strategic problem. Similar





= i if V ′i,αi > 0
∈ [0, i] if V ′i,αi = 0
= 0 if V ′i,αi < 0
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As we are looking for a symmetric equilibrium we assume that all firms but firm i exploit the same
strategy and deduce the value functions assuming the firm itself then follows the same strategy.
Finally, we verify the optimality of firm i’s strategy.
Case 1: Ii = 0, Ij = 0 for all j 6= i.
Then the general solution to (34) is given by










As before due to the boundary condition K2(αi, α−i) ≡ 0, so we have a linear in p value function.
Case 2: Ii = i, Ij = i for all j 6= i.
The general solution to (34) is then given by (note that now G is a two-dimensional function)





























Case 3: Ii = Ij = I ∈ (0, i) for all j 6= i.
In the mixing region any player is indifferent between investing or not and therefore
V ′i,αi(αi, α−i, p) = 0 implying the value function in it does not depend on αi. Denote the general
solution for this region as MOS(α−i, p).
Equilibrium construction
In equilibrium the following set of conditions hold:87
V OS0 (αi, α−i, p
L(α)) =MOS(αi, α−i, p
L(α)) (V alueMatchingLeft)
V ′OS0p (αi, α−i, p
L(α)) =M ′OSp (αi, α−i, p
L(α)) (Smooth− PastingLeft)
V ′OS0αi (αi, α−i, p) 6 0 for all p 6 p
L(α) (LeftOptimality)
MOS(αi, α−i, p
R(α)) = V OS1 (αi, α−i, p
R(α)) (V alueMatchingRight)
M ′OSp (αi, α−i, p
R(α)) = V ′OS1p (αi, α−i, p
R(α)) (Smooth− PastingRight)
V ′OS1αi (αi, α−i, p) > 0 for all p > p
R(α) (RightOptimality)
87Note that we demand these equalities to hold only on the equilibrium path where αi = α/N for all i. Otherwise
we cannot exploit the structure of symmetric equilibrium.
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As in the single-firm problem we impose additional smooth-pasting conditions on both thresholds:
V ′OS0αi (α, p
L(α)) = 0 (InvestmentLeftSmooth− Pasting)
V ′OS1αi (α, p
R(α)) = 0 (InvestmentRightSmooth− Pasting)
What is even more surprising, although we do not demand it, resulting value function will eventually
be continuously-differentiable with respect to all α−i as well.
Left threshold
As in single-firm problem we can obtain the first threshold from (IS − PL). Differentiating
V OS0 with respect to αi we get











Note that the decision on whether to invest some positive amount depends for any firm only on
aggregate installed capacity, but not on individual capacities.

























All terms with ∂p
∂αi
cancel out and we obtain the expression for pL(α) which coincides with (35).
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Intermediate Value
To find the right threshold we first need to find resulting value function in the interior region.
It can be done using (VML) condition.
αi(λp




From (35) we get






L(α)− c)− α (αλ+ r)
r








Substituting α from (35) into the expression above we finally obtain














Note that the function is convex in p (as it should be in models with positive value of information).
Right threshold






(λp2 − c) + (1− p2)erαiG =M,









−(1− p2)erαiG′1 − α−i(1− p2)erαiG′2 =M ′1.
Solving the system we get the familiar equality which determines the second cut-off.








(λ− c) + rαi (λp− c) +M ′1 − (αi + α−i)λp(1− p)M ′2
]
.












(c+ cp− 2λp) = 0
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experimentation cutoff). For that we first evaluate the expression in both endpoints. Second
we verify that the above function is convex in p.









p(c− λp) = 0.
At c
λ





































2p(c− λp) < 0.
Case 2. α > 0. In that case we have a non-zero summand where we divide by zero. When
p → c
λ
from below the whole expression converges to +∞ (it was not so in Case 1). Indeed,
c + cpm − 2λpm = c + c
2
λ
− 2c < 0. Now we evaluate the expression at p1. The first summand
remains from the Case 1 so we do not write it.
rα(c− λp)− αp(λ− c)(αλ+ r)− α(αλ+ r)(c− λp) + αp(αλ+ r)(λ− c) = −α2λ(c− λp) < 0.
Finally we check the remaining non-linear part of the equation is a convex function.
(√
p


















p(c− λp) < 0.
Lemma 4. Let f ∈ C2[a, b] be a strictly convex function and f(a) < 0 < f(b). Then there is a
unique solution to the equation f(x) = 0 on [a, b].








Then there exist two functions pL(α) and pR(α) such that all firms invest i if p > pR(α), do























(c+ cp− 2λp) = 0
for every α > 0.
Figure 11 illustrates both efficient cooperative solution (red line) and strategic solution (blue
line). In both scenarios all firms starts with zero initial capacity. Until its expansion curve reaches
threshold pR in both cases the firm invests into its capacity at a maximal speed of i. Then in between
thresholds pR and pL in cooperative problem the firm still continues to invest at a maximal speed
whilst in strategic framework gradually invests less and less. This happens because information
provided by the other firms is a public good and a standard free-riding problem occurs. Finally,
below pL in both scenarios firms stop investments.
Conclusion
This paper presents a model of strategic experimentation with rigidity in experimentation’s
intensity. Existing literature mostly concentrates on frameworks where the choice of today’s actions
generate information only today. In contrast we make actions taken today to be irreversible and
therefore to affect the experimentation in all consequent periods.
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We solve for optimal experimentation strategy for a single agent and two problems with multiple
agents: cooperative and strategic. We find that in decentralized equilibrium (strategic problem)
the agents start to free-ride on information provided by other agents from some point onward which





Appendix for “Timing of Predictions in Dynamic Cheap Talk:
Experts vs. Quacks”





. We show that rE(m, t) > 0 if and
only if rQ(m, t) > 0 for any (m, t) for any history with b(hpt ) ∈ (0, 1). Together with the fact that
b0 ∈ (0, 1), this will then mean that on equilibrium path we never arrive at a [non-terminal] history
with b(hpt ) ∈ {0, 1}, hence the statement is true for all histories on equilibrium path.
Part 1: rE(m, t) > 0 ⇒ rQ(m, t) > 0. Suppose by contradiction that rQ(m, t) = 0. Then
b(m, t) = 1, meaning that WQt (m, t) attains maximum among all continuation payoffs (feasible or
not). The initial assumption rQ(m, t) = 0 then means that either WQt (∅), or W
Q
t (m, s) for some
m and s > t attain maximum, since one of these options should be more appealing to the quack
than report (m, t). These payoffs, however, cannot attain maximum, since bt < 1.
Part 2: rQ(m, t) > 0 ⇒ rE(m, t) > 0. Suppose that rE(m, t) = 0. Since rQ(m, t) > 0, we have
b(m, t) = 0, and hence WQt (m, t) attains minimum among all continuation payoffs. However, since
belief about the forecaster’s type is a martingale from the observer’s point of view, we have either
b(−m, t) > 0 or bt+1 > 0. Thus at least one of these strategies (reporting −m or staying silent at
t) strictly dominates the strategy of reporting (m, t) for the quack, so rQ(m, t) = 0.
Similarly, one can show that rQ(G, s) + rQ(B, s) = 1 if and only if rE(G, s) + rE(B, s) = 1.
Indeed, if for some t we have rE(G, t)+rE(B, t) = 1 and rQ(G, t)+rQ(B, t) < 1, then not making a
report by t grants quack a continuation payoff of zero, while by martingale property of belief there
exists m ∈ {G,B} such that b(m, t) > 0, and therefore report (m, t) dominates the strategy of
staying silent. Similarly, if rE(G, t) + rE(B, t) < 1 and rQ(G, t) + rQ(B, t) = 1, then not making a
report by t yields the maximal continuation payoff, while again by the martingale property making
at least some report gives strictly less in expectation.
Before we proceed, it is useful to introduce some new pieces of notation which come in handy
for further proofs. The expert’s report probabilities can be rewritten as





p̃0 · zt,G · rEG(m, t) + (1− p̃0) · zt,B · rEB(m, t) + zt,∅ · rE∅(m, t)




η (m, t)|ω] =
π · zt,ω · rEω (m, t) + (1− π) · zt,−ω · rE−ω(m, t) + zt,∅ · rE∅(m, t)
π · zt,ω + (1− π) · zt,−ω + zt,∅
,
(36)
where p̃0 = p0π + (1 − p0)(1 − π), and zt,η = P {ηt = η, µt−1 = ∅|η∗ = η} for η ∈ {∅, G,B}. I.e.,
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zt,η is the probability that the expert has information η at time t and has not made a report prior
to t, conditional on expert’s signal realization being η∗ = η (or unconditional if η = ∅). It can be
expressed recursively as





rEη (m, t− 1)
)

















with z0,G = z0,B = 0 and z0,∅ = 1. In any symmetric equilibrium we have zt,G = zt,B ≡ zt, so the
expectations above transform into
rE(m, t) = Eη[r
E




G(m, t) + (1− p̃0)rEB(m, t)
)
+ (1− zt)rE∅(m, t), (38)
Eη[r
E
η (m, t)|ω] = zt
(
πrEω (m, t) + (1− π)rE−ω(m, t)
)




and 1− zt = zt,∅zt+zt,∅ .
Given the strategies, we also define the likelihood ratio of reports as






with ±∞ being admissible values. This ratio summarizes the information about the forecaster’s
type contained in report (m, t).
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is valid for all π ∈ (12 , 1]. We begin with a useful observation:
WEt,∅(m, t) =W
Q
t (m, t) form ∈ {G,B}. (40)
If the expert reports (m, t) before observing a private signal, his continuation payoff coincides with
that of the quack, since they possess the same private information at any such history.
Note further that the existence of a Godwin point t̄ = min{t ∈ T |V Et,∅ = V Qt } is trivial since
the required equality is always satisfied for the last point of S. To see this, observe that any report
(m, t) for t > t|S| yields zero reputation for the rest of the game due to assumption (OP), and
is therefore weakly dominated for any type of the forecaster by staying silent. At the same time,
staying silent yields the same time-t expected payoff to the uninformed (as of time t) expert as it
does to the quack, since they have the same information. This together with (40) gives the result.
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Most of the remaining proof is devoted to showing that V Et,∅ = V
Q
t for some t implies babbling
in all further times. This is established in a series of claims. The second part of the proposition is
then easily shown by contradiction.
As a starting point, we show that WEt,η(m, t) = W
Q
t (m, t) for any m ∈ {G,B}, any η ∈ {G,B}
and any t ∈ Sm such that t > t̄. Suppose the converse – there exist m, t and η such that
WEt,η(m, t) 6=WQt (m, t). Then (ML) and (SY) imply that there can be three cases:
Case 1: rEG(G, t) = r
E
B(B, t) > r
E
G(B, t) = r
E
B(G, t) > 0.
In this case WEt,G(G, t) = W
E













t (B, t), which reduces to the equality of


















If rEG(G, t) > r
E
B(G, t) then, by (39) and the expression for b
ω(m, t), the LHS of (41) is
weakly positive. However, due to (SY) we then have that rEG(B, t) < r
E
B(B, t), so the RHS
is weakly negative. The converse also holds, which leaves us with the conclusion that for
(41) to be satisfied, its both sides must be equal to zero. Therefore, βG(m, t) = βB(m, t) for
any m ∈ {G,B}, which implies WEt,η(m, t) = WQt (m, t) = V Qt for any η ∈ {G,B} and any
m ∈ {G,B}, – a contradiction.
Case 2: rEG(G, t) = r
E
B(B, t) > 0 = r
E
G(B, t) = r
E
B(G, t).
As rEG(G, t) > r
E
B(G, t) and r
E
B(B, t) > r
E




t,G(G, t) > W
Q
t (G, t) =




t . Next, note that V
E
t̄,∅
is, for all t > t̄, bounded below by
t−1∑
s=t̄
w (βs) + P{t∗ 6 t | t∗ > t̄} ·
(
p̃0 · V Et,G + (1− p̃0) · V Et,B
)
+ P{t∗ > t | t∗ > t̄} · V Et,∅,



















which gives us a contradiction with the definition of t̄.
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Case 3: rEG(G, t) = r
E
B(B, t) = r
E
G(B, t) = r
E
B(G, t) = 0 and r
E
∅(m, t) > 0 for some m.
rEG(G, t) = r
E
G(B, t) = r
E
B(G, t) = r
E
B(B, t) automatically implies W
E
t,η(m, t) = W
Q
t (m, t)
for any η ∈ {G,B} and any m ∈ {G,B}, which gives us a contradiction with the initial
assumption.
Next we show thatWEt,η(m, t) =W
Q
t (m, t) for all η,m ∈ {G,B} with t ∈ Sm implies that report
(m, t) is babbling. Without loss of generality assume η = G. Expanding the equality, we see that
0 =WEt,G(m, t)−WQt (m, t) =













and therefore βG(m, t) = βB(m, t). It further implies that (7) reduces to (10). In other words, it
follows that reputation should not be affected by the revelation of state after any time-t report.
To conclude that only babbling is possible after t̄ we are left to show that (9) holds for all (m, s)
with s > t̄. Condition (9) is equivalent to g(m, s) = 0. Three cases are possible (since we have
shown in the proof of Proposition 1 that rγ(G, s) + rγ(B, s) = 1 cannot be the case for exactly one
γ).
Case 1: s = max{t ∈ S | t > t̄} and rγ(G, s) + rγ(B, s) = 1 for any γ ∈ {S,Q}.
If m is the only report made at s then rγη (m, s) = 1 for all γ, η, which implies g(m, s) = 0.
If both reports are made on path at s, then by the same logic rγη (G, s) + r
γ
η (B, s) = 1, and
if g(m, s) 6= 0 for some m then the report with higher g(m, s) is strictly preferred by either
forecaster, contradicting that both reports occur on path.
Case 2: s = max{t ∈ S | t > t̄} and rγ(G, s) + rγ(B, s) < 1 for γ ∈ {S,Q}.
If m is the only report made at s and g(m, s) 6= 0 then a quack has strict preference between
report (m, s) and staying silent at s (because in either case he gets a degenerate lottery at T ,
since (10) is satisfied). This strict preference cannot occur in equilibrium, thus g(m, s) = 0.
If both reports are made on path at s then we can combine the two indifference arguments
above to obtain that g(G, s) = g(B, s) and, consequently, g(m, s) = 0 for all m ∈ {G,B}.
Case 3: s < max{t ∈ S | t > t̄}.
From the previous case we know that g(m, s) = 0 for any on-pathm at s = max{t ∈ S | t > t̄}.
We can iterate backwards from there as follows. If s−1 ∈ S then a quack should be indifferent
between making an on-path report at s−1 and at s, which can only happen if g(m, s−1) = 0,
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because g(m, s) = 0 and (10) is satisfied for both reports. Iterating backwards we establish
the claim for all t > t̄. If some of these periods are not in S then they can be skipped because
beliefs do not change at such periods.
All of the above proves that only babbling is possible after the Godwin point.
We are left to show the second part of the proposition. First, suppose there exist m and t < t̄




t,∅(m, t) = W
Q
t (m, t) = V
Q
t , where the second equality
follows from (40). Thus t > t̄ by definition of t̄ – a contradiction.
Now suppose there exists t 6 t̄ such that rEη (−η, t) > 0 for some η ∈ {G,B}. As shown before,




t (m, t) = V
Q
t for all η,m ∈ {G,B}. Suppose first that t = t̄. Then
as rE∅(m, t|S|−1) = 0 for m ∈ {G,B}, we have




+P{t∗ 6 t̄ | t∗ > t|S|−1}·
(
p̃0 · V Et̄,G + (1− p̃0) · V Et̄,B
)















= V Qt|S|−1 ,
which constitutes a contradiction with the definition of the Godwin point. One can similarly show





(m, t̄) = WQt (m, t̄) = V
Q
t̄
for all η ∈ {G,B} and all
m ∈ {G,B}, which leads to the same contradiction with the definition of the Godwin point as




forecaster who has received a signal by period t can postpone his report until t̄ and receive strictly
more than the quack which contradicts V Et,η = V
Q
t implied by r
E
η (−η, t) > 0.
We are left to show that the expert never wants to conceal his private signal. Assume
rEη (η, t̄) < 1. Then thet expert must weakly prefer to conceal his private signal than to report
it. In the first case the expert receives exactly V Q
t̄











. Let {rγη (m, t)} be an equilibrium
strategy profile. Consider a new strategy profile {r̃γη (m, t)} such that r̃Et,η(m, t) = rEt,η(m, t),
r̃Qt (m, t) = r
Q
t (m, t) for all t 6 t̄ and r̃
E
t,η(m, t) = r̃
Q
t (m, t) = 0 for all t > t̄. As strategies coincide
on S̃ and all reports (m, t) with t > t̄ are babbling in the original equilibrium, the following are
true:
1. beliefs b(m, t) and bω(m, t) induced by the two strategy profiles coincide for all ω,m ∈ {G,B},
t ∈ S̃;
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2. belief sequences bt induced by the two strategy profiles coincide for all t ∈ T .
The latter statement also exploits the fact that S\S̃ is nonempty (otherwise the proposition
statement trivially holds), so it must be that rQ(G, t̄) + rQ(B, t̄) < 1 and rE(G, t̄) + rE(B, t̄) < 1.
The first statement above implies that any report (m, t) with t 6 t̄ yields the same payoff under
either strategy profile. The second statement states that reporting nothing in any period yields the
same payoffs as well. Strategy of reporting nothing yields the same payoff under {r̃γη (m, t)} as any
report (m, t) with t > t̄ under {rγη (m, t)}, since all such reports are babbling. Finally, any report
(m, t) with t /∈ S yields the same payoff under either strategy profile due to (OP).
Everything said above directly implies that if rγη (m, t) is a best response for type-γ forecaster
to strategy profile {rγη (m, t)} then r̃γη (m, t) is a best response for him to strategy profile {r̃γη (m, t)}
and yields the same payoff.
Before proceeding to the proof of Theorem 1, we provide some expressions for belief updating
that will be useful in further proofs. Using Proposition 2 and the notion of zt introduced earlier in
this Appendix, we can rewrite the expressions for (4) and (6) in a more explicit form. Proposition
2 implies that for all t < t̄ we have rEG(B, t) = r
E
B(G, t) = 0. Therefore, (38) and (39) together
imply that for all t ∈ S we have






G(G, t) + (1− zt)rE∅(G, t)
rQ(G, t)
,

















G(G, t) + (1− zt)rE∅(G, t)
rQ(G, t)
,








B(B, t) + (1− zt)rE∅(B, t)
rQ(B, t)
,






(1− π)ztrEG(G, t) + (1− zt)rE∅(G, t)
rQ(G, t)
,










and It is also worth remembering that rE∅(m, t) = 0 for any t < t̄.
In case no report was made in period t < t̄, the belief is updated as
βt = βt−1 ·
1− rE(G, t)− rE(B, t)
1− rQ(G, t)− rQ(B, t) = βt−1 ·
1− ztrEG(G, t)
1− rQ(G, t)− rQ(B, t) , (44)
116
while the analogous expression for t = t̄ is given by
βt̄ = βt|S|−1 ·
1− rE(G, t̄)− rE(B, t̄)
1− rQ(G, t̄)− rQ(B, t̄) = βt|S|−1 ·
(1− zt̄) ·
(
1− rE∅(G, t̄)− rE∅(B, t̄)
)
1− rQ(G, t̄)− rQ(B, t̄) . (45)
In (44) we use the fact that rEG(G, t) = r
E
B(B, t) due to (SY), and in (45) we use that r
E
G(G, t̄) =
rEB(B, t̄) = 1 by Proposition 2.
What follows is the proof of the main result, Theorem 1. To avoid duplicating the arguments,
we merge it with the proof of Propositions 7 and 9.
Proof of Theorem 1 and Propositions 7 and 9. . First, recall that Propositions 1, 2 and 3 are true





, and so can be employed in this proof. Further, note that in all babbling periods
t we have i(m, t) = 0, b(m, t) = bt−1 for m ∈ {G,B}, and bt stays on a constant level. Together
with Propositions 2 and 3 this means that it is enough to show the statement of the Theorem for
informative equilibria. The proof is separated into several steps.
Step 1. We start by showing that ∆wη(m, t), which is defined as
∆wη(m, t) := w





is a weakly decreasing function of t on S given m = η (note that ∆wG(m, t) = −∆wB(m, t)).
Suppose the expert has private information η = G at time t, but has not yet made any report. He
chooses a report (m, τ) with τ > t which maximizes WEt,G(m, τ), where “making no report” is also























where p̃0 = p0π + (1− p0)(1− π).
A quack is indifferent between all such reports at time t. His continuation value WQt (m, τ) can
















Given that the latter expression is constant over all (m, τ), the optimization problem of an expert
with η = G becomes equivalent to maximizing the difference ∆wG(m, τ) over all τ ∈ {S|τ > t} and
m ∈ {G,B}.
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Similarly, an expert who has observed signal B chooses report (m, τ) which maximizes
∆wB(m, τ). Propositions 1, 2 and 3 imply that S = {t ∈ T | rEη (η, t) > 0} for any η ∈ {G,B}, so
since t ∈ S, it must be that (G, t) maximizes ∆wG(m, τ) and (B, t) maximizes ∆wB(m, τ) across
all (m, τ) with τ ∈ {S | τ > t}. Therefore, ∆wη(η, t) must be a weakly decreasing function of t on
S.
Step 2. The second step of the proof consists in showing that for η ∈ {G,B}, ∆wη(η, t) is
weakly decreasing on S\{t̄} if and only if βη(η, t) is weakly decreasing on S\{t̄} (if an equilibrium is
reticent then ∆wη(η, t) is weakly decreasing on S if and only if βη(η, t) is weakly decreasing on S).
We demonstrate it for all cases stated in Theorem 1, Proposition 7 and Proposition 9 separately.
Case 1: π = 1.
This case is obvious, as then w (β−η(η, t)) = 0 for any η ∈ {G,B}, and w(·) is a strictly
increasing function.
Case 2: wc(·) is convex and π < 1.
Note that since rE∅(m, t) = 0 for all t ∈ S\{t̄} (or for all t ∈ S if an equilibrium is reticent)







∈ (0, 1) because π > 12 . Take any τ1 > τ2 with τ1, τ2 ∈ S. Then if
βη(η, τ1) = x1 > x2 = β







> wc (x2)− wc
(












where the first inequality follows from convexity of w(β), and the second is valid because
w(β) is strictly increasing.






Similarly to the previous case take any τ1, τ2 ∈ S and let x1 := βη(η, τ1), x2 := βη(η, τ2).







































< (x2 − x1) ·
(






d̄− d · 1−π
π
)
> 0, we must have x2 > x1.
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Conversely, if x2 > x1 then
0 < (x2 − x1) ·
(




















which grants the result.
Step 3. We next show that whenever |S| > 3 and an equilibrium on S exists, it must be that
bt1 > b(m, t1) for any m ∈ {G,B} (alternatively, if equilibrium is reticent, then this claim is valid
for any S with |S| > 2). Assume there exists m ∈ {G,B} such that bt1 < b(m, t1). Quack’s value
from report m at t1 and t2 are equal to










































Consequently, it must be that either β(m, t1) < β(m, t2), or β
m(m, t1) < β
m(m, t2) or β
−m(m, t1) <
β−m(m, t2). However, (42) and (43) imply that both β
G(m, t) and βB(m, t) differ from β(m, t) by
a constant factor for any t ∈ S\{t̄} (since rE∅(m, t) = 0), so the three inequalities are equivalent.
Therefore, βm(m, t1) < β
m(m, t2), which contradicts β
m(m, t) being decreasing on S\{t̄}. In
reticent equilibria rE∅(m, t̄) = 0, therefore the claim extends to t̄ as well.
Step 4. We finally show how the claim in the theorem can be obtained from the previous steps.
We have shown that bt1 > b(m, t1) for anym ∈ {G,B}. Consequently, as bt is a martingale, we have
that bt1 > b0 and b(m, t1) 6 b0 for at least one m ∈ {G,B}. As b(m, t1) 6 bt1 for m ∈ {G,B}, we
must have that either b(m, t2) 6 b(m, t1), or b
m(m, t2) 6 b
m(m, t1) or b
−m(m, t2) 6 b
−m(m, t1) to
make the quack indifferent between reports (m, t1) and (m, t2). Again, (42) and (43) imply that all
three inequalities are equivalent, so all three have to hold. The fact that bt is a martingale together
with resulting inequalities bt1 > b(m, t1) > b(m, t2) for m ∈ {G,B} imply bt2 > bt1 . Iterating this
argument further, we achieve that b(m, t) 6 bt and bt is increasing in t on S\{t̄} (on whole S if
equilibrium is reticent).
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The above proves the second and the third parts of Theorem 1 and Propositions 7 and 9.88 It
remains to show the first part. Note that, by the same inductive reasoning as above, if bt1 > b(m, t1)
then bt|S|−1 > b(m, t|S|−1). Consequently, it is possible to show that b
m(m, t̄) < bm(m, t|S|−1).
Indeed, suppose the converse. Then to make the quack indifferent between reporting m at t|S|−1














which contradicts the fact that ∆wη(m, τ) is weakly decreasing in t on S for m = η.
Finally, remember that for all t ∈ S\{t̄} we have
|i(m, t)| = ln
(
1 + βm(m, t)

















increasing function of x. For the last two points of S we have
|i(m, t|S|−1)|−|i(m, t̄)| = ln
(




















where the last inequality follows from βm(m, t|S|−1) > β
m(m, t̄) and the fact that π > 12 . This
concludes the proof of Theorem 1/Proposition 9 for general informative equilibria.
We continue by presenting the proof of Proposition 6, which is a special case of Theorem
1/Proposition 9 for delay equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 6. Let {rγη (m, t)} constitute a delay equilibrium on S. First, note that if
bt1 = b(G, t1) = b(B, t1) then bt = b(m, t) = b0 for t ∈ S\{t̄}. It further implies that bm(m, t) is
constant on S\{t̄}. Therefore, i(m, t) is constant on S\{t̄} as well, as suggested by (46), so we get
all three statements. If equilibrium is reticent then all these claims are valid for all t ∈ S.
To show that bt1 = b(G, t1) = b(B, t1), proceed by contradiction. If there exists m ∈ {G,B}
such that bt1 > b(m, t1) then r
E
m(m, t) = 1 for all t ∈ S\{t|S|−1}.89 Due to (SY), the same applies
to the other m as well. Further, if such m exists then, as shown above, bm(m, t̄) < bm(m, t|S|−1),
88The statement that bt is constant on T \S follows trivially from (4).
89The claim for all points except the two last ones follows from the fact that bm(m, t) is strictly decreasing in this































if and only if x1 > x2
whenever π = 1 (which corresponds to Theorem 1) or any of the two conditions in Proposition
9 are satisfied. Finally, (43) implies that 1−π
π



















The resulting inequality means that informed expert strictly prefers to report his private information
at t|S|−1 rather than at t̄. This is the last step towards the conclusion that if there existsm ∈ {G,B}
such that bt1 > b(m, t1) then r
E
m(m, t) = 1 for m ∈ {G,B} and all t ∈ S, which is a contradiction
to {rγη (m, t)} constituting a delay equilibrium.
Proving statements about equilibrium existence and properties requires showing some
supplementary results first. We start with a lemma that shows that delay equilibria can effectively
be considered as modifications of relay equilibria.
Lemma 5. For any delay equilibrium on S with |S| > 3 there exists a payoff-equivalent relay
equilibrium, such that beliefs after the same histories coincide in the two equilibria.
Proof. Assume that strategy profile {rγη (m, t)} constitutes a delay equilibrium on S. Consider
strategy profile {r̃γη (m, t)} such that
1. r̃Eη (m, t̄) = r
E
η (m, t̄) and r̃
Q(m, t̄) = rQ(m, t̄) for η ∈ {∅, G,B} and m ∈ {G,B};
2. r̃Eη (m, t) = 1 for m = η, r̃
E
η (m, t) = 0 for m 6= η, and r̃Q(m, t) = r
Q(m,t)
rEm(m,t)
for all t ∈ S\{t̄}.
By Proposition 6 a strategy profile constitutes a delay equilibrium on S with |S| > 3 only if
bt = b(G, t) = b(B, t) = b0 for all t ∈ S\{t̄}. Therefore rQ(m, t) = rE(m, t) for m ∈ {G,B} and





= 1, that is r̃Eη (m, t) = 1 is indeed a
well-defined profile of strategies. Moreover, profile {r̃γη (m, t)} induces the same beliefs as profile
{rγη (m, t)} after the same histories, and therefore also constitutes an equilibrium. At the same time,




Next we proceed with describing which conditions are necessary for a given profile of strategies
{rγη (m, t)} to constitute a relay equilibrium. We consider two sub-cases depending on whether not
making a report by t̄ is on equilibrium path.
Lemma 6. Suppose that beliefs β(m, t) and βω(m, t) for all t ∈ S are given by (42) and (43)
respectively, while βt is given by (44) for all t < t̄. Moreover, let strategy profile {rγη (m, t)} be such
that: (1) rEη (η, t) = 1 for all η ∈ {G,B} and all t ∈ S, and (2) r∅(m, t) = 0 for all m ∈ {G,B}
and all t ∈ S\{t̄}.
1. Strategy profile {rγη (m, t)} with rE∅(G, t̄) + rE∅(B, t̄) = 1 constitutes a relay equilibrium on S
only if
WQt1 (m, t) = W̄ for all t ∈ S and m ∈ {G,B} for some W̄ ∈ R+,
rQ(G, t̄) + rQ(B, t̄) = 1.
(47)
Moreover, there exists at most one solution to this system, and if w(β) = βα and wc(β) = θ·βα
then this solution always exists.
2. If (45) holds then strategy profile {rγη (m, t)} with rE∅(G, t̄) + rE∅(B, t̄) < 1 constitutes a relay
equilibrium on S only if
WQt1 (m, t) =W
Q
t1
(∅) = W̄ for all t ∈ S and m ∈ {G,B} for some W̄ ∈ R+. (48)
Moreover, there exists at most one solution to this system, and if w(β) = βα and wc(β) = θ·βα
then this solution always exists.
Proof. By Proposition 1, a strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium only if WQt1 (m, t) is constant
for all t ∈ S and m ∈ {G,B}. Additionally, if rE∅(G, t̄) + rE∅(B, t̄) < 1 – that is, not making a
report by t̄ is an on-path action – the value that the quack receives from making any report must
be equal to value from making no report.
The proof of Proposition 1 argued that rE(G, t̄) + rE(B, t̄) = 1 implies rQ(G, t̄) + rQ(B, t̄) = 1.
From Proposition 2 we know that rEη (η, t̄) = 1, and therefore r
E(G, t̄) + rE(B, t̄) = 1 is equivalent
to rE∅(G, t̄) + r
E
∅(B, t̄) = 1. This completes the proof of the first parts of both statements.
To prove the uniqueness of solutions to respective systems, assume that there exist two different
strategy profiles {rγη (m, t)}, {r̃γη (m, t)}, values of making a report WQt (m, τ), W̃Qt (m, τ), and belief
profiles b, b̃ that solve either system (47) or system (48). Then rQ(G, t1) 6= r̃Q(G, t1), as otherwise
equilibria coincide. Indeed, strategies rEη (m, t) = r̃
E
η (m, t) for all t ∈ S. Therefore, if rQ(G, t1) =
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r̃Q(G, t1) then b(G, t1) = b̃(G, t1) and b
ω(G, t1) = b̃
ω(G, t1), meaning that W
Q
t1




By the first two parts of the lemma, the quack’s values WQt1 (m, t) should then coincide for all m
and t ∈ S, which implies rQ(m, t) = r̃Q(m, t) – a contradiction.
Without loss, assume rQ(G, t1) > r̃
Q(G, t1). Then since W
Q
t1




W̃Qt1 (G, t1) = W̃
Q
t1
(B, t1), we must have r
Q(B, t1) > r̃
Q(B, t1) as well. By (44) this implies that
bt1 > b̃t1 . Consequently, r
Q(G, t2) > r̃
Q(G, t2) and r
Q(B, t2) > r̃




WQt1 (m, t2) and W̃
Q
t1
(m, t1) = W̃
Q
t1
(m, t2) for m ∈ {G,B}. Iterating this logic further, we obtain
that rQ(G, t̄) + rQ(B, t̄) > r̃Q(G, t̄) + r̃Q(B, t̄). In the context of the first part of the lemma (case
rE∅(G, t̄) + r
E
∅(B, t̄) = 1), it clearly violates r
Q(G, t̄) + rQ(B, t̄) = r̃Q(G, t̄) + r̃Q(B, t̄) = 1. In the
context of the second part, it implies bt̄ > b̃t̄, and therefore W
Q
t1
(∅) > W̃Qt1 (∅) because the payoff
that the quack receives from staying silent is point-wise lower in the former equilibrium. At the
same time, because rQ(G, t1) > r̃
Q(G, t1), we must have W
Q
t1
(G, t1) < W̃
Q
t1
(G, t1). As in the second
case WQt1 (∅) =W
Q
t1
(G, t1) and W̃
Q
t1
(∅) = W̃Qt1 (G, t1), we arrive to a contradiction.
Finally, to prove existence of a solution for w(β) = βα and wc(β) = θ · βα assume first that
rE∅(G, t̄)+r
E






and rQ(G, t̄) + rQ(B, t̄) = 1. We can then explicitly solve this system of equations for rQ(G, t̄) and
rQ(B, t̄) as functions of rE∅(G, t̄) and r
E













































MG(x) := (T − t̄) · (p̃0zt̄ + (1− zt̄)x)
α + θ · p0 (πzt̄ + (1− zt̄)x)
α + θ · (1− p0) ((1− π) zt̄ + (1− zt̄)x)
α ,
MB(x) := (T − t̄) · ((1− p̃0) zt̄ + (1− zt̄)x)
α + θ · p0 ((1− π) zt̄ + (1− zt̄)x)




(G, t̄) + rE
∅
(B, t̄) < 1, the second part of the lemma prescribes that WQ
t̄













































































(B, t̄) = 1. Therefore, without loss we can restrict ourselves to the case rE
∅
(G, t̄) + rE
∅
(B, t̄) < 1 and only
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consider strategy profile given by (50). All above proves existence of the solution for t = t̄.








We next show that this system of equations always has a solution. Consider the following auxiliary system.
For any given c > 0 assume that rQ(G, t|S|−1) + r





Then if rQ(G, t|S|−1) approaches zero, the LHS approaches +∞ while the RHS is constant. Similarly,
the RHS strictly dominates the LHS when rQ(G, t|S|−1) = c. Moreover the LHS is strictly decreasing in
rQ(G, t|S|−1), while the RHS is strictly increasing in it. Therefore by the Intermediate Value Theorem for a
given c > 0 there exists a unique pair rQ(G, t|S|−1), r
Q(B, t|S|−1) such that r
Q(G, t|S|−1)+ r
Q(B, t|S|−1) = c
and WQt|S|−1(G, t|S|−1) = W
Q
t|S|−1
(B, t|S|−1). Also note that both r
Q(G, t|S|−1) and r
Q(B, t|S|−1) are strictly
increasing in c. Further for the same c > 0 still assume that rQ(G, t|S|−1) + r






as an equation in c. The RHS of it is a strictly increasing function of c which approaches +∞ when c
approaches 1. As established before, the LHS of it is a strictly decreasing function of c (because rQ(G, t|S|−1)
is strictly increasing in c), which approaches +∞ when c approaches zero. Therefore there exist unique
rQ(G, t|S|−1) and r
Q(B, t|S|−1) such that W
Q
t|S|−1
(G, t|S|−1) = W
Q
t|S|−1





The bottom line of the lemma above is that for a given tuple
[
S, rE∅(G, t̄), rE∅(B, t̄)
]
, a
strategy profile that constitutes a relay equilibrium is a unique solution to a particular system
of algebraic equations. Moreover, solution to this system always exists if w(β) = βα and
wc(β) = θ · βα. Representing a strategy profile as a solution to a system of equations allows
us to compare equilibrium strategies and, therefore, report informativeness across different relay
equilibria employing the arguments similar to the Implicit Function Theorem.
In all further lemmas it is assumed that strategy profile rγη (m, t) and all associated equilibrium
objects such as valuesWQt (m, τ), belief profiles b, p, and informativeness measures i(m, t) constitute
a solution to either system (47) or system (48) for a given tuple
[
S, rE∅(G, t̄), rE∅(B, t̄)
]
, and therefore
are understood as functions of
[
S, rE∅(G, t̄), rE∅(B, t̄)
]
.
The next lemma establishes that whenever w(β) = βα and wc(β) = θ · βα, it is true
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that strategies that constitute a solution to either system (47) or system (48) are continuously
differentiable in rE∅(G, t̄) and r
E
∅(B, t̄) at r
E
∅(G, t̄) + r
E
∅(B, t̄) = 1. The same will then be true of all
associated equilibrium objects WQt (m, τ), b and i(m, t), as they all are continuously differentiable
functions of the strategies. The statement of this lemma is valid for any continuously differentiable
w(·), but the statement for this particular functional form is enough for the needs of the paper and
is significantly easier to prove. Lemma 7 allows us to further omit the consideration of the case
rE∅(G, t̄)+r
E




∅(B, t̄) < 1.
Lemma 7. Suppose w(β) = βα and wc(β) = θ · βα, and strategy profile {rγη (m, t)} solves either
system (47) or system (48). Then rγη (m, t) is a continuously differentiable function of rE∅(G, t̄) and
rE∅(B, t̄) for all r
E
∅(G, t̄) + r
E
∅(B, t̄) 6 1.
Proof. First note that rγη (m, t) exists by Lemma 6. Next, the strategy profile for the expert is
fixed by the premise of Lemma 6 and is therefore a continuously differentiable function of rE∅(G, t̄)
and rE∅(B, t̄). Therefore we are left to establish that r
Q(m, t) is a continuously differentiable
function of rE∅(G, t̄) and r
E
∅(B, t̄) for all m ∈ {G,B} and all t ∈ S. As expressions in (49) coincide
with the ones in (50) for rE∅(G, t̄) + r
E
∅(B, t̄) = 1, without loss, we restrict ourselves to the case
rE∅(G, t̄)+r
E
∅(B, t̄) < 1. Both expressions in (50) are continuously differentiable functions of r
E
∅(G, t̄)




∅(B, t̄) 6 1. Thus, it is left to show the same for r
Q(G, t) and rQ(B, t)










=WQt|S|−1 (B, t̄) .


















on bt|S|−2 – that is, on strategies r
Q(G, t) and rQ(B, t) for t 6 t|S|−2 – but only on r
Q(G, t̄)









continuously differentiable functions of rQ(G, t̄) and rQ(B, t̄), which eventually implies that they are
continuously differentiable functions of rE∅(G, t̄) and r
E
∅(B, t̄). Proceeding backwards we establish
the claim for all rQ(G, t) and rQ(B, t) for t ∈ S.
The two following lemmas are mostly technical and provide little intuition for the main problem.
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Lemma 8. Suppose
m(x) = (χ1 (a1 + bx)




for k > 2, b > 0,
k∑
i=1
χi = 1, a1, . . . , ak > 0 with ai, aj > 0 for some i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, i 6= j. Then
m(x) is strictly decreasing when α > 1 and is strictly increasing when α < 1.






χ1 (a1 + bx)
α−1 + . . .+ χk (ak + bx)
α−1
(χ1 (a1 + bx)





First, if α > 1 then, since xk is strictly convex for k > 1, we have
(
χ1 (a1 + bx)




< χ1 (a1 + bx)




< 0 if α > 1.
Second, if α < 1 then, because xk is strictly convex for k < 0, we still have (51) satisfied.
Therefore, because α−1
α
< 0, we have
χ1 (a1 + bx)
α−1 + . . .+ χk (ak + bx)
α−1 > (χ1 (a1 + bx)






> 0 if α < 1.
Lemma 9. Suppose w(β) = βα, and strategy profile {rγη (m, t)} solves either system (47) or system






1− rE∅(G, t̄)− rE∅(B, t̄)
)
1− rQ(G, t̄)− rQ(B, t̄)
)
> 0,






1− rE∅(G, t̄)− rE∅(B, t̄)
)
1− rQ(G, t̄)− rQ(B, t̄)
)
< 0.
Additionally, for any m ∈ {G,B} and any t ∈ S we have that WQt1 (m, t) is strictly increasing in
rE∅(m, t̄) if α < 1, and W
Q
t1
(m, t) is strictly decreasing in rE∅(m, t̄) if α < 1.
Proof. Lemmas 6 and 7 imply that rQ(m, t) exists for all m ∈ {G,B} and t ∈ S and is continuously
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differentiable in rE∅(G, t̄) and r
E
∅(B, t̄). Next, from (50) we can calculate that
(1− zt̄) ·
(

















(T − t̄+ θ)
1
α
+ (1− zt̄) ·
(





which is the sum of two functions of the form from Lemma 8 and a constant. Therefore, the first statement
of the Lemma follows directly from Lemma 8.




(B, t̄) < 1.
What follows is the proof for the case α < 1 (case α > 1 is analogous). For a given m ∈ {G,B} fix some
rE
∅
(m, t̄) < r̃E
∅
(m, t̄) and rE
∅
(−m, t̄) = r̃E
∅

















as {rγη (m, t)} and {r̃γη (m, t)}. Denote by b
and b̃ the respective beliefs, and by W γt (m, τ) and W̃
γ
t (m, τ) the respective values from reports.
Assume that WQt1 (m, t) > W̃
Q
t1
(m, t). Then rQ(m, t1) 6 r̃
Q(m, t1) for m ∈ {G,B}. From (44) we then
get that bt1 6 b̃t1 . This, in turn, implies that r
Q(G, t2) 6 r̃
Q(G, t2) and r
Q(B, t2) 6 r̃
Q(B, t2) because
WQt1 (m, t1) = W
Q
t1
(m, t2) and W̃
Q
t1
(m, t1) = W̃
Q
t1
(m, t2) for m ∈ {G,B}. Iterating this logic further, we get


















1− rQ(G, t̄)− rQ(B, t̄) ,
and therefore WQt1 (∅) < W̃
Q
t1
(∅). This gives us a contradiction with the initial assumption WQt1 (m, t) >
W̃Qt1 (m, t) because we must have W
Q
t1
(∅) =WQt1 (G, t1) and W̃
Q
t1
(∅) = W̃Qt1 (G, t1).
Proof of Proposition 4. We first show that for any set of parameters |S| = 1, rE∅(G, t̄) > 0, and
rE∅(B, t̄) > 0, the informative equilibrium with given parameters exists. Proposition 2 and the
values of rE∅(m, t) pin down the expert’s strategy. We next show that there exists such a quack’s
strategy rQ(m, t̄) that conditions in Lemma 6 are satisfied, which proves this part of the proposition.
Note also that for singleton S we have zt̄ = F (t).
The first condition one needs to check in order to establish existence is WQ
t̄
(G, t̄) = WQ
t̄
(B, t̄),
which can be written as



















From (42) and (43) we see that the LHS is strictly decreasing in rQ(G, t̄), and the RHS is strictly
increasing in rQ(G, t̄). Moreover, all six terms in (52) are always positive irrespectively of rQ(G, t̄)
because rE∅(G, t̄) > 0 and r
E
∅(B, t̄) > 0. Therefore when r
Q(G, t̄) = 0 the LHS strictly dominates
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the RHS, and when rQ(G, t̄) = 1 the RHS strictly dominates the LHS. By the Intermediate Value
Theorem, there exists unique rQ(G, t̄) (and therefore rQ(B, t̄)) such that (52) is satisfied.
If rE∅(G, t̄) + r
E
∅(B, t̄) = 1 then we are done. Strictly speaking, this is enough to prove
the statement. However, for sake of completeness we show that the equilibrium exists in case
rE∅(G, t̄) + r
E
∅(B, t̄) < 1 as well. To do this we need to ensure that W
Q
t̄
(G, t̄) = WQ
t̄
(∅), i.e., that
the value of not making a report at t̄ is equal to the value of making a report:








= (T − t̄) · w (βt̄) + wc (βt̄) . (53)
By the same logic as above, we know that for any given c > 0 there exist unique rQ(G, t̄) and
rQ(B, t̄) such that (52) is satisfied and rQ(G, t̄) + rQ(B, t̄) = c. Further, note that rE∅(G, t̄) and
rE∅(B, t̄) that are obtained as a solution to this auxiliary system are both increasing in c.
90 Finally,
consider (53) as an equation in c. From the previous observation it follows that its LHS is decreasing
in c, while the RHS is increasing in c. If c = 0 then the LHS dominates the RHS, and if c = 1
the RHS dominates the LHS. Therefore, by the Intermediate Value Theorem there exists unique c
such that (53) is satisfied. Solving (52) using this c gives a pair rQ(G, t̄) and rQ(B, t̄) that uniquely
solves the original system of (52) and (53).
To prove the second part of the proposition we construct a relay reticent equilibrium for a given
S with |S| > 2 and rE∅(G, t̄) = rE∅(B, t̄) = 0. Since states are symmetric, for any t ∈ S the quack is
indifferent between reports (G, t) and (B, t) if and only if rQ(G, t) = rQ(B, t). Thus, we are only
left to ensure the indifference between a report and no report for the quack and to verify that the
constructed equilibrium is incentive compatible for informed expert. Define g := g(G, t1) = g(B, t1).
Then WQt1 (G, t1) =W
Q
t1
(B, t1) is equal to















From the expression above we see that the value of g fully determines the value that the quack
gets in equilibrium. In a relay equilibrium the expert’s strategy is fixed, so smaller g means larger
rQ(G, t1) and r
Q(B, t1). Larger r
Q(G, t1) and r
Q(B, t1), in turn, imply higher bt1 . Finally, because
the quack must be indifferent between reports at t1 and t2, higher bt1 implies larger r
Q(G, t2) and
rQ(B, t2). All in all, it means that the payoff that the quack receives by not making a report is
90At least one of rE∅ (G, t̄) and r
E
∅ (B, t̄) must be higher for a higher c, and (52) implies that higher r
E
∅ (G, t̄) implies
higher rE∅ (B, t̄).
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point-wise strictly decreasing in g. When g = 0 we have that bt = b0 for all t ∈ T (remember
that rE∅(G, t̄) = r
E
∅(B, t̄) = 0, so following the logic from Proposition 9 we have g(m, t) = 0 for
all t ∈ T ), therefore value of making no report by the end of period T evaluated at t1 is equal to
(T − t1) · w (β0) + wc (β0). When g → −∞ we have that the value of making no report strictly
dominates the value of making a report. When g = 0 we have












> (T − t1) · w (β0) + wc (β0)
because wc(·) is convex. Therefore, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists a unique
g 6 0 such that the quack is indifferent between making a report and not making a report. Finally,
because g(G, t1) = g(B, t1) = g 6 0 we have b(m, t1) 6 b0 6 bt1 . From Proposition 9 for convex
wc(·) we know that it implies that bm(m, t) – and, consequently, ∆wη(m, t) for m = η – are
decreasing on S, which verifies that rEη (η, t) = 1 is an optimal strategy for the expert, i.e., the
constructed profile indeed constitutes an equilibrium.
To prove the third part assume the contrary: there exists S with |S| > 3 such that informative
equilibrium with respective strategy profile {rγη (m, t)} for t ∈ S exists. By Lemma 5 we can assume
without loss that the equilibrium is a relay one. By Lemma 6 we know that there exists a strategy
profile {r̃γη (m, t)} (and associated belief profile b̃ and value function W̃ γt (m, τ)) for the same S with
r̃E∅(G, t) = r̃
E
∅(B, t) = 0 which solves system (48). We next show that this profile constitutes a
relay equilibrium on S. The only condition that needs to be verified is that this profile is incentive
compatible for informed expert. By the proof of Proposition 9, for S with |S| > 3 this is equivalent
to verifying that b̃t1 > b̃(m, t1) for m ∈ {G,B} because r̃E∅(G, t) = r̃E∅(B, t) = 0.
In the original equilibrium we have bt1 > b(m, t1) by the same Proposition 9. By Lemma 9,
because rE∅(m, t) > r̃
E




implies that rQ(m, t1) < r̃
Q(m, t1) for m ∈ {G,B}, and therefore b̃t1 > bt1 > b(m, t1) > b̃(m, t1)
for m ∈ {G,B}, which completes the argument.
We have established the existence of the relay equilibrium on S with r̃E∅(G, t) = r̃E∅(B, t) = 0.
By Proposition 9 there exists m ∈ {G,B} such that b̃(m, t1) 6 b0, and therefore














At the same time, because in such equilibrium bt > b0 for all t ∈ S (again by Proposition 9), we
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have
W̃Qt1 (∅) > (T − t1) · w (β0) + w
c (β0) .

















> wc (β0) . (54)
If wc(·) is strictly concave then (54) can not be satisfied, which gives us the contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 5. Denote by W γt (m, τ) and W̃
γ
t (m, τ) the respective values of making report
and by b and b̃ the beliefs for strategy profiles {rγη (m, t)} and {r̃γη (m, t)}.




m ∈ {G,B}. Assume the contrary, i.e., that WQt1 (m, t1) > W̃
Q
t1
(m, t1) for m ∈ {G,B}.91
Then it directly implies rQ(m, t1) < r̃
Q(m, t1) for m ∈ {G,B}. From (44) it then follows that
bt1 < b̃t1 . This, in turn, implies that r
Q(G, t2) < r̃
Q(G, t2) and r
Q(B, t2) < r̃
Q(B, t2) because
WQt1 (m, t1) =W
Q
t1
(m, t2) and W̃
Q
t1
(m, t1) = W̃
Q
t1
(m, t2) for m ∈ {G,B}. Iterating this logic further,
we obtain that bt < b̃t for all t ∈ S. Additionally, by Proposition 9 we have btk 6 btk+1 6
. . . 6 btk+n (we can extend the argument to btk+n because r̃
E
∅(m, tn+k) = 0 for m ∈ {G,B}).
Therefore, WQt1 (∅) < W̃
Q
t1
(∅). Making no report is an on-path action in both equilibria, thus
WQt1 (G, t1) = W
Q
t1
(∅) and W̃Qt1 (G, t1) = W̃
Q
t1




gives us a contradiction with the initial assumption.
Condition WQt1 (m, t) 6 W̃
Q
t1
(m, t) directly implies that rQ(m, t1) > r̃
Q(m, t1) – since in a relay
equilibrium the strategy of the expert is fixed, – and therefore |i(m, t)| 6 |̃i(m, t)| for all t ∈ S.
Finally, |i(m, t)| = 0 for any t /∈ S, meaning that |i(m, t)| < |̃i(m, t)| for t ∈ S̃\S.
Proof of Proposition 8. In an ideal equilibrium, rEη (η, t) = 1 and r
E
∅(m, t) = r
Q(m, t) = 0 for
η,m ∈ {G,B} and all t ∈ S. Report (η, t) at t yields maximal continuation reputation to the
expert with information η ∈ {G,B}, so is trivially optimal at the time when he receives his private
signal. The uninformed expert’s preference for staying silent at any t is at least as high as that
of the quack (due to the option value of receiving news in the future and obtaining the maximal
continuation payoff). Therefore, it is enough to verify that the quack prefers to stay silent at
91Because WQt1 (G, t1) = W
Q
t1
(B, t1) and W̃
Q
t1
(G, t1) = W̃
Q
t1
(B, t1), we have that either W
Q
t1




both m ∈ {G,B} or WQt1 (m, t1) < W̃
Q
t1
(m, t1) for both m ∈ {G,B}.
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every point of the support. Since after any report the reputation jumps to w̄ := lim
x→+∞
w (x) and to
w̄c := lim
x→+∞
wc (x) after state is revealed, in case of no report it must decrease, as bt is a martingale.
Therefore, WQt1 (m, t) is maximized at t = t1 (and any m). Report (G, t1) and report (B, t1) yield,
respectively,
WQt1 (G, t1) = (T − t1) · w̄ + p0 · w̄
c,
WQt1 (B, t1) = (T − t1) · w̄ + (1− p0) · w̄
c.
We have assumed p0 >
1
2 , and therefore W
Q
t1
(G, t1) > W
Q
t1
(B, t1). Using (4), (38), and (39), one
can calculate the flow payoff from staying silent until t, which equals w (β0 (1− F (t))). Therefore,




(tk+1 − tk) · w (β0 (1− F (tk))) + (T − t̄) · w (β0 (1− F (t̄))) + wc (β0 (1− F (t̄))) .
Staying silent is optimal if and only if WQt1 (G, t1) 6 W
Q
t1
(∅). This requires that both w̄ and w̄c to
be finite, while if w(·) or wc(·) is strictly increasing and convex, it must be that w̄ = +∞.
131
Appendix for “Bad News Turned Good: Reversal under
Censorship”
All statements below fix some strategy profile (rL(p), rH(p))p∈[0,1]2 , which in turn produces
functions D(p) and f s(p). Some statements further require this strategy profile to constitute an
equilibrium.
Lemmas 1 and 2 are used heavily throughout the Appendix. They are monolithic in essence,
but it proved more convenient to stagger their proofs for different bands, since they use different
supplementary results.
Lemma 10. 1. D(p) ∈ [−1,−q) if and only if f s(p) > ps.
2. D(p) = −q if and only if either f s(p) = ps or rH(p) = rL(p) = 0.
3. D(p) ∈ (−q, 1− q] if and only if f s(p) < ps.
Proof. To show the first claim, observe that D(p) < −q is equivalent to
(1− q) · (1− rH(p))− (1− rL(p)) < −q















Two other claims can be obtained by reversing the inequalities or equating both sides. Finally, if
rH(p) = rL(p) = 0, then (14) directly gives that D(p) = (1− q)− 1 = −q.
Lemma 11. For any k > 0 the following hold:
1. For all p = (pn, ps) ∈ B↑k, if there exists p̃ = (pn, p̃s) with p̃s ∈ [p̄, ps] and D(p̃) > 0, then






λz(1− z) · π(pn, z)D(pn, z)dz. (55)
2. For any p = (pn, ps) ∈ B↑k, if D(pn, p̃s) < 0 for all p̃s ∈ [p̄, ps] and τ(p) < +∞, then τ(pn, ·)
is differentiable in its second argument at ps.92
92At p with ps = p̄ by the derivative of τ(pn, ·) we understand its right derivative.
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3. If D(p) 6 −ε < 0 for all p ∈ B↑k, then τ(p) is finite for all p ∈ B
↑
k.
4. Suppose g(p) : B↑k → [p̄, 1] is defined indirectly as τ (fn(pn), g(p)) = ψ (τ(p)) for some
differentiable and strictly increasing function ψ, and τ(p) is finite for any p ∈ B↑k ∪B
↑
k−1 with
ps < 1, strictly increasing and differentiable in ps on [p̄, 1).93 Then g(p) is a strictly increasing











where J(p) is a differentiable function of ps.
Proof. 1. If there exists p̃ = (pn, p̃s) with p̃s ∈ [p̄, ps] and D(p̃) > 0, then pt never reaches B↓k, so
τ(p) = +∞ by definition. Now let pst denote the solution to (14) with the initial condition
ps0 = p
s. If D(pn, p̃s) < 0 for all p̃s ∈ [p̄, ps], pst is a strictly decreasing function of t. Therefore,
there exists an inverse function t(pst ) measuring the time it takes for belief to drift from the
initial value ps to pst . Its derivative is given by
dt(pst )
dpst
= (λpst (1− pst ) · π(pn, pst )D(pn, pst ))−1 ,





λz(1−z)·π(pn,z)D(pn,z)dz. As D(p̄) < 0, the threshold is
crossed in zero time. Then substituting pst = p̄ we get the result.
94
2. If D(pn, p̃s) < 0 for all p̃s ∈ [p̄, ps], then representation (77) is valid. Taking the derivative
with respect to ps we get
dτ(p)
dps
= − (λps(1− ps) · π(pn, ps)D(pn, ps))−1 . (56)
As long as 0 < p̄ 6 ps < 1 and D(pn, ps) < 0, the derivative is finite and positive.
3. In case D(p) 6 −ε < 0 the improper integral in (77) converges for any p and therefore
τ(p) < +∞.
4. Differentiability of g(p) follows directly from the differentiability and monotonicity of a
composition and an inverse function. Differentiability of J(p) is then straightforward as
93If p ∈ B0, then we let Bk−1 = Bk = B0.
94This proof does not imply that the integral converges. Hence even if D(pn, p̃s) < 0 for all p̃s ∈ [p̄, ps], it may












is a sum of differentiable functions and is therefore differentiable.





















> ln(1 + ε).
Proof. We prove only the first claim, the second one is analogous. D(p) > −q + ε implies























Proof of Lemma 1 for B↑0. Suppose there exists p̃ = (p̃n, p̃s) ∈ B
↑
0 with τ(p̃) = +∞. Then consider
states pinf,1 := (p̃
n, psinf,1) and pinf,2 := (f
n(p̃n), psinf,2), where p
s
inf,1 = inf{ps | τ(p̃n, ps) = +∞}

















By Lemma 11 there can be three (mutually non-exclusive) sub-cases to consider.
Case 1 D(pinf,1) > 0. Then τ(pinf,1) = +∞, and rL(pinf,1) > 0.96 Therefore, a low-type seller
must weakly prefer to disclose a bad review, and thus τ(f(pinf,1)) = +∞. Then psinf,2 6 f s(pinf,1)












6 ln(1−q) by Lemma 12, which together
imply (57).
Case 2 D(pinf,1) < 0 and there exists a sequence {p̃sk} such that p̃sk ↓ psinf,1 and D(p̃k) > − 1k ,
where p̃k := (p̃
n, p̃sk). Then for any ε > 0 and sufficiently high K we have D(p̃K) > − q4 ,
95As the set is non-empty and bounded from below by p̄, the infimum exists.
96The latter is true because if rL(pinf,1) = 0, then D(pinf,1) 6 −q.
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< ε. As τ(p̃K) = +∞ and rL(p̃K) > 0, we must















































for sufficiently small ε.
Case 3 D(pinf,1) < 0 and there exists a sequence {p̃sk} such that p̃sk ↑ psinf,1 and k < τ(p̃k) < +∞,
where p̃k := (p̃
n, p̃sk). As τ(pinf,1) = +∞ in this sub-case and τ(p̃k) < +∞, for any k there exists
p̂k = (p̃
n, p̂sk) with p̂
s
k ∈ [p̃sk, psinf,1] such that τ(p̂k) > k and D(p̂k) > − 1k . Note that p̂k → pinf,1
as k → +∞. Now suppose (57) does not hold. Fix some arbitrary δ > 0. For any δ > 0 we have
τ(fn(p̃n), psinf,2 − δ)) < +∞, so we can find k > 4q such that τ(p̂k) > τ(fn(p̃n), psinf,2 − δ)). By
















. As rL(p̂sk) > 0, we must have
τ(f(p̂k)) > τ(p̂k), and therefore by the monotonicity of τ(f
n(p̃n), ps) in its second argument we
must have f s(p̂k) > p
s






















which implies that f s(p̂k) < p
s
inf,2, and by taking sufficiently small δ we achieve a contradiction.









= +∞}. Equation (57) then implies that psinf,k < p̄ for all















, i.e., we have pinf,k ∈ B↓0, and there exists εk > 0 such that p ∈ B
↓
0 for
all p = (pninf,k, p
s) with ps ∈ [psinf,k, psinf,k + εk). However, by definition we have τ(p) = 0 for all
p ∈ B↓0, which brings us to a contradiction with the definition of pinf,M .
Proof of Lemma 2 for B↑0. Proofs for this and other regions proceed by contradiction: we show that
the low-type seller can neither have strict preference towards revealing a review (rL(p) = 1), nor
towards deleting a review (rL(p) = 0).
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Suppose that at some p ∈ B↑0 ∩ R a low-type seller strictly prefers to reveal a bad review, i.e.,
rL(p) = 1. Then D(p) > 0 and τ(p) = +∞, which contradicts Lemma 1 for B↑0. If rL(p) = 0
and rH(p) > 0 instead, then revealing a bad review brings the maximal continuation profit to a
low-type seller, while deleting it yields strictly less if no new bad review arrives in time τ(p), which
is finite by Lemma 1 for all p ∈ B↑0, so the probability of this happening is strictly positive. That
contradicts rL(p) = 0. As rL(p) < 1 for all p ∈ B↑0, we have that a low-type seller weakly prefers to
conceal a bad review at every state in B↑0. Therefore, the value of a low-type seller is equal to the




e−rt ·µdt. As V L(p) = V L(f(p)), we
must then have τ(p) = τ(f(p)).

















By Lemma 11 τ(p) is differentiable in ps, and by Lemma 1 for B↑0, in any equilibrium τ(p) < +∞
for all p ∈ B↑0. Therefore, in any equilibrium D̄(p) is well defined in B
↑
0 and is differentiable with
respect to ps for any ps < 1. Lemma 2 for B↑0 also states that τ(p) = τ(f(p)), and therefore function
J(p) is well-defined for all p ∈ B↑0 by Lemma 11.
Lemma 13. 1. Suppose there exists a state p̃ = (p̃n, p̃s) ∈ B↑0 such that D̄(p̃) 6 −q − ε for
some ε ∈ (0, 1 − q]. Then there exists p̂s ∈ [p̄, p̃s] such that D̄(p̃n, p̂s) 6 −q − ε and
J(p̃n, p̂s) > ln(1 + ε).
2. Suppose there exists a state p̃ = (p̃n, p̃s) ∈ B↑0 such that D̄(p̃) > −q + ε for some ε ∈ (0, q).
Then there exists p̂s ∈ [p̄, p̃s] such that D̄(p̃n, p̂s) > −q + ε and J(p̃n, p̂s) 6 ln(1− ε).
Proof. We only show the first statement; the second is proved analogously. Consider a set
S := {ps ∈ [p̄, p̃s] | J(p̃n, ps) > ln(1 + ε)}. First, it is nonempty, as otherwise by Lemma 12
we have D(p) > −q − ε for all p with ps ∈ [p̄, p̃s], which violates D̄(p̃) 6 −q − ε.97 Second, S is
closed (as J(p) is continuous in ps) so its upper contour sets are closed in ps. Finally, S is trivially
bounded from above by p̃s. Therefore, there exists p̂s := supS ∈ S. Moreover, for all ps > p̂s we
have J(p̃n, ps) < ln(1 + ε) and, therefore, D(p̃n, ps) > −q − ε, which implies D̄(p̃n, p̂s) 6 −q − ε.
The second property of p̂s follows directly from the definition of S.












Proof of Proposition 10. First note that any strategy profile that generates f s(p) = ps for all
p ∈ B↑0 ∩ R constitutes an equilibrium. Indeed, by Lemma 10 f s(p) = ps implies D(p) = −q for
all p, and therefore τ(p) = τ(f(p)) for all p ∈ B↑0, making both types of sellers indifferent between
disclosing and concealing a bad review.
Proof of the converse is split into two steps. In step 1 below we show that if there exists
p ∈ B↑0 ∩ R such that J(p) 6= 0, then there exists a state p̃ such that either D̄(p̃) 6 −q − ε and
J(p̃) > ln(1+ε), or D̄(p̃) > −q+ε and J(p̃) 6 ln(1−ε).98 Then in step 2 we achieve a contradiction
in both of these cases.
Step 1 Suppose there exists p ∈ B↑0 such that J(p) 6= 0. If D̄(p) 6= −q, then the claim is valid by
Lemma 13. Now suppose that D̄(p) = −q. Then as J(p) 6= 0, it must be that D̄(f(p)) 6= −q and
we can apply Lemma 13 to f(p).
Step 2 Suppose there exists p1 such that D̄(p1) 6 −q − ε and J(p1) > ln(1 + ε). Denote
K := 1 + ln(1 + ε) · τ(p1)−1. As τ(f(p1)) = τ(p1) and D(p) > −1, it must be that D̄(f(p1)) 6
K · (−q − ε). Then by Lemma 13 there exists p2 = (ps2, pn2 ) with ps2 ∈ [p̄, f s(p1)] and pn2 := fn(pn1 )
such that D̄(p2) 6 K(−q−ε) and J(p2) > ln(1+K(q+ε)−q) > ln(1+ε). Iterating this procedure
M := [− logK(q + ε)] + 1 times we arrive at a state pM such that D̄(pM ) 6 KM (−q − ε) < −1,
which is impossible.
Alternatively, suppose there exists p1 such that D̄(p1) > −q + ε and J(p1) 6 ln(1 − ε). Then
as τ(f(p1)) = τ(p1) and J(p1) < 0, it must be that D̄(f(p1)) > −q + ε. Then by Lemma 13




2 ) with p
s
2 ∈ [p̄, f s(p1)] and pn2 := fn(pn1 ) such that D̄(p2) > −q + ε and





























M ) such that
psM < p̄ and τ(pM ) = τ(p1), – a contradiction.
Proof of Corollary 2. Proposition 10 and Lemma 10 imply that D(p) = −q for all p ∈ B0 in any
equilibrium. Therefore, (77) states that τ(p) for any given p must be the same in any equilibrium.
Representation (15) then implies that the same is true for V L(p). The high type’s value V H(p) is
98Note that J(p) = 0 implies fs(p) = ps.
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Finally, consumers’ behavior and, hence, payoffs are always the same at a given p in any equilibrium.
Therefore, for a given p ∈ B0 all players’ payoffs are the same in any continuation equilibrium.
Lemma 14. If µ < 1/2, then B1 ∩R = ∅.









by deleting all future reviews and retaining naive consumers forever and sophisticated consumers
for time τ(p). Disclosing any bad review makes naive consumers quit the market until a good
review arrives (which is never for a low-type seller), so






As one can see, if µ < 1/2, then V L(f(p)) < V L(p), hence the low-type seller is never willing to
disclose a bad review.
Proof of Lemma 2 for B1. Whenever µ < 1/2, by Lemma 14 we have B1∩R = ∅ so the statement is
trivially true. Thus from now on assume µ > 1/2. We divide the proof into two parts corresponding
to two subregions of B1.
Case 1: p ∈ B↓1 There it must be that (1− q) · rH(p) > rL(p), as by sacrificing the pool of naive
consumers any seller must gain the pool of sophisticated consumers for at least some period of time,
so f s(p) > p̄ > ps. In particular, this implies that rL(p) = 1 is not possible in any equilibrium.
As for the second case, suppose instead that rL(p) = 0 and rH(p) > 0. Then any single bad
review reveals a high-type seller and trades off the pool of naive consumers for the whole pool of
sophisticated consumers forever. Either group under the respective scenario stays on the marker
forever, and the other group joins after a good review. Thus rL(p) = 0 is optimal for the low-type
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seller only if µ = 1/2. In that case the low-type seller is indifferent between disclosing a bad review
and concealing it. If, however, µ > 1/2, then the combination of rL(p) = 0 and rH(p) > 0 is
impossible, and thus rL(p) > 0.
Case 2: p ∈ B↑1 If µ = 1/2, then a strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium in B
↑
1 if and only
if rH(p) = rL(p) = 0 for states with ps > p̄, and rL(pn, p̄) = 0. At p̄ the low-type seller can
then retain one and only one of two types of consumers on the market while another is driven out
forever, and he is therefore indifferent between revealing and deleting (but in equilibrium deletes
all bad reviews).
Thus for the remainder of the proof we assume that µ > 1/2 and consider p ∈ B↑1 ∩ R. If
rL(p) = 1, then D(p) > 0, so staying silent at p gives the maximum possible continuation payoff to
any seller. On the other hand, by disclosing at p any seller loses naive consumers for at least some
time and therefore gets strictly less, – a contradiction with the optimality of rL(p) = 1.
We are left to show that the low-type seller cannot strictly prefer to delete a bad review. Suppose
by way of contradiction that there exists p̃ ∈ B↑1 ∩ R such that rL(p̃) = 0 and rH(p̃) > 0. Then
f s(p̃) = 1 and τ(f(p̃)) = +∞. Moreover, non-disclosure is on path for the low type in this and all
future states, thus deleting this and all future bad reviews must be weakly better for the low-type















+ e−rτ(f(p̃)) > e−rτ(p̃). (58)
On the other hand, the high-type seller’s value from disclosing a bad review at p̃ is


























The value that the high-type seller gets from deleting a bad review at p̃ is at least as large as the
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where the last inequality follows from (58) after recalling that τ(f(p̃)) = +∞. As rH(p̃) > 0, it
must be that V H (f(p̃)) > V H(p̃), which implies:

































(1−x)λqr is a decreasing function
of x for all x ∈ (0, 1). This means that (61) is violated whenever µ > 1/2, so there does not exist
any p̃ ∈ B↑1 ∩R with rL(p̃) = 0.
Finally, as rL(p) < 1 for all p ∈ B1 and the low-type seller is indifferent between disclosing and
concealing a bad review at all p ∈ B↑0 ∪ B1, (58) holds with equality for all p ∈ B
↑
1.
Proof of Lemma 1 for B↑1+. We prove the claim only for B
↑
1. Induction to all further bands is
straightforward. Assume the contrary. Then there exists p̃ = (p̃n, p̃s) ∈ B↑1 with τ(p̃) = +∞.
Consider a state p̃inf := (p̃




inf = inf{ps | τ(p̃n, ps) = +∞}. According to
Lemma 11, there can be three sub-cases. Either D(p̃inf ) > 0, or D(p̃inf ) < 0 and there exists a
sequence p̃sk converging to p̃
s
inf either from below or from above such that D(p̃
n, p̃sk) → 0.
If D(p̃inf ) > 0 or p̃
s
k converges to p̃
s
inf from above, there exists p̂ such that τ(p̂) = +∞ (i.e., no
disclosure at p̂ grants the maximal continuation payoff) and D(p̂) > −q, with the latter implying
that p̂ ∈ R. By deleting all bad reviews the seller can retain both groups of consumers in the
market forever starting from p̂. However, we know that V θ(f(p̂)) is strictly smaller than the
maximal possible payoff for seller of type θ, since this is true for any p ∈ B0 with ps < 1. Revealing
a bad review at p̂ is thus strictly suboptimal for either type of the seller, which contradicts p̂ ∈ R.
If p̃sk converges to p̃
s
inf from below, then for any ε > 0 and any C > 0 there exists p̂ such that
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D(p̂) > −ε and τ(p̂) > C. The latter property is satisfiable, as improper integral in (77) diverges,
and therefore for any C > 0 there exists some k such that τ(p̃n, p̃sinf − 1k ) > C. As for the former,
we know that τ(p̃n, p̃sinf ) − τ(p̃n, p̃sinf − 1k ) = +∞, and therefore there exists p̂s ∈ [p̃sinf − 1k , p̃sinf ]
such that D(p̃n, p̂s) > −ε. As the seller’s value V θ(p) in any state p ∈ B↑0 with ps < 1 is strictly
less than the maximal one and as C can be made arbitrarily large, we can find C large enough that
the value of disclosure is strictly less than the value of staying silent. Since p̂ ∈ R as long as ε < q,
we achieve a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 11. It is shown in Lemma 14 that if µ < 1/2, then rL(p) = rH(p) = 0 for all
p ∈ B1 ∩ R is the only possible equilibrium strategy profile. To show the second condition, recall
from Lemma 2 that a low-type seller must be indifferent between revealing a bad review at p ∈ B↑1
and not, and that his indifference condition can be written as
1− µ
µ
+ e−rτ(f(p)) = e−rτ(p). (62)
As τ(f(p)) 6 +∞, it should be that τ(p) 6 1
r








ln µ1−µ which gives the result.
Proof of Proposition 12. The claim was already established for B↓1 in the proof of Lemma 2 for B1.
We are left to show it for B↑1. As Lemma 11 shows, we can construct a mapping g such that
1− µ
µ
+ e−rτ(g(p)) = e−rτ(p), (63)












for some function J(p) which is differentiable in ps. Taking the derivative of both sides of (63) with
respect to ps, we get
e−rτ(p) · dτ(p)
dps






As is shown in Lemma 11, dτ(p)
dps








ps + (1− ps)e−J(p)
]2 .
Plugging the three derivatives, we get that (65) corresponds to
e−rτ(p) · µq = e−rτ(g(p)) · (−D(p)) ·
[




Plugging (63) into the expression above we get
(−D(p)) ·
[





µ+ (1− µ) · erτ(g(p))
]
. (66)
Consider state (pn, p̄) ∈ B1. We know τ(pn, p̄) = 0, therefore (63) implies τ(g(pn, p̄)) > 0, which
in turn means J(pn, p̄) > 0. For any p ∈ B↑1 we have τ(g(p)) > τ(g(pn, p̄)) > 0, therefore there
exists ε > 0 such that the RHS of (66) is larger than q + ε. If additionally dJ(p)
dps
< 0, (66) implies
D(p) < −q− ε, and consequently J(p) > ln(1+ ε) by Lemma 12. It then follows from continuity of
J(p) in ps that J(p) > 0 for all p ∈ B↑1. For there to exist p ∈ B
↑
1 such that J(p) 6 0 there should
exist p̃ such that J(p̃) ∈ (0, ln(1+ ε)) and dJ(p̃)
dps
< 0, which is ruled out by the argument above.
Lemma 15. If µ > 1/2, then for any set R̃ ⊆ B↓1 there exists an equilibrium with B
↓
1 ∩R = R̃.
Proof. As Lemma 2 states, for µ > 1/2 the low-type seller is indifferent between disclosing a bad
review and concealing it at all p ∈ B↓1 ∩R. This indifference is given by (62), and using τ(p) = 0 for
























1− f s(p) =
ps
1− ps ·











Next we consider incentives of a high-type seller. Since rH(p) > 0, he should weakly prefer to
reveal a bad review. We further show that this is always true whenever µ > 1/2 (and the preference
is strict if µ > 1/2), and therefore rH(p) = 1 constitutes an equilibrium in B↓1. The value from




revealing a bad review can be computed by plugging (62) and τ(p) = 0 into (60) to obtain

















The value of staying silent at p is no greater than supremum over all T of expected payoffs from
staying silent until T and then receiving and disclosing a bad review exactly at T (with T = +∞
allowed as an option to stay silent forever). The remainder of this proof shows that this amount is




































+ e−(r+λq(1−µ))T · V H (f(pT )) ,







and V H(f(pT )). The latter is given by (67) and






r + λq(1− µ)
)
,
which would mean that staying silent at p is weakly worse than revealing a bad review at p, and





























which concludes the argument.
Proof of Lemma 2 for B2+. Suppose not: there exists some p ∈ R at which the low-type seller has
143
strict preference. Depending on the direction of this preference, two cases are possible:
Case 1: rL(p) = 0, rH(p) > 0 Then f s(p) = 1 and fn(p) > p̄, so by revealing this bad review and
deleting all future ones the seller can guarantee himself the maximal possible continuation payoff.
Therefore, deleting bad review at p cannot be strictly better than leaving it – a contradiction.
Case 2: rL(p) = 1, rH(p) 6 1 It implies D(p) > 0. If ps > p̄, then this contradicts Lemma 1 for
p ∈ B↑1+. If, however, ps < p̄, then by Lemma 10 D(p) > 0 implies that f s(p) < ps for bad reviews
revealed at p, and therefore f s(p) < p̄. The low-type seller’s value from revealing a bad review in
B↓1 is equal to the value of deleting all future bad reviews starting from f(p). Deleting a bad review
in B↓2 can guarantee at least the same value by case of deleting all bad reviews. This means that
despite we’ve assumed rL(p) = 1, the low-type seller is indeed indifferent between disclosure and
concealment at p.
We have shown that the low-type seller’s value at any p ∈ B2+ is equal to that from deleting all
bad reviews starting from p, and the value of disclosure at p is equal to the value he gets deleting

















which can be further reduced to
τ(f(p)) = τ(p). (69)
This concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 13. We show the claim for B↑2. Induction to B
↑
k with k > 2 is straightforward.
As Lemma 11 shows, we can construct mapping g such that τ(g(p)) = τ(p), and for some












Now suppose that there exists p̃ = (p̃n, p̃s) ∈ B↑2 such that f s(p̃) < p̃s. Then g(p̃) = f s(p̃), and
therefore J(p̃) < 0. As J(p) is a continuous function of ps and J(p̃n, p̄) = 0, there exists p̂s < p̃s such
that J(p̃n, p̂s) = 0 and J(p̃n, ps) < 0 for all ps ∈ (p̂s, p̃s]. Thus g(p̃n, ps) 6 ps for all ps ∈ [p̂s, p̃s].
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Therefore, by Lemmas 10 and 11 we must have D(p̃n, ps) > −q for all ps ∈ [p̂s, p̃s]. However,
D(p) 6 −q for all p ∈ B↑1 which violates τ(g(p̃))− τ(g(p̂)) = τ(p̃)− τ(p̂) given representation (77),
where p̂ = (p̃n, p̂s).
Proof of Theorem 2. The statement of the Theorem follows directly from Propositions 10, 12 and
13.
Proof of Corollary 1. From Theorem 2 and expression (12) we have
(1− q) · rH(p) > rL(p).
Therefore, if rH(p) = 0, then we must have rL(p) = 0 and p 6∈ R. If rH(p) > 0, then
rH(p) > (1− q) · rH(p) > rL(p)
which proves the claim.
Proof of Theorem 3. To prove the first part note that first, by Corollary 2 all continuation equilibria
are payoff-equivalent in B↑0. Next, if µ < 1/2, then Lemma 14 implies that D(p) = −q for all
p ∈ B1, and therefore all continuation equilibria are payoff-equivalent in B1 as well. As B↓1 ∩R = ∅
by Lemma 14 and ps can never cross p̄ from below, seller’s value V θ(p) for p ∈ B↓2+ is equal in
any equilibrium to the value of keeping naive consumers in the market forever. Finally, in any
equilibrium D(p) = −q for all p ∈ B↑2+: by Theorem 2 and Lemma 10, D(p) 6 −q, and if there
exists an equilibrium and p ∈ B↑2+ with D(p) < −q, then J(p) > 0 by Lemma 10, which violates
τ(f(p)) = τ(p) as D(p) = −q for all p ∈ B1. This implies that τ(p) is constant across equilibria,
which together with the above gives payoff-equivalence in B↑2+.
If µ = 1/2, then D(p) = −q for all p ∈ B↑1 ∩R with ps > p̄. Since on any path of play the game
only passes through one state in B↑1 with ps = p̄ (which is the only state in B
↑
1 where D(p) < −q
is possible), and drift there is still negative, τ(p) in any equilibrium must be the same as in case
µ < 1/2 (where B↑1 ∩ R = ∅) for all p ∈ B
↑
1. The same logic as above can then establish that
D(p) = −q for all p ∈ B↑2+. Finally, in case µ = 1/2 it may be that B
↓
1 ∩ R 6= ∅, but both types
of seller are in any such p indifferent between revealing and deleting a bad review, and therefore
receive the same payoff as if B↓1 ∩R = ∅.
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The remainder of the proof is devoted to constructing an equilibrium that satisfies the
requirements of the second part of Theorem 3. We propose a strategy profile and show that it
satisfies all equilibrium conditions.
Construct the strategy profile as follows. Let B↑0 ∩R = ∅, and for all p ∈ B
↓





in such a way that B↓1 ∩R = B
↓
1, – the latter is possible by Lemma 15.
For µ > 1/2 the inequality in (68) is strict for all p ∈ B↓1, so by continuity of preferences of
the high-type seller there exists ε1 > 0 such that he strictly prefers to reveal at all p ∈ {B↑1 | ps ∈
[p̄, p̄ + ε1)}, i.e., these states can belong to R in equilibrium. In all such states it must be that
rH(p) = 1, and rL(p) is then defined implicitly by (62). The latter can be reduced to the following

































.100 Then rL(p) can be obtained from
J(p) = ln (1− q) − ln rL(p). By the existence theorem (see Pontryagin [1962], chapter 4, §21)
a solution to (70) exists in some neighborhood of (pn, p̄), i.e., there exists ε2 > 0 such that J(p),
and consequently rL(p), is well-defined for all p = (pn, ps) with ps ∈ [p̄, p̄+ε2). Take ε = min (ε1, ε2)
and set rL(p) for all p ∈ {B↑1 | ps < p̄+ ε} as prescribed by the procedure above. At the remaining
states p ∈ {B↑1 | ps > p̄+ ε} set rH(p) = rL(p) = 0.
The strategy profile in B2+ is constructed as follows. For any p ∈ B↓2+ let rH(p) = 1 and





















meaning p̄ > f s(p) > ps. In B↑2+ let rH(p) = rL(p) = 0 for p ∈ {B
↑
2+ | ps = p̄}. Let rH(p) = 1
for all p ∈ {B↑2+ | ps > p̄}. We compute rL(p) inductively over bands, where the induction
statement is “rL(p) is constructed for all p ∈ B↑k and it is such that D(p) 6 −q”. This is true
by construction for k = 1, which starts the induction. Suppose it holds for k − 1. For p ∈ B↑k





and let J(pn, z) represent, with abuse of notation, the respective transformation of J(p), i.e.,






. Then taking the derivatives of both sides of (69) with
100This initial condition is such that J(p) is continuous at (pn, p̄).
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= −D (fn(p), z + J(pn, z)) (71)





















= −ε < 0. As a solution to


























− 1 > q
q
− 1 = 0.













= −ε – a contradiction. As ε > 0 was taken arbitrarily, it shows that





. We next can take arbitrary solution to (71) in the neighborhood
of its initial condition, the existence of which is ensured by the existence theorem (see Pontryagin





if and only if J(pn, z) < +∞ for all







− 1 = 1− q
q
< +∞.
Consequently, by Lemma 10 we obtain that D(p) 6 −q for all p ∈ B↑k, which concludes this part of
the proof.
We next show that the constructed strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium. We first show
that the low-type seller is indifferent whether to reveal a bad review or to conceal it at all
p ∈ B2+ ∩R. If p ∈ B↓2+, then by construction 0 < rL(p) < 1. From Lemma 15 we also know that
0 < rL(p) < 1 for p ∈ B↓1 ∩ R. Then the value of a low-type seller in any p ∈ B
↓
1+ ∩ R is equal to
the value he receives in case he deletes all future bad reviews: V L(p) = 1−µ
r
. Therefore, a low-type
seller is indeed indifferent between disclosing a bad review and deleting it for any p ∈ B↓2+∩R. For
p ∈ B↑1+ ∩ R the indifference directly follows from the way rL(p) is constructed and the fact that
rL(p) < 1.102
101The RHS of (71) is not smooth in J(pn, z), but is piecewise smooth. Therefore, as a solution to (71) we take a
composition of two solutions which are pasted together using continuity.
102The latter is true as J(p) < +∞ for all p ∈ B↑1+ ∩R.
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By construction, the high-type seller strictly prefers to reveal bad reviews at all p ∈ B1∩R. We
proceed by showing that the high-type seller weakly prefers to reveal a bad review at all p ∈ B↓2+∩R.
Concealing a review at p ∈ B↓2 ∩ R cannot yield him a payoff higher than if he could choose time
T at which a bad review will arrive and will be revealed:



























r + λq (1− µ)
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V H (f (pT )) = V
H (f (p))
















r + λq(1− µ)
)
for all p ∈ B↓1 since the high-type seller can delete all future bad reviews. The last equality holds
because V H(f(pT )) is independent of T . Indeed, distributions of arrival times of the next buying
consumer are the same for all p ∈ B↓1. Therefore, V H(p) is the same for all p ∈ B
↓
1. The resulting
inequality V H(p) 6 V H(f(p)) implies that the high-type seller weakly prefers to reveal a bad review
at all p ∈ B↓2. The argument above can be extended by induction to all further bands in order to
obtain that V H(p) 6 V H(f(p)) for all p ∈ B↓2+.
We are left to show that the high type at least weakly prefers to reveal a bad review in B↑2+.
We show the argument for B↑2, and the argument for B
↑
k with higher k then follows by induction.
Fix some state p = (pn, ps) ∈ B↑2 ∩ R. The high-type seller’s value in case he decides to conceal a
bad review at p is bounded from above by his payoff when he can receive and reveal a bad review
at any time T of his choice:



























where we use that ps
τ(p) = p̄. On the one hand, since deleting all bad reviews is always feasible for
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dt+ e−rτ(p) · V H(pn, p̄)
where the second inequality follows because by construction τ(p) = τ(f(p)), and V H(fn(p), p̄) >










dt+ e−rT · V H(f(pT ))
because the high-type seller can reveal no reviews during [0, T ], and because if pT ∈ R, then the
process given by (14) with starting point f(p) reaches value f(pT ) at exactly time T (this is since
τ(p) = τ(f(p)) for all p ∈ B↑2 ∩ R), while if pT 6∈ R, then V H(f(pT )) = 0. Everything said above
implies that V H(f(p)) > V H(p) for all p ∈ B↑2+, which concludes the proof that strategy profile is
an equilibrium.
Finally, to conclude the proof of Theorem 3 we need to show that the equilibrium has the desired
properties. We start with the fact that f s(p) > ps for all p ∈ R. By construction the strategy profile
already implies f s(p) > ps for all p ∈
(
B0 ∪ B1 ∪ B↓2+
)
∩R. We next establish the claim for p ∈ B↑2.
From (71) we know that J(p) > 0 for all p ∈ B↑2+. Suppose by way of contradiction that there exists
some p̃ = (p̃n, p̃s) ∈ B↑2 such that f s(p̃) = p̃s, i.e., J(p̃) = 0. Assume first that f(p̃) ∈ R which by
Lemma 10 implies D(f(p̃)) < −q. Then there exists ε > 0 such that D(fn(p̃), ps) 6 −q − ε for all
ps ∈ [f s(p̃)− ε4 , f s(p̃)] as, by construction, D(p) is continuous in ps.104 At the same time, we have
that J(p) < J(p̃) + ε2 =
ε
2 for all p = (p̃
n, ps) with ps ∈ [p̃s − ε4 , p̃s]. By converse of Lemma 12 this
implies thatD(p) > −q− ε2 for those p. Therefore τ(p̃)−τ(p̃n, p̃s− ε4) > τ(f(p̃))−τ(fn(p̃), f s(p̃)− ε4).
Consequently, J(p̃n, p̃s − ε4) < 0, – a contradiction. Now assume f(p̃) 6∈ R, that is D(f(p̃)) = −q.
Then (71) can be solved explicitly. Its general solution satisfies





103Values at the cutoff are equal to respective values under the cutoff since the latter are constant, and total payoff
is insensitive to alterations of flow payoff in a single state (i.e., the fact that sophisticated consumers are buying in
ps = p̄ does not affect payoffs).
104Otherwise there exists a sequence {psk} such that p
s
k → f
s(p̃) and D(fn(p̃), psk) → −q as k → +∞ which
contradicts the continuity of D(p) in B↑1 .
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where C is a constant pinned down by the boundary condition for z0 where z0 = inf{z | f(pn, z) 6∈

















= 0. Therefore, C is well-defined and finite. As we have assumed J(p̃) = 0 for some
p̃, substituting it into (73) we achieve C = −∞, – a contradiction.
All said above shows that J(p) > 0 for all p ∈ B↑2. By Lemma 10 it implies D(p) < −q for all
p ∈ B↑2, and the argument then extends to further bands straightforwardly.
To see that this equilibrium is not payoff-equivalent to an equilibrium with R = ∅, note that,
for instance, the equilibrium constructed above has D(p) < −q for p ∈ {B↑1 | ps ∈ [p̄, p̄ + ε)}, as
opposed to D(p) = −q in the fully censored equilibrium, meaning that τ(p) is smaller in the former




Proof of Proposition 14. By Lemma 2 the low-type seller is indifferent between revealing a bad
review and deleting it at all p ∈ B1+ ∩ R. Therefore, V L(p) = 1−µr for all p ∈ B
↓
1+ irrespective of










Therefore, to show the claim we need to establish that larger R implies pointwise weakly smaller
τ(p). The claim holds for B↑0 (larger B
↑
0 ∩R has no effect on τ(p) for p ∈ B
↑
0). Proceed by induction
and show that if the claim holds for B↑k−1, then it also holds for B
↑
k. For any p ∈ B
↑
k we show that






where objects indexed by single and double primes denote
respective objects in the two equilibria under consideration with R′ and R′′ ⊂ R′ respectively.
Three cases are possible for every p with τ ′(p) = τ ′′(p):
1. If p 6∈ R′, then D′(p) = D′′(p) = −q.
2. If p ∈ R′\R′′, then D′(p) 6 −q = D′′(p), where the first inequality follows from Theorem 2
and Lemma 10.
3. If p ∈ R′′, then τ ′(f(p)) 6 τ ′′(f(p)) implies that J ′(p) > J ′′(p), which in turn means that
D′(p) 6 D′′(p) because both equilibria are semi-separating.
Therefore, D′(p) 6 D′′(p) for all p ∈ B↑k. Since τ(pn, p̄) = 0 for all pn, (77) implies that τ ′(p̃) 6 τ ′′(p̃)
for all p ∈ B↑k.
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Proof of Proposition 15. As the seller of a high quality product never receives any bad review, after
any bad review beliefs jump to f s(p) = fn(p) = 0 and no future consumers ever buy the product
again. Revealing a bad review thus grants the worst continuation payoff, and is therefore strictly
dominated by deleting it for any seller who can guarantee non-zero continuation payoff which is
true if either pn > p̄ or ps > p̄.
Proof of Proposition 16. First let us introduce some extra notation for the general setting. Let






k > 1.105 By analogy with Bk for k > 0, B−k measure distance between pn and p̄: if p ∈ B−k for
k > 0, then k less bad reviews would be required to bring naive consumers back to the market.
Let us also refresh the expressions for belief updating for the general case. Rational consumers’

























after good and bad reviews respectively, and as





































We construct the equilibrium as follows. For good reviews let R+ = B↑−1 and rθ+(p) = 1 for
either θ and all p ∈ R+. For bad reviews let R− = ∪k>1B↓k and rH− (p) = 1 for all p ∈ R−. Let
rL−(p) for p ∈ B↓2+ be constructed as in Theorem 3. Finally, rL−(p) for p ∈ B
↓
1 is constructed below.
We construct rL−(p) for p ∈ B↓1 in such a way as to make the low-type seller indifferent between
revealing a bad review and not. In such construction, V L(p) = 1−µ
r
for any p ∈ B↓1 (and actually
all p ∈ B↓1+ given the remainder of the construction), so deleting all future bad reviews is optimal.
105Here function fn is meant in the sense of [0, 1] → [0, 1] (i.e., fn(pn)) since, as we remember, fn(p) does not
depend on ps.
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To clarify, this expression describes payoff from selling to sophisticated consumers until τ(p) and
to all consumers after a good review arrives if this happens before τ(p). The latter is valid because
condition qH+ · qH− > qL+ · qL− ensures that revealing one additional good review in any p ∈ B↑−1 brings
naive consumers back to the market.
















for all p = (pn, ps) ∈ B↑−1. Furthermore, τ(p) is continuous and strictly increasing in ps, so V L(p)
is continuous and strictly increasing in ps as well. Finally, τ(p) → ∞ as ps → 1 and τ(p) → 0 as







across p ∈ B↑0.
Fix some p ∈ B↓1. Let p̂ ∈ B
↑
−1 be such that V
L(p̂) = 1−µ
r







whenever µ > 1/2. Finally, let rL−(p) for p ∈ B↓1 be such that f−(p) = (fn−(pn), p̂s)
(closed-form expression for rL−(p) can be obtained from (74)).
The construction above trivially implies f s−(p) > p̄ > p
s for all p ∈ B↓1. It also generates
f+(p) > p
s for all p ∈ R+. Construction in Theorem 3 also implies that f s−(p) > ps for all p ∈ B↓2+.
This verifies the first property in the Proposition. The second property is trivial – R− is nonempty
for the strategy profile constructed above. Therefore, to conclude the proof we need to verify two
things: that the constructed strategy profile constitutes an equilibrium and that this equilibrium
is payoff-distinct from fully censored equilibrium in any meaning of the latter.
We start by verifying that the strategy profile above constitutes an equilibrium. First, either
type of the seller at least weakly prefers to reveal good reviews at all p ∈ R+. This is because
f+(p) ∈ B↑1 so D(f(p)) = 0 and τ(f(p)) = ∞.106 Simply speaking, revealing a good review moves
seller to an absorbing state in which he can retain both naive and sophisticated consumers in the
market forever. This attains the maximal payoff, so is always at least weakly optimal.






− which we do not consider in this proposition, one would need to either ensure that
prior p0 is such that f
n
+(f−(p)) > p̄ for all p ∈ B
↓
1 on equilibrium path, or to verify that the argument to follow holds




Low-type seller is by construction indifferent between deleting and revealing bad reviews at all
p ∈ B↓1. This indifference extends to B
↓
2+. If in any p ∈ B
↓
2 the low-type seller chooses to delete a
bad review, he can achieve a payoff of 1−µ
r
by deleting all future bad reviews as well. At the same
time, revealing a bad review at p (or any future state) grants him V L(f(p)) = 1−µ
r
which is exactly
the same payoff. The argument can be iterated further to show that the low type is indifferent at
all B↓2+.
The only equilibrium property left to verify is the high type’s preference. Suppose that the
high-type seller is currently in some state p ∈ B↓1. If he deletes all future bad reviews, then his
payoff equals 1−µ
r
. If, however, he has a bad review in hand and reveals it, then he arrives at some
































Given that qH+ > q
L














, trivially V H(f(p)) > 1−µ
r
. Doing the usual argument with the high-type seller solving a relaxed
problem in which he has a choice of when to reveal the bad review (used in proofs of Lemma 15
and Theorem 3), we can arrive at the conclusion that he strictly prefers to reveal a bad review
at p. Using the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 3 we can then show that this strict
preference propagates to B↓2+. This concludes the proof that the constructed strategy profile is an
equilibrium.
Finally, we want to show that the equilibrium above is payoff-distinct from fully censored
equilibrium in either sense of the latter (i.e., where R− = ∅ and R+ is either same as above, or
also empty). In either case it is enough to consider V H(p) at any p ∈ B↓1. In either fully censored
equilibrium we have V H(p) = 1−µ
r
because the high-type seller is unable to reveal any reviews. In
contrast, in the equilibrium constructed above V H(p) > 1−µ
r
because this inequality is true for all




1 (by receiving and revealing a bad review)
with a positive probability in finite time.
Proof of Proposition 17. We construct the equilibrium in a way analogous to Proposition 16 but
accounting for fake reviews. For good reviews let R+ = B↑−1 and rθ+(p) = φθ+(p) = 1 for
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either θ and all p ∈ R+. For bad reviews let R− = ∪k>1B↓k and rH− (p) = φH− (p) = 1 for
























Finally, rL−(p) and φ
L
−(p) for p ∈ B↓1 are constructed in such a way as to make the low type
indifferent between revealing bad reviews and not. Similarly to Proposition 16 in such construction
we have V L(p) = 1−µ
r















Given the strategies defined above, D(p) = −(qH+ − qL+) < 0 for all p ∈ B↑−1 as in Proposition









for all p ∈ B↑−1, meaning that f s+(p) > ps so f+(p) ∈ B
↑
1 for
all p ∈ B↑−1.
From here the fact that this strategy profile is an equilibrium and all required equilibrium
properties can be verified in exactly the same way as in Proposition 16.
107This is analogous to the construction in Theorem 3. It ensures that fs−(p) > p
s and f−(p) ∈ B
↓.
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Appendix for “The Limits of Social Learning”
When talking about current strategy in some public state pt we always assume that equilibrium is
not babbling in this state.
We also introduce the following notation
Gp(b) = p · µH(b|p) + (1− p) · µL(b|p).
This is a cdf of the distribution of private posterior b as perceived by the consumer with the prior
given by public belief p.
We will also use extensively the following representation of messaging strategies.
Definition 9. A messaging partition Σ(pt) = {Ij} in public state pt given strategy profile r is a




Ij = [0, 1],
2. for each Ij there exists mj ∈ M such that r(mj | pt, bt) = 1 if and only if bt ∈ Ij.
Strategy profile r admits representation with a partition at state pt if there exists a respective
messaging partition Σ(pt).




t and corresponding messaging partitions
Σ(p′t) = {I ′j} and Σ(p′′t ) = {I ′′j }. Then we call messaging partition Σ(p′′t ) a parallel shift of Σ(p′t) if













∈ I ′′j .
We call Σ(p′′t ) a consistent parallel shift of Σ(p
′
t) if
E[bt | bt ∈ I ′j ] < p̄ ⇒ E[bt | bt ∈ I ′′j ] < p̄.
The first result provides a more convenient representation for value function (21). It shows that
any posterior p ∈ E(pt) is fully characterized by two numbers V H(p) and V L(p).
Lemma 16. If p ∈ E(pt) then
V (p | pt, bt) = θ(bt)− c+ β
(
btV










βj−t−2 · I (pj > p̄) · sj
∣∣∣∣ p, θ = i

 , i = {H,L}.
Moreover, V (p | pt, bt) is linear and strictly increasing in bt for any given p.
Proof. Because p ∈ E(pt) then the next consumer buys the product. Therefore (21) reduces to
V (p | pt, bt) = bt (H − c) + (1− bt) (L− c) + β
(
btV
H(p) + (1− bt)V L(p)
)
,
which is (77). At the same time if θ = H then I (pj > p̄) · sj > 0 for any j, while if θ = L then
I (pj > p̄) · sj 6 0. Therefore
(




L− c+ βV L(p)
)
, and due to (77) V (pt, bt | p)
is thus strictly increasing in bt.
Because V (p | pt, bt) is linear in bt, the higher bt is, the more weight is assigned to V H(p) and
less to V L(p). Therefore at a higher bt a consumer would prefer to induce a posterior with higher
V H(p) and lower V L(p). The next lemma shows it formally.
Lemma 17. Suppose that m′,m′′ ∈ M(pt) and p̄ 6 q(pt,m′) < q(pt,m′′). Then either
V H(q(pt,m
′)) = V H(q(pt,m
′′)) and V L(q(pt,m
′)) = V L(q(pt,m
′′)), or V H(q(pt,m
′)) <
V H(q(pt,m
′′)) and V L(q(pt,m
′)) > V L(q(pt,m
′′)).
Proof. If V H(q(pt,m
′)) < V H(q(pt,m
′′)) and V L(q(pt,m
′)) < V L(q(pt,m
′′)) then V (q(pt,m
′) |
pt, bt) < V (q(pt,m
′′) | pt, bt) and therefore m′ 6∈ M(pt), – a contradiction. Analogously, it can not
be that V H(q(pt,m
′)) > V H(q(pt,m
′′)) and V L(q(pt,m
′)) > V L(q(pt,m
′′)). Finally, if for some p′
and p′′ we have V H(p′)) > V H(p′′)) and V L(p′)) < V L(p′′)) it implies that there exists b̄ ∈ [0, 1]
such that V (p′ | pt, bt) < V (p′′ | pt, bt) for bt ∈ [0, b̄) and V (p′ | pt, bt) > V (p′′ | pt, bt) for bt ∈ (b̄, 1].
Therefore we must have p′′ < p′.
Corollary 3. In any equilibrium for any pt
1. V H(p) is a [weakly] increasing function of p on E(pt),
2. V L(p) is a [weakly] decreasing function of p on E(pt).
Proof. Directly follows from Lemma 17.
Lemma 18. At any public state pt there exists b̄(pt) > 0 such that
1. If r(m|pt, bt) > 0 for some bt < b̄t then q(pt,m) ∈ S(pt);
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2. If r(m|pt, bt) > 0 for some bt > b̄t then q(pt,m) ∈ E(pt);
3. If public state pτ < 1 with S(pτ ) 6= ∅ occurs with strictly positive probabilities AH > 0 if
θ = H and AL ∈ [0, AH ] if θ = L from public state pt then V (pt, p̄) > 0;
4. b̄t 6 p̄ and the equality is attained if and only if any chosen p ∈ E(pt) leads to a continuation
equilibrium where experimentation never stops, i.e. to an equilibrium which is payoff-
equivalent to a babbling equilibria played from period t+ 1 onward.
Proof. If S(pt) = ∅ then we can take b̄t = 0. Therefore we hereafter assume that S(pt) 6= ∅. To
prove the first two claims assume the contrary. That is there exist b′t < b
′′
t , m
′, m′′ such that
q(pt,m
′) ∈ E(pt), q(pt,m′′) ∈ S(pt) and r(m′|pt, b′t) > 0, r(m′′|pt, b′′t ) > 0. Then V (pt, b′′t ) = 0, and
V (pt, b
′
t) > 0 as S(pt) 6= ∅. At the same time due to Lemma 16 we have
0 = V (pt, b
′′
t ) > V (q(pt,m
′) | pt, b′′t ) > V (q(pt,m′) | pt, b′t) > 0,
which leads to a contradiction. This argument proves first two parts of the lemma.
By the first two parts it follows that if S(pτ ) 6= ∅ then b̄τ > 0. Next, note that from point of
view of consumer at pt who holds private belief bt = p̄ at every future history stage payoff is not
less then zero. Indeed, if there is no experimentation, then payoff is equal to 0, while if there is it
is also equal to 0. Therefore





1− FH (s̄τ )
)
(H − c) +AL (1− p̄)
(
























Finally, we prove the last part. If any posterior p ∈ P(pt) induces babbling from (t + 1), then
the current consumer decides whether all future consumers will buy the product or avoid it. Their
expected utility from her point of view is then 11−β (θ(bt)− c) or zero in the two respective scenarios.
Therefore as equilibrium is not babbling the current consumer makes all subsequent consumers buy
the product if and only if bt > p̄.
To show the reverse statement it suffices to show that V (pt, p̄) > 0. Then by continuity it would
imply b̄(pt) < p̄. If at any public state pτ which is a part of a history originating from pt we have
S(pτ ) = ∅, then this equilibrium is payoff-equivalent to a one where babbling equilibrium is played
from period t+ 1 onwards. Therefore suppose there exists a public belief pτ such that S(pτ ) 6= ∅.
Denote the path of public beliefs that lead to this public belief as pτ−1, pτ−2, . . .. Without loss
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also take minimal τ with such property. Consider public state pτ−1 such that E(pτ−1) = pτ .
Then by part 3 there exists p̃τ such that V (p̃τ | pτ−1, p̄) = p̄V H(p̃τ ) + (1 − p̄)V L(p̃τ ) > 0.
Because S(pτ−1) = ∅ as τ was taken to be minimal and by Corollary 3 and Lemma 17 we have
that either p̃τ or any other public belief with the same V
H and V L is induced for all private
beliefs bτ−1 6 p̄ and by belief consistency in some neighborhood above p̄. With respect to Gpτ−1
this region has a strictly positive measure. Therefore probability AL that private belief bτ−1
is within this region if θ = L is positive and is lower than probability AH that private belief
bτ−1 is within this region if θ = H. Therefore at pτ−2 there exists p̃τ−1 ∈ E(pτ−2) such that
V (p̃τ−1 | pτ−2, p̄) = p̄V H(p̃τ−1) + (1 − p̄)V L(p̃τ−1) > βAH p̄V H(pτ−1) + βAL(1 − p̄)V L(pτ−1) > 0.
As τ is finite going backward through the history of public states we get the result for pt which
concludes the argument.
Proof of Proposition 18. For decentralized case the proof directly follows from part 4 of Lemma
18. The proof for commitment case follows from Theorem 4.
Lemma 19. Suppose there exist 0 < l < p̄ < r < 1, ε > 0 and r(ε) > r such that
Ex∼Gp [x | x ∈ [l, r]] = Ex∼Gp [x | x ∈ [l − ε, r(ε)]] = p̄.
Then for any ε there exist γ, γ > 0 such that γε < r(ε)− r < γε.
Proof. Because both fL(x), fH(x) are continuously differentiable there exist δ > 0 and constants
0 < Bl < Bh such that G
′
p(x) ∈ (Bl, Bh) for all x ∈ (δ, 1 − δ). In what follows we consider this
neighborhood. By definition



















Using boundedness of G′p(x) we can therefore obtain
Bl
(
p̄− l + ε
2
)
· ε < Bh
(
r − p̄+ r(ε)− r
2
)
· (r(ε)− r) ,
Bh
(
p̄− l + ε
2
)
· ε > Bl
(
r − p̄+ r(ε)− r
2
)
· (r(ε)− r) .
Solving these inequalities in r(ε)− r we get
2Bl
(






p̄− l + ε
2
)
+B2h (r − p̄)
2 +Bh (r − p̄)
ε < r(ε)− r <
2Bh
(






p̄− l + ε
2
)
+B2l (r − p̄)
2 +Bl (r − p̄)
ε.
Both the LHS and the RHS are continuous in ε and therefore attain their lowest and highest
values respectively on ε ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore we can find such constants γ and γ such that
γε < r(ε)− r < γε.
Lemma 20. There exists δ > 0 such that for any pt and any p ∈ E(pt) we have V C(p | pt, bt) < 0
for all bt ∈ [0, δ].
Proof. Because p > p̄ at time t+1 the next consumer certainly purchases the product and therefore
by Lemma 16 we get
V C(p | pt, bt) = θ(bt)− c+ β
(
btV
C,H(p) + (1− bt)V C,L(p)
)
.
Because V C,H(p) 6 H−c1−β and V
C,L(p) 6 0 we have that V C(p | pt, bt) 6 0 for all bt 6 δ :=
(1−β)(c−L)
H−βc−(1−β)L .
Lemma 21. Consider public state pt and p
′, p′′ ∈ E(pt). Consider all public beliefs p′τ and p′′τ that
can be on paths originating from p′ and p′′ respectively and their associated messaging partitions
Σ(p′τ ) and Σ(p
′′
τ ). Then if Σ(p
′′
τ ) is a consistent parallel shift of Σ(p
′





same increment then V θ(p′) = V θ(p′′) for θ ∈ {H,L}.
Proof. Note that probability that private belief bt is lower than some threshold conditional on some










. If one shifts all the bounds for all sets in a
given partition by the same increment, then expectations over all sets in the new partition shift by
the same increment. Moreover, if the new partition is consistent with the previous one it implies
therefore that conditional on θ under Σ(p′′τ ) in any public belief p
′′
τ the experimentation stops with
the same probability as it does under Σ(p′τ ) in p
′
τ . Therefore V
θ(p′) = V θ(p′′).
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Proof of Theorem 4. We initially assume that at time t all consumers in the queue (current and
future) can commit to a particular message structure. As the very initial step note that for every
pt an optimal V
C(pt) is achieved by choosing optimal Σ(pτ ) for every pτ that can originate from
pt. Next, this partitions without loss can be assumed to be Markovian. That is Σ(pτ ) for all
pτ originating from pt should not depend on t explicitly. Indeed, suppose there exists p and
τ > t such that pt = pτ = p, but optimal partitions originating from pt and pτ do not coincide.
Then if V C(pt) = V
C(pτ ) without loss we can prescribe any of these partitions to p. If however,
say, V C(pt) < V
C(pτ ) then we can prescribe partition corresponding to pτ to pt which then would
strictly increase V C(pt). Because partition for pt was assumed to be optimal we get a contradiction.
The case V C(pt) > V
C(pτ ) is analogous. Finally, in what follows we understand by Σ̂(pt) a
collection of optimal partitions for all pτ with τ > t that deliver V
C(pt) (if it exists).
We next divide the proof into several steps outlined in the text.
Step 1. Note that ex ante value when public belief is p is equal to the value a consumer with
private belief p gets when she induces public belief p. Formally, V C(p) = V C(p | x, p) for any
time-t public belief x. Indeed, public beliefs about the state coincide in these two cases and in the
second case consumer’s own belief is also equal to p and therefore she has the same expectations
about future histories as a consumer who face public belief p.
Step 2. Take some pt. There exists a set of public beliefs pτ (including pt) which can be reached
on path originating from pt. For each of them including pt there exists an optimal partition Σ(pτ ).
Note that for any bt > p̄ at any pτ it is strictly optimal to induce experimentation. Indeed, suppose
it is not, and at such bt experimentation stops. Then we can exclude this belief from the set of
private beliefs that induce no experimentation and induce babbling continuation in bt forever after.
In that case posterior for the pooled region where the experimentation stops will stay below p̄,
while for bt we now get strictly positive continuation value.
We next show that for any pt in an optimal partition Σ(pt) there exists δ > 0 such that
a consumer with private belief bt ∈ [0, δ] sends a message that stops experimentation. Lemma
20 implies that if the consumer with private belief bt 6 δ :=
(1−β)(c−L)
H−βc−(1−β)L induces public belief
p ∈ E(pt) then V C(p | pt, bt) < 0. Suppose that in Σ(pt) there exists some set of points within
[0, δ] that is pooled with private beliefs above p̄ and the resulting posterior is above p̄. Denote this
posterior as ppool. Then we can construct an alternative Σ̂(pt) that will deliver at least the same
ex ante value and where for all bt ∈ [0, δ] the experimentation stops.
First, cut from the pooling region private beliefs below δ that induce experimentation and
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substitute continuation with no experimentation afterwards. If this set was of measure zero then
we are done.108 If it was of positive measure then we can cut the right end of this interval such
that the resulting posterior stays on the level of ppool. Now for all points below δ by Lemma 20 this
adjustment provides an improvement. For all points that were not cut the value stays the same as
induced posterior stayed the same. For the points that were cut from the right end we now need
to prescribe continuation partitions that also provide an improvement. We do that by inducing
truthful information transmission at all such points at pt. In all resulting public states pt+1 = bt











We then without loss we can pool together all messages that induce no further experimentation
into one message. We now know that resulting posterior of this region will be uniformly separated
from p̄ for any pt.
Step 3. We show that V C(bt | pt, bt) is a continuous, strictly increasing and [weakly] convex
function of bt for any pt. Consider some bt and denote as Σ(bt) the corresponding optimal partitions.
Then for any point b̃t in the right neighborhood of bt consider partitions Σ̂(b̃t) that consist of shifted
partitions Σ̂(bt).
109 Because the posterior for the no experimentation region is uniformly separated
from p̄, in some neighborhood of bt we can always do that in such a way that all the posteriors on
path of play that were above p̄ stay above it, and the ones that were below p̄ stay below it. Then





Now suppose V C(bt | pt, bt) is discontinuous at some bt > p̄. Then there exists ε > 0 such that
for any δ > 0 we can find b′t and b
′′
t with |b′′t − b′t| < δ such that
V C(b′′t | pt, b′′t )− V C(b′t | pt, b′t) > ε.











. There also exist such δ that this shift will be consistent, which by Lemma 21 implies
that V θ(b′′t ) = V
θ(b′t). Because V
H(p)−V L(p) 6 H−L for any p we than have that taking δ < ε
H−L
we get




· (V H(p)− V L(p)) = ε,
which gives us a contradiction.
Similarly, using parallel shifts and the fact that in some right neighborhood of any private belief
108Measure here is understood in terms of conditional measure on this pooling region.












bt they will be consistent, one can show strict monotonicity and convexity of V (bt | pt, bt).
Step 4. Because V C(pt) is weakly convex so is V
C(bt | pt, bt) as a function of bt. Therefore,
first, one does not pool any private beliefs bt above p̄, and, second, if one pools beliefs below and
above p̄ induced posterior should be p̄. Indeed, if one pools some private beliefs bt below and above
p̄ and the resulting posterior is strictly above p̄, then one can cut the right end of this region to
lower induced public belief to p̄. This weakly increases V C(pt) by Jensen’s inequality. Finally, the
pooling region has to be convex below p̄. For any p > p̄, in particular p̄ itself, we have





Therefore gains from pooling private beliefs below p̄ decrease in distance from p̄. At the same time
due to convexity of V C(bt | pt, bt) in bt losses are increasing in distance from p̄. Now suppose that
the set of pooled private beliefs is not convex below p̄. Then, first, we can cut private beliefs in
the left end of the pooling region and attach the same measure of private beliefs directly to the
left of the maximum pooling region around p̄. This will weakly increase the posterior belief for the
pooling region, which we can further decrease by cutting points from the right end of it. This will
again improve V C(bt | pt, bt) point-wise.
Therefore without loss we can assume that there exist 0 6 lC(pt) 6 p̄ and set I
C(pt) with all
it’s points above p̄ such that
1. for all bt 6 l(pt) consumer sends message m ∈ S(pt), i.e., experimentation stops.
2. for any bt 6∈ IC(pt) consumer truthfully transmits his private belief bt (or what is the same
his private payoff) to the public, that is pt+1 = bt.
3. for all bt ∈ (l(pt), pt)
⋃
IC(pt) consumer sends message m such that q(pt,m) = p̄.
Step 5. We now show that it is always optimal to pool at least some private beliefs bt around
the cutoff for any pt if V
C(p̄ | pt, p̄) > 0. In other words it has to be that l(pt) < p̄ < r(pt).
From the previous step we know that V C(p̄ | pt, p̄) > 0, therefore pooling ε ∈ (0, δ) below p̄ with
some above p̄ gives a benefit of V C(p̄ | pt, p̄) · ε + O(ε2). At the same time because V C(b|pt, b)
is continuous in b, its slope is less than H − L, and by Lemma 19 losses associated with pooling
beliefs above p̄ do not exceed Bε2 for some B > 0. Therefore there always exists such ε > 0 that
V C(p̄ | pt, p̄) · ε + O(ε2) > Bε2, and therefore pooling at least some beliefs around p̄ is always
optimal. If V C(p̄ | pt, p̄) = 0 then it can only be the case if V C(bt | pt, bt) = θ(bt) − c for bt > p̄.
162
Therefore for any pt it is not optimal to pool any private beliefs around p̄, and therefore in any pt
we have that no experimentation is induced for all bt ∈ [0, p̄]. Then if Aθ = Pr(bt+1 > p̄ | θ) we
have
V C(p̄ | pt, p̄) > p̄AH · (H − c) + (1− p̄)AL · (L− c) > 0,
because AH > AL. This contradicts V C(p̄ | pt, p̄) = 0. Therefore V C(p̄ | pt, p̄) > 0 and it is always
optimal to pool at least some private beliefs around p̄.
Proof of Theorem 5. The first part of the Theorem follows from the fact that any decentralized
solution induces partitions of private beliefs bt for every pt. The maximal value which can be
achieved for any partitions in public state pt is delivered by V
C(pt), and therefore V
D(pt) 6 V
C(pt).
The second part follows from part 4 of Lemma 18. It implies that b̄t < p̄. Therefore we can
take lD(pt) = b̄t. By belief consistency and Lemma 17 there should exist r
D(pt) > p̄ and message
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